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CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLEM 
The application of some or other form of interroga-
tion to the problems of education goes back at least as 
far as Socratic dialectic as seen in the Platonic dia-
logues. The use of questions as a part of the educative 
process seems to have taken place more or less continu-
ously from at least that far back down to the present 
time. Perhaps the most common use of questioning in 
education has been evaluative. But, as in the case of 
Socratic dialectic, some kind of questioning has fre-
quently been seen as an integral part of the learning 
process rather than as merely an evaluative tool. It is 
probable that one of the basic assumptions that has 
served to justify this use of questioning is the belief 
that questioning tends to promote both faster and more 
permanent learning by stimulating greater and more vig-
orous participation of the learner in the process. This 
belief constitutes the basic premise of the present work. 
The problem addressed in this work is the formula-
tion of an educational approach to a document in the 
philosophy of science that will be largely auto-didactic 
in its application. The fact that some of immediacy of 
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an in-person, face to face dialogue are sacrificed by the 
use of a written format is counterbalanced by at least 
one advantage that the spoken format fails to provide. 
This advantage is the availability that the written for-
mat can supply. Thus, this effort represents an attempt 
to combine some of interactive stimulation of dialogue 
with the availability of the written format. 
The task attempted here, then, is to start with a 
document, i. e., a professional paper, in the philosophy 
of science and derive from it a set of questions which 
will serve as an autodidactic tool that will facilitate 
the learning of that document. The primary problem lies 
in the analysis of the document that is required to 
convert all of its significant concepts into questions in 
such a manner that the complete set will reflect the 
conceptual patterns of the document. 
The level of profundity that this effort will at-
tempt to attain is the middle level. That is, there will 
be no attempt to construct the questions in such a way 
that they will teach the fundamental concepts that a 
student must have become acquainted with before having 
begun the study of the document. Neither will an attempt 
be made to teach the student the higher skills that will 
enable him to synthesize new concepts by rearranging the 
juxtapositions of the elements of the concepts that can 
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be learned from the study of this document, to evaluate 
these concepts through the use of external criteria, nor 
to relate these concepts to external conceptual contexts. 
The task attempted here is rather to develop a set of 
questions that will enable the student to understand the 
concepts as they are expounded within the document it-
self. 
The problem of ordering and categorizing the ques-
t ions logically is addressed to some extent here, but 
not that of ordering with reference to didactic consid-
erations. It is, of course, possible that the logical 
order will turn out to be the optimal didactic order. 
While the close association that has developed in peo-
ple's minds over the years linking the concepts of 
logic, thinking and learning tends to lead to the 
conclusion that this sometimes assumed coincidence is a 
fact, the truth is that this cannot be safely taken for 
granted. Moreover, the undertaking of the empirical 
investigations that might serve to establish or refute 
this principle is beyond the scope of this work. 
One relatively peripheral assumption that has to 
some extent guided the form that the results of the 
present inquiry have taken is the principle that empha-
sizes the importance of establishing and strengthening 
associations, making connections, between the elements of 
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the concepts being studied. A palpable result of the 
application of this principle to the formulation of the 
question-answer set that constitutes the concrete product 
of this work lies in the fact that the suggested answers 
that have been suggested for these questions invariably 
include the whole sense of the questions within them-
selves. It is the above named principle that justifies 
this apparent redundancy. 
In sum, what is attempted here can be conceptually 
divided into two main categories of tasks: (1) to ana-
lyze the conceptual structure of a document in the phi-
losophy of science, and (2) to categorize the results of 
this analysis in a such a way that the results can be 
used to guide the formulation of a group of questions 
that somehow manages to express or reflect that struc-
ture. The next chapter will consist of a discussion of 
some of the details of the nuts and bolts methodology 
that structures the tasks whose aims have just been 
stated. 
CHAPTER II 
THE METHOD 
What will be attempted here are three tasks: (1) to 
give a brief account of the document to be analyzed, (2) 
to describe briefly the process that led from an analysis 
of the document to the final result, and (3) to explain 
the method of relating the final result to the process 
that produced it. The first of these tasks will now be 
performed. 
The document to be used as the sample test to be 
"taught" by the method proposed here is Chapter 5, "Con-
cepts of Model", of Mario Bunge's work, Method, Model and 
Matter. 
It is a work in the philosophy of science dealing 
with the use of models in science. The role of models in 
science has, over the years, motivated an ongoing contro-
versy in the philosophy of science. The question that 
asks, "To what extent should models be considered as 
part of scientific theories or to what extent should they 
even be accorded an integral role in an account of the 
web of interrelated processes that constitute the body of 
scientific endeavor?", forms one aspect of this contro-
versy. The problem of defining the limits of the concept 
5 
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of "model" forms another. The document under considera-
tion here addresses itself primarily to the second of 
these two problems, dealing with it as indicated in the 
following sketch. 
The work concerns itself primarily with four basic 
concepts: referent, model object, theoretical model, and 
general theory. (These concepts will be hereafter be 
referred to as content-concepts.) Referents are real 
objects, processes or situations that are to be repre-
sented as the first step in the process of accounting for 
them. Model objects are qualitive representations of 
referents. They consist of lists of their significant 
elements or properties, possibly in conjunction with some 
information about their spatial disposition, but they 
lack any important quantitative data about the ways that 
these elements or properties interrelate. Theoretical 
models are the result of supplying model objects with the 
quantitative data that they lack. Theoretical models 
consist of series of logically interrelated statements 
that quantitatively relate the elements and properties of 
the model object to each other. They are also called 
specific theories. General theories are mathematical 
statements that may have a wide range of specific appli-
cations that can be implemented only indirectly by being 
combined with model objects to form theoretical models. 
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That they can be tested only in this way points up the 
importance of theoretical models and, hence, of model 
objects. 
The primary polemical thrust of this text relates to 
the proposition that model objects (and, by extension, 
theoretical models) can be classified as black box, grey 
box, translucid or transparent boxes according to whether 
they supply none, some, or much information about the 
inner workings of their referents. Black boxes give only 
the input and output of the system, while successively 
lighter colored boxes connect the input and output by 
providing successively greater amounts of information 
about the mechanism of the system. The text, then, 
opposes the rather behavioristic viewpoint that maintains 
that the black box is enough. This viewpoint contradicts 
the main philosophical position of the text by implying 
that, since no mechanism has to be explained, none ex-
ists. The text, then, reflects the view that a mechanism 
must be assumed, and, in cases where scientific knowledge 
is sought, an attempt must be made to explain it. This 
ends the implementation of the first of the three speci-
fied tasks: to examine briefly the document to be used 
in this work as a sample object to be learned. Now the 
second task, the description of the derivation of the 
results from the document will be attempted. 
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The approach to the studying of such a document 
herein proposed assumes that a set of questions and 
answers can reflect the results both of a logical analy-
sis of a text and of the method that is employed to 
transform that analysis into the set of questions and 
answers. The philosophical implications of this assump-
tion will not be questioned in the present work, since 
its use here will be primarily practical. Neither will 
the present task include the actual doing of the analy-
sis. Rather what will be attempted is merely to provide 
a description of the general processes that figured in 
the task of the analysis that resulted in the production 
of the set of questions and answers. The first of these 
processes is the separation of the task of analysis into 
two principal divisions: (1) the discovery of ways of 
categorizing the textual material itself and (2) the 
invention or discovery of ways of categorizing the kinds 
of tasks that the resultant questions will represent. 
The first of these divisions, the problem of 
categorizing the textual material, is also divided into 
two subproblems: (1) the problem of classifying the 
specific ideas that are to be found in the text and (2) 
the problem of finding more general categories to 
implement the classification of the kinds of ways that 
the author has chosen to deal with those ideas that are 
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specific to the text. 
The ideas or constructs that are specific and to a 
considerable degree peculiar to the text are those (as 
explained above) of referent, model object, theoretical 
model and general theory (content-concepts). An examina-
tion of the text shows that every statement or idea 
therein can ultimately be traced back to one or more of 
these content-concepts. 
Accordingly, the analysis proceeded by means of an 
minute examination of the text. The purpose of this 
examination is to sift out and list all of the state-
ments, claims and comments in the text and then to 
divide them into subsets according to which of the four 
concepts predominates in each. These statements, claims 
and comments, then, within the framework of the task 
being attempted here, constitute the logical elements of 
the text, elements which had at this point had been 
categorized and labelled according to one criterion: 
their primary conceptual focus. The results of this 
first categorization are the content-concepts. 
After isolating and labeling the logical elements of 
the text according to one criterion, it became necessary 
to repeat the task using another criterion in order to 
implement the second part of the first task: the cate-
gorization of the means that the author chooses to deal 
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with the content-concepts that he has set forth. This 
does not mean that the already obtained categories were 
subdivided, but that the complete list of logical ele-
ments was repartitioned without regard for their first 
division. This procedure was necessary because the text-
ual examination revealed that the author did not deal 
with each given content concept in its own way, inventing 
or applying means that are especially appropriate to 
each. Had this been the case, each mean-category could 
reasonably have been designated one of a number of sub-
categories of each content-concept. What he did do, 
rather, was to select from a field of means-categories 
the ones to be applied to each content-concept in way 
that turned out to be unpredictable solely on the basis 
of the identity of the latter. Thus, a set of means-
categories was applied to the raw list of content--
concepts leaving each element twice categorized--a member 
of two separate categories. Yet neither of these cate-
gories bore any simply expressed relation to the other. 
The foregoing consequently comprised the two stages of 
the first of the processes that were performed for the 
purpose of deriving a set of questions and answers that 
would reflect the logical structure of the text. 
The next procedure that was performed for this pur-
pose dealt not directly with the text per se, but with 
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the text only indirectly by means of processes that would 
contribute to the formulation of the questions that would 
be derived from it. The first of these processes was the 
selection of a series of modes in which to formulate the 
proposed questions, to answer questions about whether the 
questions would require the user directly to supply an 
answer, to choose between a number of given answers or to 
come up with an answer by means of deduction. This proce-
dure did not, like the previous ones, result in a new set 
of categories to apply to the logical elements (content-
concepts and means-categories) of the text, but in a set 
of categories to apply to the proposed questions. At 
this point neither the elements of the text nor the 
author's ways of dealing with them were being categor-
ized. What was being categorized was the ways that these 
things were to be treated in the present work, not in the 
document to be analyzed. 
The next step in this process was that of developing 
a set of categories that would render it possible to 
classify the kinds of tasks that the resultant questions 
would require performed within the process of obtaining 
appropriate answers for them. The issues to be decided 
involved decisions regarding another aspect of the nature 
of the questions to be generated. It had to be deter-
mined whether any given question would require a descrip-
12 
tion, a classification, a comparison, etc •• 
When the list of task types had been formulated, 
what then remained to be accomplished was the integration 
of all of the previous work: the derivation of a set of 
questions and answers based upon the logical elements 
(the content-concepts and the means-categories) of the 
text and the ways that these were dealt with therein, and 
expressed in terms of the modes and task types that would 
indicate the kinds of requirements that these questions 
would embody. What has been been described so far, then, 
finishes the implementation of the second of the three 
tasks: to describe the process that led from the textual 
analysis to the finished product. What remains to do is 
the third task: to explain how to identify the results 
of textual and task analysis for any given element (ques-
tion and answer set) of the final result. This will be 
attempted now. 
Since the purpose of this task is to enable the 
reader to identify the main textual and categorical ele-
ments that contributed to the formulation of any speci-
fied question and answer set comprising the final results 
of the present work, the point of departure will be the 
identity 1 ine that accompanies each such set. In order 
to implement this task, such a line will be shown here 
and then analyzed. First, the general meaning of each of 
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the kinds of indicators that appear in the line will be 
described. And then each of the possible replacements 
for each indicator will be described in turn. A line 
from chapter III, page eighty-seven follows: 
"Q and A 233: page 91; line 10; type IV, i, E, d.". The 
first part of this line, 'Q and A 233:', assumes that the 
351 questions and answers that comprise the results of 
this work are presented in series and numbered serially 
from 1 through 351, and indicates that the question and 
answer set being identified holds the 233rd position in 
that series. Chapter III (pp. 31-72) contains the ques-
tion and answer sets numbered 1 through 149. Chapter IV 
(pp. 73-99) contains the question and answer sets num-
bered 150 through 278. And Chapter V (pp. 100-127) 
contains the question and answer sets numbered 279 
through 351. 
The next member of the identity line to appear, 
'page 91 ,', indicates that the textual material used in 
the formulation of this question and answer set can be 
found on page 91 of Bunge' s work. The chapter from that 
work that constitutes the basis of the present work can 
be found in the appendix. It should be noted that the 
indicator, 'page 91 ;', refers to page 91 of Bunge's work, 
not of either the main body nor the appendix of the 
present work. 
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After the page number indicator, 'page 91;', next 
appears the line indicator, 'line 10;', whose function 
it, obviously enough, is to indicate the line on page 91 
in Bunge's work in which can be found the textual mat-
erial from which this particular question and answer set 
was derived. This is all pretty straightforward except 
for one minor point. The line named by the line indica-
tor is not necessarily the only line upon which this 
material appears. It can be better described as approxi-
mately the first line upon which the immediately related 
material appears since this material may occupy several 
lines or even paragraphs, and since the place where such 
material begins is not always clear. The difficult ques-
tion here is 'At what point is the material closely 
enough related to the conceptual focus of the question 
and answer set to merit inclusion in the reference? 
However, it need not be inferred from the above that the 
situation is always or even usually that bad. Most of 
the time the extent of the relevant reference is clear, 
and even when its clarity is not optimal, it does not dip 
below an acceptable level. 
CHAPTER III 
TASK TYPES 
Next after the line indicator, and comprising the 
balance of the line, is seen the type indicator "type IV, 
i, E, d.," whose four parameters will be explained below. 
The first of these, designated by Roman numeral IV in the 
sample, is designated by Roman numerals I through VIII in 
the complete question and answer set. The function of 
these Roman numerals is to indicate the nature of the 
task that each question requires of the student who is to 
answer it. The questions are grouped together under each 
task designation in such a way that task I comprises 
questions and answers 1-8; task II comprises questions 
and answers 9-149; task III comprises questions and an-
swers 150-155; task IV comprises questions and answers 
156-254; task V comprises questions and answers 255-258; 
task VI comprises questions and answers 259-278; task 
VII comprises questions and answers 279-347 and task VIII 
comprises questions and answers 348-351. 
In the process of describing these tasks, the ex-
pression, "semi-schematic form" will be used. The ex-
pression is meant to denote the result of an attempt to 
simplify and formalize questions and answers to some 
1 5 
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degree in order to provide a glimpse of their logical 
structure. No pretense is made that these results will 
have been formalized sufficiently to make it possible to 
translate them into rigorous symbolic form. They are 
meant only as aids in understanding the various tasks and 
in revealing the similarities and differences among them. 
Task I is centered on the concept of definition. 
Questions of this set take the semi-schematic form "What 
is an X?" or the equivalent. An X in this case is some 
central concept such as referent or model object. The 
skeletal form then fills out to "What is a referent?" or 
"What is a model object?" The answer can be expected to 
assume a semi-schematic form equivalent to "An X is a Y 
that possesses the set of attributes Z. The term "Y" 
represents a wider class of objects or concepts than does 
"X," and "Z" represents a set of attributes that distin-
guishes an X from other elements of Y. By making appro-
priate substitutions, something on the order of "A theor-
etical model is a hypothetico-deductive system concerning 
a model object." is obtained. "Concerning a model ob-
ject" does not follow the prototypical adjectival formula 
for attribution. Nevertheless, to say that a hypotheti-
co-deduct i ve system concerns a model object does, in a 
wider but still legitimate sense, express attribution. 
Thus, task I requests a definition which, in these ques-
1 7 
tions, implies placement in a wider class plus sufficient 
attribution to enable the defined concept to be differ-
entiated from the other elements of the wider class. 
This ends the explanation of task I; an explanation of 
task II follows. 
The primary thrust of task II is specification. 
Questions of this group require the supplying of some 
specific bit of information, the naming perhaps of an 
object, relation, principle, concept, etc. The semi-
schematic form of the typical question of this group is 
"What object or concept that is an element of set Y 
fulfills the set of conditions, Z?" To put it in a 
slightly different form, questions of type II may be seen 
as requests to "Supply or name the object or concept, 
that is a (member of wider class) Y, and that (set of 
attributes or conditions) Z can be predicated of it." A 
set of attributes or conditions plus a genus is supplied, 
while a species or element of a species is asked for. 
For example, "What is the object, mechanism or process 
that a model object represents?" In this case, "object, 
mechanism or process" as a general class is Y. The 
particular object, mechanism or process asked for is X. 
And the attribute or predicate of being represented by a 
model object is Z. An appropriate answer to a question 
of this kind, in effect, simply supplies the species or 
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member of the species that had been asked for by the 
question. Such answer would typically take the semi-
schematic form, "An object or concept that is a member of 
class Y of which Z is predicated is X (or, an X)." A 
fleshed out example comes out, "The object, mechanism, or 
process that a model object represents is its referent." 
where "its referent" is X. This finishes the explana-
tion of task II; that of task III follows. 
Task III focuses on description or attribution. 
Questions of this type generally require one or the other 
of these two kinds of responses: (1) the attribution of 
a set of properties or characteristics that adequately 
describe an object or concept within a given context, or 
( 2) the "unpacking," elaboration, or making explicit of 
a set of attributes that reside implicitly within some 
briefer, more cryptic description of a given concept. 
Semi-schematic forms that can represent these kinds of 
questions are (1) What set of attributes, Z, adequately 
describe an X of which set of attributes Y is predicated? 
or, (2) What (wider or more detailed) set of attributes Z 
are implied by a (narrower or more compact) set of attri-
butes, Z, which is predicated of object or concept, X? It 
can be seen that, in spite of certain superficial dif-
ferences, there exists a kind of rough equivalence be-
tween these two forms of the kinds of questions that 
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implement task III. The actual phrasing of these ques-
tions does not of ten reveal their semi-schematic form in 
any obvious way. For example, either of them is capable 
of generating the question, "What is a more or less 
schematic model object?" Here, "model object" represents 
the object or concept, X, while "more or less schematic" 
represents the set of attributes, Y, which is predicated 
of X. z, then, represents the set of attributes which 
the question is supposed to evoke in order to "unpack" Y. 
The answer to this kind of question turns out to be 
appropriately complementary to the question. It merely 
supplies the set of attributes of the given object or 
concept that, implicit in the given predicate, nonethe-
less serve to flesh it out. The semi-schematic form 
comes out "Set of attributes, Y, which is predicated of X 
implies (more detailed) set of attributes, z." This, in 
response to the example question, filled out to "A more 
or less schematic model object is a model object that in 
some way represents its referent but does it rather 
crudely--leaving out many significant aspects of the 
referent." 
Classification or categorization is the focal point 
of task IV. The object here is to place some object, 
process, or concept in some wider category, e.g., some 
particular in its species or some species in its genus. 
20 
The differentiation of the object, process, or concept 
from from other similar entities belonging to the same 
wider category is incidental at best. If it is at all 
called for, it is unessential to the performance of task. 
If this were not so, this task would be identical to task 
I, i.e., def ini ti on. Although it is superficially simi-
lar to task I--"What is a ••• ?" being the apparent form--
it differs from that task in that the request for differ-
entia occurs, if at all, only incidentally. In semi-
schernatic form, the questions that implement this task 
comes out thus: "What is the smallest relevant class Y 
to which an X belongs?" where an X is the object or 
concept for which classification is asked for. Substi-
tuting actual concepts for X and Y, produces, "What is 
the smallest relevant class to which a mass cell be-
longs?" In actual practice, this comes out, "What is a 
mass cell?" The answer to a question that implements 
task IV, turns out considerably more straightforward than 
the question. 'rhe semi-schematic form shows up as, "An X 
is a Y," or "An X belongs to class Y." The meanings of X 
and Y, of course, remain the same as for the questions. 
The substitution of these meanings gives "A mass cell is 
an example of a model object." Here "A mass cell" is 
substituted for X, while "An example of a model object" 
is substituted for Y. The transparency of the equiva-
21 
lence of the alternate form "A mass cell belongs to the 
class of examples of a model object," is not detracted 
from by its awkwardness. This ends the explanation of 
task IV, and now begins that of task V. 
Task V involves the general concept of comparison; 
this includes that of contrast. Questions of this type 
may ask for any of three kinds of response. They may ask 
for a set of attributes that two concepts or objects 
possess in common, for a set of attributes that distin-
guish two concepts or objects, or for a set of attributes 
that justify some value judgement that distinguishes 
between two concepts or objects. What these three kinds 
of request share are (1) that they each involve the 
furnishing of set of attributes and (2) that in each 
case, the required set of attributes serves to distin-
guish between two concepts or objects. 
Type V questions, it has been seen, can be divided 
into three groups. Each of these can be represented by 
its own semi-schematic form. The first of these, dealing 
with similarities is "What set of attributes Z do con-
cepts or objects X and Y possess in common?" The second, 
involving differences is, "What sets of attributes V and 
W serve to distinguish between concepts or objects X and 
Y?" And the third one, also having to do with differ-
ences is "What set of attributes Z justifies value judge-
22 
ment V by distinguishing between concepts or objects X 
d Y?" an · When the proper substitutions are made, the 
first example produces, "What set of attributes do seman-
tic models and metascientif ic models possess in common?," 
or more idiomatically, "In what ways are semantic models 
and metascientif ic models similar?" The second example 
gives, "What set or sets of attributes distinguish be-
tween theoretical models and semantical models?," in a 
more idiomatic form, "What is the difference between 
theoretical models and semantical models?" And the third 
example come out, "What set or sets of attributes justify 
the preference for the theoretical model over the model 
object?," idiomatically, "In what way is a theoretical 
model far richer than the bare model object?" 
The answer to each of these kinds of questions 
involves the supplying of the correct set of attributes, 
in the first case, similarities, in the second, differ-
ences, and in the third, differences that justify a 
preferential value judgement. In the first case, the 
substitutions give the semi-schematic form, "The set of 
attributes Z which concepts X and Y have in common is set 
A consisting of elements (attributes) a, b, c, d and e. 11 
Semi-idiomatically, this comes out, "The set of attri-
butes that semantic models and metascientif ic models have 
in common consists of the possession of (a) a set of 
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abstract statements, (b) a set of designation rules, (c) 
a set of semantic assumptions, (d) a set of properties 
linking those designation rules and semantic assumptions 
in such a way as to provide the abstract statements with 
factual content, and (e) a set of properties that make it 
possible for that factual content to be assigned truth 
values." In completely idiomatic form (for this sort of 
thing) this comes out, "Semantic models and metascien-
tific models are similar to the extent that they both 
contain designation rules and semantic assumptions that 
provide the abstract statements with factual content that 
can be assigned truth values." 
The second example, in a similar manner, gives semi-
schernatically, "The sets of attributes V and W that 
distinguish concept Y from concept X are the sets of 
attributes A and B." Semi-idiomatically this yields "The 
sets of attributes that distinguishes between theoretical 
models and semantical models consists of the following: 
for theoretical models, the attribute of consisting of 
statements concerning some aspect of reality and for 
semantical models, the attribute of serving to interpret 
abstract theories." In a more idiomatic form, this is 
obtained, "The difference between theoretical models and 
semantical models is that while theoretical models are 
sets of statements concerning some aspect of reality, 
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semantical models are interpretations of abstract 
' II theories. 
The third kind of answer returns the semi-schematic 
example, "The set of attributes Z that distinguishes 
between concepts X and Y thereby justifying preferential 
value judgement V is set A." Semi-idiomatically, as a 
result of appropriate substitutions, it becomes, "The set 
of attributes that distinguishes between the theoretical 
model and the model object, thereby justifying a prefer-
ential value judgement in favor of the theoretical model, 
is the theoretical model's capacity to link together the 
list of traits that constitutes the model object." In 
final form, this shows up as, "A theoretical model is far 
richer than the bare model object in that it links to-
gether mathematically the mere list of traits that con-
stitutes the bare model object." These examples show 
that while the questions and answers that serve to imple-
ment task V display some differences of form, their basic 
unity is manifested by their common involvement with the 
closely related concepts of comparison and contrast. It 
is time now to turn from the consideration of task V to 
that of task VI. 
The questions that serve to implement task VI ask 
for an interpretation or the meaning of an expression 
which may be a word, a phrase, or a sentence. In semi-
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symbolic form, such a question can be expressed, "What 
aoes (expression) X mean?" or equivalently, "What is 
meant by (expression) X?," or "What does it mean to say 
(expression) X?." In spite of the fact that several 
variants are possible, in general, the foregoing are also 
the virtual idiomatic forms of these questions. A few 
actual examples are, "What does 'The same holds, 
a fortiori for the diagram' mean?," or "What does it mean 
to say that a referent is not abstract?" 
The answers to these questions typically perform the 
function of supplying the interpretation or meaning that 
the questions ask for. Their semi-symbolic forms, pre-
dictably, are usually, "(Expression) X means (interpreta-
tion or meaning) Y," "By (expression) X, (interpretation 
or meaning) Y is meant," or "To say (expression) X means 
(interpretation or meaning) Y." The foregoing are also 
usually the idiomatic forms, although the latter some-
times comes out, "To say (expression) X is to say (ex-
pression or statements giving the interpretation or mean-
ing for X) Y." The actual examples that correspond to 
the above questions are, "The same holds, a fortiori, for 
the diagram" means that the diagram, in some respects, a 
prototypical case of metaphor, can be expected to display 
its properties par excellence. In this case, the proper-
ty in question is that of being misleading when used as 
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the characterization of a model object," and "To say 
that a referent is not abstract, is to say that it is a 
factual referent. This means that it (purportedly) re-
presents some concrete (real) thing or event. It has 
empirical content." Thus terminates the explanation of 
task VI and now begins that of task VII. 
Task VII deals with the concept of explanation. As 
in the case of task II, task VII is something of a catch-
all. There are so many kinds of explanation that an 
attempt to account for them all would not prove useful in 
the present context. Suffice it to say that, while an 
explanation can subsume any of the foregoing tasks, it 
must in some way go a bit farther than they do. An 
explanation is somewhat more comprehensive than a defini-
tion, an identification, a specification, a description, 
etc. An explanation frequently gives reasons, frequently 
accounts for some state of affairs. An explanation is 
often called for by means of a why-question or a how-
question. Questions meant to evoke explanations can be 
expressed semi-symbolically thus, "What (set of reasons) 
Y accounts for (state-of-affairs) X?," or "What (set of 
statements) Y indicates the manner or mode in which 
(process) Y occurs?" In a slightly more idiomatic form, 
"Why is X so?" or "How does X occur?" Here are the true 
to life examples, "Why might the logical strength of a 
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theory be expected to turn out to be inversely related to 
its ability to solve particular theoretical problems and 
to empirical testability of that theory." and "How can it 
be known that a linear model of a gas is a theoretical 
model?" 
The answers to questions of this kind, it follows, 
simply provide the reasons or statements requested. The 
semi-symbolic for the answers that correspond to the 
above questions are, "The set of reasons that accounts 
for (the state-of-affairs) X is Y," or "The set of state-
ments that indicate the manner or mode in which (process) 
X occurs is Y." The corresponding examples from list of 
questions and answers are, "The logical strength of a 
theory might be expected to turn out to be inversely 
related to its ability to solve particular theoretical 
problems and to the empirical testability of that theory 
because logical strength is gained only at the expense of 
empirical content, whereas particular theoretical prob-
lern s are essentially about empirical content." and "It 
can be known that a linear model of a gas is a theor-
etical model because it has been stated that a linear 
model of a gas can mimic the condensation process. In 
order to mimic the condensation process, the model must 
specify the mathematical dimensions of the changes or 
movement that takes place. And if a model can specify 
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the mathematical dimensions of the changes or movement 
that takes place, it must be a theoretical model." At 
this point, the discussion of task VII ends and that of 
task VIII starts. 
The questions that implement task VIII ask for some 
kind of evaluation, that is, they ask for some kind of 
judgement or assignment of value. Although this assign-
ment of value is the primary component of an appropriate 
response to this question, it frequently happens that 
some kind of explanation of that judgement seems in 
order. It is the fact that this asked for explanation is 
secondary to the evaluation that makes it impossible to 
classify these questions as belonging to task VII and 
make necessary to categorize them, rather, as belonging 
to class VIII. Generally, the idiomatic expression of a 
questions of this type tends to disguise rather than to 
reveal the question's inner structure. Hence, the idio-
matic expression does not prove readily deducible from 
its semi-symbolic form. Nor, of course, is the converse 
the case. The following example from the questions and 
answers provides a case in point. Where V is some value, 
C is a set of (possibly problematic) conditions, and X is 
given concept (expressed as a set of statements), the 
semi-symbolic form is this, "What value of V can be 
appropriately applied to X under C?" Comparison with the 
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idiomatic version shows that the derivation is not imme-
diately obvious. "In section 1 O, it is stated that (1) 
semantical models are interpretations of formal systems 
that make all statements of the system true, (2) theoret-
ical models (since their content is empirical) are never 
more than partially true so they cannot be semantical 
models, ( 3) the three empirical model objects described 
on page 112 are not always true, nonetheless (4) they 
constitute (or produce) semantical models. How is this 
possible?" In this example, (1 ), (2), and (4) constitute 
concept X, (3) constitutes condition c, but V is not 
asked for in a straightforward manner. The formulation 
of the nuclear question, "How is this possible?" repre-
sents something of a trick since it falsely assumes that 
X is possible under C, ostensibly asking only the manner 
of that possibility. The student is then required to 
reject the question as formulated, substitute another, 
"Is it in fact possible?," and answer the substituted 
one. Although this formulation appears logically messy, 
its use may be justifiable on didactic grounds. Asking 
the student to go beyond the rather cut and dried mechan-
ical answering of a question to uncover a trick may tend 
to stimulate him to think more deeply about some of the 
issues that are examined in the paper and thus to encour-
age the development of a greater degree of intellectual 
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penetration into their implications and subtleties. 
The answers to these questions frequently conform 
reasonably well to the expectations raised by those ques-
tions, that is, they conform with respect to their inner 
structures as represented by their semi-symbolic forms. 
The answer to the above example gives this: "The value 
of v that can be appropriately applied to X under C is 
A." Although the idiomatic answer from the question set 
does not reveal this conformity in a markedly obviously 
way, it nevertheless can be demonstrated that it does in 
fact exist. First, the idiomatic version: "This is not 
possible, it constitutes an unexplained contradiction. 
If semantical models are interpretations of formal sys-
tems that make all statements of the system true (1 ), and 
theoretical, hence empirical, models are never more than 
partially true (2), then it is manifestly impossible for 
them to constitute semantical models. The value of V, 
namely A, in this case, is represented by sentence, "This 
is not possible, it constitutes an unexplained contra-
diction." After the implicit rejection of the ostensible 
question, "How is this possible?," the answer to the 
"real" question, "Is it possible?" is given. This answer 
constitutes, in effect, a negative evaluation of the 
claim X that "they [semantical models] constitute (or 
produce) semantical models." This negation is then spec-
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ified as operative under the conditions C, "If semantical 
models are interpretations of formal systems that make 
all statements of the system true (1 ), and theoretical, 
hence empirical, models are never more than partially 
true (2)," The conclusion of the argument, "then it is 
manifestly impossible for them [theoretical models] to 
constitute semantical models," is no more than a slight-
ly more elaborate reiteration of the opening negative 
evaluation, "This is not possible, it constitutes an 
unexplained contradiction." Thus, it can be seen that 
the idiomatic version does, although not obviously, con-
form to the semi-symbolic representation of an appro-
priate response to the question. This, then, by conclud-
ing the exposition of task type VIII, concludes the 
explanation of the series of task types, and leads to the 
consideration of the modes. This will be taken up in the 
next chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
MODES 
The three modes that are made use of in the classi-
fication of the question set are represented by the lower 
case Roman numerals, i, ii, and iii. The first of these, 
the indicative mode, simply indicates that the specific 
question being classified asks for the straightforward 
supplying of an answer. Its gross semi-symbolic form 
shows up as a brief, "What is X?" X, then, will turn 
out to be a definition, a classification, an evaluation 
or so on according the specified task type. Since this 
semi-symbolic form is gross, it lacks sufficient detail 
to distinguish one task type to which it may be applied 
from another. Thus, if this form is applied to task IV, 
X would represent a classification of the pertinent con-
cept. If it is applied to task V, a comparison of two 
given concepts. Or if to task VII, an explanation of the 
appropriate concept. For example, in the case of this 
task II idiomatic realization of the above semi-symbolic 
form, "What is the relation between a sketch of an animal 
population and the animal population itself," X turns out 
to be a relation to be specified between two given con-
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cepts. In the case of this task VI realization of the 
same semi-symbolic form, "How can the relation between 
hypothetical mechanisms and model objects be stated in 
terms of subsets and supersets?," X is now a kind of 
interpretation, elaboration, or statement of the "mean-
ing" of the given concept, in this case, a particular 
relation. 
The answers to questions in the indicative mode 
merely involve, as might be expected, the production of 
the required value of X: a definition, a description, or 
an explanation according to the task type being irnple-
mented. The gross semi-symbolic form accordingly takes 
shape as, "X is A," where X is the means of expressing 
the required concept or statement in the question, while 
A performs the analogous function in the answer. The 
idiomatic actualization of the answer to the first of the 
above example-questions comes out, "The relation between 
a sketch of an animal population and the animal popula-
tion itself is the relation that holds between a model 
object and its referent: the modeling relation." Here, 
"the relation between a sketch of an animal population 
and the animal population itself" is X while "the rela-
tion that holds between a model object and its referent: 
the modeling relation." is A. The idiomatic answer to 
the second of the example-questions is "The relation 
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between hypothetical mechanisms and model objects can be 
stated in terms of subsets and supersets by saying that 
the set of hypothetical mechanisms forms a subset of the 
set of model objects, which is equivalent to saying that 
the set of model objects forms a superset of the set of 
hypothetical mechanisms. Here X is "The relation between 
hypothetical mechanisms and model obj ects ••• in terms of 
subsets and supersets," while A is "the set of hypotheti-
cal mechanisms forms a subset of the set of model ob-
jects, which is equivalent to saying that the set of 
model objects forms a superset of the set of hypothetical 
mechanisms." This cone 1 udes the explanation of mode i, 
upon which will follow that of mode ii. 
Mode ii might be described as a sort of binary mode. 
It calls for an affirmation or denial, an assertion that 
some statement or claim is either true or false. The 
answerer is asked to choose between two possibilities, 
one of which is assumed at the outset to be correct while 
the other is taken to be incorrect. As in the case of 
mode i, this mode may be used to implement any of the 
tasks. The difference between these two modes does not 
involve a difference between the kinds of tasks to be 
implemented, but rather a difference between the manner 
of evoking the desired implementation. Mode ii, it turns 
out, offers considerable more in the way of restrictions 
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or guidance with respect to the kind of answer expected 
than does mode i. 
Again, the semi-symbolic examples to be considered 
here will reveal only the gross structure of mode ii 
while obliterating the details of the various tasks. 
Basically equivalent but superficially variant forms are, 
"Is situation X the case or is it not?" and "Which is the 
case, situation X or situation Y?" Both offer examples 
of the disjunctive form which implies a background in 
which the universe with respect to the problem being 
considered is divided into two mutually exclusive but 
conjunctively exhaustive possible states of affairs. The 
possibility of the existence of a third state of affairs 
in which the question has been misapplied has been im-
plicitly rejected ipso-facto by the use of this form. 
Normally, with a question of this type asked in good 
faith, it can reasonably be expected that this division 
of the universe of discourse fairly represents the situa-
tion being discussed. Nevertheless, the possibility that 
didactic strategy might suggest the employment of devious 
methods (as in the case of task VIII) cannot be entirely 
ruled out. To recognize the equivalence the above exam-
ples, it need only be considered that the negation or 
falsity of situation (represented by a statement) X in 
the former is equivalent to the affirmation or truth of 
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situation Y in the latter because of the mutual exhaust-
iveness implicitly assumed in both cases. 
The former example converted to idiomatic form 
gives, "Does the set of entities: 'the set of bodies,' 
'the temperature,' 'the quantity of heat per unit mass,' 
and 'the specific heat at constant volume' constitute a 
semantical model?" Here the constitution of a semantical 
model by the set of entities: the set of bodies, the 
temperature, the quantity of heat per unit mass, and the 
specific heat at constant volume is the current value of 
x, while the failure of said constitution is the value of 
not-X (the denial or falsity of X). The conversion of 
the second example to idiomatic form results in, "Is the 
Rashevsky citation meant to inform the reader about how 
to go about performing a scientific investigation, or 
what?" Here, the present value of X is the truth of the 
statement that the Rashevsky citation is in fact meant to 
inform the reader about how to go about performing a 
scientific investigation, while the "or what?" represent 
the value of its denial. Furthermore, the addition of 
the phrase "or what?" invites the inclusion of an alter-
nate definition of the situation in case that the re-
sponse denies the truth of X. Certainly this example 
constitutes something of a variant of the cited semi-
forrnal case where both alternatives are explicit as 
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opposed to the above idiomatic version in which one is 
implicit. Nonetheless, the general principle, although 
perhaps not transparent, is adequately illustrated by 
these examples. 
The relation of the semi-symbolic forms of the an-
swers of mode ii questions to those of the questions 
themselves interjects few surprises. In the first case, 
what is asked for is a choice between the affirmation or 
the denial of the truth of a statement outlining a pro-
posed situation. What the answer gives is essentially 
that. The semi-symbolic representation gives either, "X 
is the case (is true)" or "X is not the case (is false)." 
In the latter case, non-logical (didactic) considerations 
may prompt the expectation that the answer will contain 
some sort of supplementary explanation or alternative 
suggestion, but such an inclusion would constitute a 
secondary adjunct to the primary selection of choices. 
In the case of the semi-symbolic form of an answer to the 
second example, the inclusion of a statement delineating 
an alternate state of affairs along with a possible 
explanation is explicitly called for. The semi-symbolic 
form that reveals the skeletal structure of this type of 
question is, either "X is the case and Y is not the 
case," "Y is the case and X is not the case." Whether or 
not Y is stated explicitly as a possibility or merely 
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explicitly called for without being named can be of 
paramount importance for certain purposes, but not for 
those of the present work. 
The idiomatic versions of these examples conform 
predictably to the expectations raised by the serni-
symbolic representations of their underlying structures. 
The first gives, "No. The set of entities 'the set of 
bodies,' 'the temperature,' 'the quantity of heat per 
unit mass,' and 'the specific heat at constant volume' 
does not constitute a semantical model." Here, the an-
swer is little more than a flat denial that the proposed 
situation does in fact obtain. The second example gives 
this possible realization of its semi-symbolic form: "The 
Rashevsky citation is not meant to inform the reader how 
to go about the performance of a scientific investiga-
tion, but to describe some of the essentials of scientif-
ic investigation as necessarily performed by practicing 
scientists." Here X, i. e., the truth of the statement 
that the Rashevsky citation is not meant to inform the 
reader how to go about the performance of a scientific 
investigation, is rejected while an alternative, Y, i. 
e., the statement that the Rashevsky citation is meant to 
describe some of the essentials of scientific investiga-
tion as necessarily performed by practicing scientists" 
is proposed and certified as true. The nature of the 
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task that a question is meant to evoke, it can be seen, 
is a matter of indifference to the mode. Whether the 
given task involves a definition, a comparison or an 
explanation has little bearing per se on the selection of 
the mode that is to evoke it. Mode ii questions simply 
offer the choice between the acceptance or rejection of a 
given definition, comparison or explanation, or else they 
ask for choice between alternate definitions, compari-
sons, or explanations. The discussion now turns from the 
consideration of mode ii questions to the contemplation 
of those of mode iii. 
Mode iii questions involve deduction or inference. 
They ask the answerer to go beyond the explicitly stated 
facts to attempt the discovery of the implicit. While 
the structural details of these questions vary consider-
ably, the overall structure merely serves as a framework 
for supplying premises and the asking for a conclusion. 
The semi-symbolic form that shows this structure amounts 
to, "What relevant statement Y can be deduced from set of 
premises X?" The main difference between mode iii ques-
tions and those of modes i and ii is that the answer 
asked for does not appear in the demonstration document 
in explicit form at all; it can be obtained only by 
inference. One idiomatic realization of this form pro-
duces, "If one of the aims of research were to be in-
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stantaneously and universally realized, what would be the 
effect on all black boxes?" It can be noticed that this 
example turns out doubly obscure. Not only does it call 
for the production of an inference, but only a hint is 
given as to the exact content of one of the premises. 
The identity the "aim of research" being talked about in 
this question is not given; it is only by a perusal of 
the demonstration document at the specified location that 
the context will supply the means of ascertaining this 
information. The relation between this, the dominant 
"aim of research" dealt with in the document both as a 
whole and at the specified location, and the expected 
answer, a projected result of said "aim," is so close it 
would have been difficult if not impossible to ask the 
question without virtually revealing the answer. The set 
of premises X, then, includes both the unstated premise 
that identifies the relevant "aim of research," and the 
explicit premise, "one of the aims of research 'is' (were 
to be) instantaneously and universally realized." The 
expected conclusion Y is a statement that identifies, 
"the effect on all black boxes," consistently with the 
content of the set of premises X. 
The answer to this kind of question follows the 
expected formula, consisting essentially of nothing more 
than the revelation of the conclusion asked for by the 
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question. The semi-symbolic form in point, "A relevant 
conclusion Y that can be drawn statement X is A." A, 
here, is the specific present case value of the generic 
conclusion Y. The idiomatic version comes out, "If one 
of the aims of research were to be instantaneously and 
universally realized, all black boxes would be converted 
into built-up models. Since one of the aims of research 
is to throw further light into every box, the accomplish-
ment of this aim would change all black boxes into built-
up models or, at least, into grey boxes." "One of the 
aims of research is to throw further light into every 
box," makes specific the unstated premise to complete set 
X, while, "the accomplishment of this aim would change 
all black boxes into built-up models or, at least, into 
gray boxes," constitutes the asked for conclusion. This 
ends the discussion of mode iii questions in particular 
and of question-modes in general. Next to be considered 
are twenty "content-types" that designate the conceptual 
categories that the author of the demonstration document 
has employed in dealing with his subject matter as an 
integral component of the process of exposition. These 
will be considered in the following chapter. 
CHAPTER V 
CONTENT TYPES 
The "content-types" are not, as in the cases of the 
task-types or the modes, to be found solely in the ques-
tions; their primary source is the demonstration document 
itself. It is from there that they find their way into 
the questions. In general, it is to be understood that 
underlying every question can be found a particular kind 
of content-type called here "concept-type." In the dis-
cussion of the demonstration document these four concept-
t y p es have been named, "referent," "model object," 
"theoret ica 1 mode 1," and "genera 1 theory." Al though at 
least one of these concept-types can always be found in 
the background of any of the questions, this may or may 
not be true of the foreground. And what the term 
"content-type" designates is what is in the foreground. 
It does happen, however, that sometimes one or more 
of the concept-types is found in the foreground, and when 
this happens, an "A" appears in the classification line 
of the question wherein this occurs. This indicates that 
one or more of the concept-types is to be found at the 
conceptual focal point of the question in an explicit, 
rather than in a merely implicit form. Whether or not 
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one or another of the specific content-types is to be 
encountered there is only remotely material to the form, 
semi-symbolic or otherwise, of the questions and answers. 
Thus no attempt will be made to associate given content-
types with specific semi-symbolic forms or, 
matter, with specific modes or task-types. 
for that 
At least 
theoretically, and for the most part in practice, any 
content-type might be matched with any mode or task-type. 
Furthermore, any number of content-types might theoretic-
ally show up at the focal point of any given question, 
though the practical limit is perhaps about four or five. 
An example of content-type A in which the specific 
concept-type is referent is, "What is a referent?" And 
the answer comes out, "A referent (of a particular model 
object) is the object, process or bit of reality that is 
represented by that model object." Mutatis mutandis, for 
the model object is obtained, "What is a model object?" 
along with its corresponding answer, "A model object is a 
schematic representation of an object or process, that 
is, a schematic conceptual representation of a thing or 
of a situation assumed to be actual or possible." Analo-
gous methods would, of course, give analogous results for 
the two remaining concept-types. Both of these examples 
obtained from task I, mode i questions, but content-type 
A question and answers may be encountered in association 
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with many combinations of tasks and modes. Here, for 
confirmation of this fact, is an example of concept-type 
A combined in a question with task VIII, mode ii: "Are 
theoretical models necessarily true?" with -its answer, 
"No. Theoretical models are not necessarily true; they 
may be either true or false." 
"What is a general theory" constitutes an example of 
a content-type A question in combination with mode iii. 
I t s a n s w e r i s "A g_ e !:!.§.E. a.!. t h e o r y i s a t h e o r y ( a 
hypothetico-deductive system) that has a particularly 
wide range of application by virtue of the fact that it 
contains only high level abstractions, which is to say 
that it has no specific empirical content." This is a 
mode iii question not by virtue of any attribute or 
attributes of the question itself, but because the lack 
of an explicit definition of the term "theoretical model" 
in the demonstration document. The preceding example is 
particularly apt in that it serves the purpose of round-
ing out this exposition of content-type A in combination 
with both the remaining mode, mode iii, and the remaining 
concept-type, the general theory, before turning to the 
consideration of content-type B. 
Content-type B questions tend to revolve around the 
concept of description. They generally involve a proper-
ty, attribute, characteristic, or something of that sort. 
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whether they in some way identify, specify, describe, 
classify, compare, interpret, explain, or evaluate the 
involved attribute or attributes depends upon their task-
type. It should be noted that, in accordance with al-
ready given description of the relation between task-
types and content-types, one task-type may be found 
paired with several content-types, but not vice-versa. 
An example of a content-type B question: "What feature 
of crude (simple) models frequently renders them more 
instructive that more complicated models?" And the cor-
responding answer: "The feature of crude (simple) models 
that frequently renders them more instructive than more 
complicated models is the exactness or precision of the 
solutions that they provide." Here, it is obvious that 
the term, "feature," is one "of that sort" that fits in 
with attribute, etc. Now, the discussion turns from the 
consideration of content-type B to that of content-
type c. 
Content-type C questions deal with alternate kinds, 
sorts, types or varieties of concepts. It happens so 
frequently that the particular entity to be varied turns 
out to be one of the four basic concept-types that it may 
be assumed that content-type C questions, as well as 
questions of any other content-type, at least implicitly 
subsume the consideration of at least one of the four 
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basic concept-types. This means that virtually every 
question may be considered to be a sort of "soft" 
content-type A question. Since this "soft" attribute of 
the questions is ubiquitous, there is no distinction to 
be made with respect to it. Consequently, the content-
type labels that appear in the identification lines of 
the questions do not contain any indication that this 
attribute exists. It is only when one of the concept-
types appears explicitly as a central focal point of the 
question that the question is labeled content-type A; in 
which case it is not a "soft" Content-type A that is 
under consideration, but a "hard" one. The distinction 
between "soft" and "hard" A's can be illustrated by means 
of the following examples: The question, "What is a 
model called if it has an input and an output along with 
internal variables, but no explanatory mechanism?" and 
the corresponding answer, "A model that has an input and 
an output along with internal variables but no explana-
tory mechanism is called a grey box," provide an example 
of a content-type C question-answer that is an implicit 
or soft content-type A question-answer. As a soft 
content-type A question-answer, its only content-type 
label is "C." Whereas the question, "What are non-
realistic abstract situations?" along with its answer, 
"Non-realistic abstract situations are, in effect, model 
47 
objects in which only certain significant aspects of the 
referent are modeled. All other aspects of the referent 
are ignored," provide an example of a content-type C 
question-answer set that is also an explicit or hard 
content-type A question-answer set. The first example 
serves as an example of a content-type C question-answer 
set because a grey box is a variety of a concept. It is 
an example of an implicit or soft content-type A because 
the grey box exemplifies a kind of model object or theor-
etical model, both of which fit into the content-type 
category. The second example provides an example of a 
content-type C question-answer set that is also an ex-
plicit or hard content-type A because the fact that "non-
realistic abstract situations" represent a variety of 
model object looms larger and more central here than does 
the analogous fact in the first example. The foregoing, 
it is hoped, provides an adequate view of the meaning of 
"content-type C" and the focus of attention can now turn 
to the consideration of content-type D. 
Content-type D questions have to do with relations 
or connections of some kind or other. Again, the identi-
ty of the task-type will determine whether the particular 
relation or connection under consideration is to be clas-
sified, compared, or explained, etc. The discovery that 
the relations dealt with by means of content-type D ques-
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tions tend most frequently to link one concept-type with 
another is beyond a doubt minor. For example, the ques-
tion, "What is the relation between a continuum endowed 
with certain properties, such as compressibility and 
viscosity, and a fluid?" and its concomitant answer, 
"The re la ti on between a continuum endowed with certain 
properties, such as compressibility and viscosity and 
fluid is the relation that holds between a model object 
and its referent: the modeling relation," relate the 
concept-types, model object and referent. The relation 
between these two concept-types, model object and refer-
ent, occur in the present document more frequently than 
any others. As another example, take the question, "How 
are the sun (along with its optical and gravitational 
manifestations) and a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point 
related to each other?" Look at it together with its 
attending answer, "The sun (along with its optical and 
gravitational manifestations) and a rotating ellipsoid or 
a mass point are related to each other in the following 
way. The sun (along with its optical and gravitational 
manifestations) is an example of a referent for which a 
rotating ellipsoid or a mass point is an example of a 
model. Conversely, a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point 
is an example of a model for which the sun (along with 
its optical and gravitational manifestations) is an exam-
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ple of a referent," These provide a case in point. While 
in the preceding cases, both elements of the relation in 
question proved to be concept-types, it sometimes happens 
that one or the other of the elements turns out to be 
something other than a concept-type. Witness the exam-
ple: "How can the relation between hypothetical mechan-
isms and model objects be stated in terms of subsets and 
supersets?" with its corresponding answer, "The relation 
between hypothetical mechanisms and model objects can be 
stated in terms of subsets and supersets by saying that 
the set of hypothetical mechanisms forms a subset of the 
set of model objects, which is equivalent to saying that 
the set of model objects forms a superset of the set of 
hypothetical mechanisms." Al though one of the elements 
of the relation being discussed (model object) is a 
concept-type, the other, while closely related, is not. 
The other element of this relation, although not in 
itself a concept-type, nevertheless has been defined as a 
set of them. It constitutes in fact a set, although not 
the set of model objects. Here the discussion of 
content-type D is concluded and that of content-type E is 
begun. 
Concept-type E questions relate to examples and 
instances. Expository confrontation with the basic con-
cepts of a discipline entail the almost ubiquitous use of 
examples. 
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Examples generally represent particular con-
crete applications of more or less abstract concepts. It 
might be said that the function of an example is to 
provide the realization of those idealizations that are 
termed "concepts." The question, "What is the purpose of 
the examples of the mechanisms of electromagnetic prop-
agation, of complex chemical reactions, and of biological 
evolution?" along with its expected answer, "The purpose 
of the examples of the mechanisms of electromagnetic 
propagation, of complex chemical reactions, and of bio-
logical evolution is to combat the identification of the 
concepts of model and mechanism, that is, to show that 
the concept of model is broader than this identification 
would suggest that there are models that are not mechan-
istic," provide an example of questions wherein the fact 
that they are about examples is explicit. Whereas the 
question, "What is the referent of which the sociological 
interpretation of the symbols, 's', 'F(s)', 'G(s,s')', 
and 'G(s,s')' constitute a model object is the probabil-
ity of migration taking place between one given country 
and another," supplies an example in which the analogous 
fact can be seen to be only implicit. Nowhere in the 
test of the latter question and answer does the term 
"example" appear. Nevertheless the expression "con-
stitute a model object" can--indeed, in the present con-
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text, rrnst--be interpreted as meaning "constitute an 
exam.E.1£ of a model object." In consonance with earlier 
--
findings, it is found that the foregoing all involve 
examples of one or more concept-types. While this situa-
tion is not invariable, even the exceptions adhere to its 
spirit. The question, "What are the symbolic diagrams 
that correspond to the alternative representations of the 
motion of the set of coupled oscillators?" with the 
adjunct answer, "The symbolic diagrams that correspond to 
the alternative representations of the motion of the set 
of coupled oscillators are examples of heuristic devices 
that render the alternative representations more intel-
ligible while remaining merely adjuncts to, and not parts 
of, those model objects," constitute an example of a case 
in which, although the example is not of a concept-type, 
it nonetheless does bear an intimate relation to a parti-
cular concept-type, to wit: the model object. Even 
though the raison d'etre of the question involves the 
making of the point that the relation between the sym-
bolic diagrams and the model objects is not as close as 
it might appear to be, the raison d'etre of the symbolic 
diagrams is just that relation. The discussion now turns 
from the consideration of concept-type E to that of 
concept-type F. 
Concept-type F questions deal with classifications 
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and categorizations. The first problem that arises in 
this connection is that, at first glance, concept-type F 
seems to duplicate task-type IV, since they both deal 
with classification or categorization. This apparent 
duplication, however, proves more illusory than real. 
The difference between concept-type F and task-type IV 
resides in the fact that while task-type IV questions ask 
for a classification or categorization of some concept or 
other, i. e., a content-type or a concept-type, the 
concept-type F questions ask about some classification or 
categorization that has already been embedded either 
explicitly or implicitly in the text being analyzed. It 
should not be imagined, however, that the designations 
"task-type IV" and "concept-type F" must inevitably be 
applied in a mutually exhaustive manner. Since it is 
possible to ask for a classification or categorization 
about, or perhaps of, another classification or categor-
ization, it follows that the two designations can be 
applied simultaneously. This is, of course, consonant 
with the principle that any task-type can, at least 
theoretically, 
content-type. 
be combined in one question with any 
Also, it should be remembered that any 
content-type can, in principle, be combined with any 
other content-type in the same question. On the other 
hand, the fact that task-type IV ~ay combine with 
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concept-type F does not entail that they must. As a 
matter of fact in the set of questions and answers that 
constitutes perhaps the most palpable part of the results 
of the present work, they do not. 
An appropriate move at this time is to consider the 
question, "Why does not the set of entities 'the set of 
bodies', 'the quantity of heat per unit mass', and 'the 
specific heat at constant volume' constitute a semantical 
model?" Next, it should help to look at the answer that 
this question might expected to evoke, "The set of enti-
ties 'the set of bodies', 'the quantity of heat per unit 
mass', and 'the specific heat at constant volume' does 
not constitute a semantical model for these reasons: (1) 
this set of entities constitutes a factual interpretation 
of the mathematical system, F1 through F4, (2) it is a 
factual interpretation,of the purely formal system, A1 
through AS, (3) it does not make these systems come out 
true in every case, (4) a factual interpretation, in fact 
any interpretation of a formal system that does not make 
that system come out true in all cases fails by defini-
tion to constitute a semantical model." This question-
answer set is typical of many of those of content-type F 
in that it is about a classification without asking for a 
classification. What it does ask for is an explanation 
of why a given classification, i. e., the classification 
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of a given set of entities as a semantical model, does 
not hold. It is appropriate at this point to turn from 
the discussion of content-type F questions to that of 
questions categorized as belonging to content-type G. 
The kind of concept that content-type G questions 
involve can be suggested fairly well by such closely 
related, but not entirely synonymous terms as "function," 
"purpose," "goal," "end," "use," and "application." The 
lack of a precise definition of the scope of this cat-
egory is not really a fatal disadvantage here. In the 
8resent application, an indication of the general loca-
tion and boundaries of the conceptual area covered by 
these questions is adequate. The question, "Why are 
theoretical models necessary to science?" and the appro-
priate answer, "Theoretical models are necessary to 
science because they alone are testable," serve to exem-
plify the content-type G question-answer set. The un-
stated premise of the argument contained in the answer is 
that testing is necessary to science," Here, the test-
ability of the theoretical model explains its usefulness 
in the context of scientific investigation. Another 
question, "What are the three chief functions of theore-
tical models?" must here be considered. This question, 
along with its answer, "The three chief functions of 
theoretical models are these: (1) the posing of specific 
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theoretical problems, (2) the solution (explanation) of 
specific theoretical problems, and (3) the testing of 
proposed solutions (explanations)," brings up the problem 
of scope. In this respect the former and the latter 
question-answer sets somewhat overlap. While the former 
question was answered by naming a property that implied a 
function, the latter was answered by specifying three 
directly asked for functions. The important fact here is 
that functions or more or less closely related concepts 
are always prominent in content-type G question-answer 
sets. This concludes the treatment of content-type G 
questions and signals the start of the exposition of 
content-type H questions. 
Content-type H questions concern themselves with a 
concept-cluster that can be hinted at by such terms as 
"method," "procedure," or "process." What is involved 
here are the principles that relate to the way that 
something occurs or is done. Look at the question, "In a 
field of research like contemporary mathematical socio-
logy which has tended to produce isolated bits of know-
ledge rather than unifying concepts, how are theoretical 
models typically constructed?." Here, a way of accom-
plishing something, a method, is called for. The appro-
priate answer is, "In a field of research like contempor-
ary mathematical sociology which has tended to produce 
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isolated bits of knowledge rather than unifying concepts, 
theoretical models are typically constructed by building 
them around model objects. This is usually done by 
expanding the model into a mathematically oriented 
hypothetico-deductive system." This answer fulfills the 
requirement of the question by specifying the asked for 
procedure by means of its description. It can be noted 
here that the above example is a task-type II question, 
i. e., a question that requests specification, rather 
than a task-type III question, i. e., a question that 
asks for a description, because the description is only 
the means of accomplishing the specif ication--a secondary 
end rather than a primary one. 
Consider the question, "Why is an explicit statement 
of the semantic assumptions mandatory in the axiomatic 
reconstruction of a scientific theory?" Its answer is 
"An explicit statement of the semantic assumption is 
mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific 
theory because the same mathematical formulas will some-
times fit more than one referent. For example, the flow 
of water in a pipe can be represented by the same (or 
analogous) formulas as the flow of electricity in a wire. 
Thus, an explicit statement of the semantic assumption is 
needed to make sure that there is no confusion regarding 
which formula is being linked to which referent," This 
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constitutes an example of a content-type H question that 
does not ask for a method or a procedure. This question 
rather asks for an explanation regarding a procedure. 
Since asking for an explanation defines a task-type 
(task-type VII) and not a content-type, it is because of 
the fact that the required explanation is about a proce-
dure that this question is categorized as content-type H. 
Here ends the discussion of content-type H, and starts 
that of content-type I. 
The concept-cluster that constitutes the subject 
matter of content-type I questions is suggested by such 
terms as "result," "outcome," "upshot," or "effect." 
Something that happens because something else has oc-
curred is what lies at the focal point of these ques-
tions. Examine the question, "What is the result of 
specifying the boundary and initial conditions, the mass 
and stress distributions, and the external forces for the 
oscillation of a shell?" Here, a cause, the "something 
else" is specified and a result is specifically asked 
for. The "something else," the cause, is the specifica-
tion of the boundary, the initial conditions, etc. for 
the oscillation of a shell. Now look at the answer that 
this question might be expected to evoke, "The result of 
specifying the boundary and initial conditions, the mass 
and stress distributions, and the external forces for the 
oscillation of a shell is a model object." 
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In this 
answer, the requested result is (the production of) a 
model object. The preceding example illustrated the 
concept-type I question wherein a result is specifically 
asked for. But there are content-type I questions where-
in the reference to a result is less obvious. Take, for 
example, the question, "What can be accomplished with a 
continuum endowed with certain properties, such as com-
pressibility and viscosity?" Here the "something else" 
that is to generate the expected result is "a continuum 
endowed with certain properties, such as compressibility 
and viscosity," More accurately, it might be said that 
the "something else" is only indirectly referred to by 
the expression, "a continuum ••• etc." What the "something 
else" really is refers to is some process that is con-
nected in some unspecified way with "a, continuum ••• etc." 
The expected result in this example is obliquely referred 
to as "what can be accomplished." Now look at an answer 
that fits that question, "A continuum endowed with cer-
tain properties, such as compressibility and viscosity 
can be conjoined with (grafted onto) classical mechanics, 
general relativistic mechanics or some other general 
theory to produce a theoretical model of a fluid." It 
can now be seen that this answer explicitly names the 
called for result, i. e., the production of a theoretical 
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model of a fluid. Moreover, the "something else" is now 
directly specified.as the conjoining of "a continuum 
endowed with certain properties, such as compressibility 
and viscosity" with "classical mechanics, general rela-
tivistic mechanics or some other general theory." Here, 
the discussion of content-type I breaks off and the con-
sideration of content-type J begins. 
Content-type J questions deal with the concept-
cluster that is suggested by the terms, "term," "expres-
sion," "name," and "designation." These questions tend, 
to a considerable extent, to revolve around linguistic 
entities. They may describe these linguistic entities, 
interpret them or explain them etc. according to the 
natures of the various task-types that govern them. 
These linguistic entities, of course, are always linked, 
either immediately or ultimately, with one of the four 
basic concept-types: referent, model object, theoretical 
model, or general theory. Consider, for example, the 
question, "What expression designates a model object that 
concerns itself only with accounting for the end results 
of the referent without attempting to explain how these 
results are obtained?" This question requires the speci-
fication of a expression that fulfills certain condi-
tions, namely that it designate "a model object that 
concerns itself only with accounting for the end results 
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of the referent without attempting to explain how these 
results are obtained." Take now an appropriate answer to 
this question, "The term that designates a model object 
that concerns itself only with accounting for the end 
results of the referent without attempting to explain how 
these results are obtained can be termed a black box." 
This answer satisfies the question by specifying the 
called for expression: "black box." Similarly, regard 
the following content-type J question, "What could a 
theoretical model that has been "confirmed" be termed to 
show that, to some extent (albeit inadequately), it ful-
fills the requirements that make it possible to consti-
tute a semantical model?" Here again, a term is asked 
for that fulfills certain conditions, i. e., that it be 
applicable to theoretical models that have been con-
firmed, and it that it "show that, to some extent (albeit 
inadequately), it fulfills the requirements that make it 
possible to constitute a semantical model" Look at an 
appropriate answer to this question, "In order to show 
that, to some extent, a "confirmed" theoretical model 
fulfills the requirements that make it possible to con-
stitute a semantical model, it could be termed a "guasi-
model. '" This answer fulfills the requirements of the 
question by supplying the requested term: "guasimodel." 
At this point, the discussion turns from the considera-
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tion of content-type J to the examination of content-
type K. 
Content-type K questions deal with a concept-cluster 
that is suggested by such terms as "sign," "symbol," and 
"representation." These questions invariably involve 
something that .stands for something else. The question, 
"What does R represent?" supplies the "something that 
stands for something else," i. e., R, and asks what it is 
that R stands for. The answer, "R represents a refer-
ent," tells what it is that R stands for, i. e., a refer-
ent. The relation of the "something that stands for 
something else" to the question or answer as a whole, 
however, is not always so direct. Regard the content-
type K question, "What can be done to remedy the exces-
sive coarseness and lack of economy characteristic of the 
description of the model wherein the paired inputs and 
outputs are tabulated?" This question does not simply 
ask for either the entity that stands for something else 
or the entity for which it stands. It asks, rather, for 
a prescription, for a method of constructing a better 
something that stands for something else. Here is an 
appropriate answer, "To remedy the excessive coarseness 
and lack of economy characteristic of the description of 
the model wherein the paired inputs and outputs are 
tabulated, the ordered pairs can be implied by means of a 
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rule rather than stated explicitly by means of a table." 
The answer, accordingly, supplies the method of construc-
ting the entity that represents something else that the 
question requests. Thus ends the discussion of content-
type K questions and starts the discussion of content-
type L questions. 
Content-type L questions involve the concept-cluster 
suggested by such terms as "statement," "proposition," 
"system," or "theory." Here, the clarification should be 
made that the "system" mentioned above is primarily a 
linguistic system, or that, at least, that the questions 
are oriented primarily toward the linguistic aspects of 
any non-linguistic system under consideration. Another 
of approaching this might be to say that, to what ever 
extent the kind of "system" being discussed here is not 
linguistic, it is a conceptual system of some kind or 
other expressed linguistically. And while the object-
document may in some cases deal primarily with the con-
cept of which the linguistic entity is only a representa-
tion, the type L question primarily confronts that repre-
sentation; its involvement with the underlying concept is 
only secondary. 
As an example of the type L question's concern with 
the linguistic entity, consider the following example: 
"Why does the set of statements, 'the capital letters are 
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sets or functions, "R" is the real line, 11 0 11 is the 
arithmetic product, etc,' fail to qualify as a semantical 
model?"' Here the classification of the linguistic en-
tity, the set of statements, is all that is being ques-
tioned; the nature of the underlying mathematical con-
cepts gains relevance only by virtue of their use as an 
example. A suggested answer to this question is, "The 
set of statements, 'the capital letters are sets or 
functions, "R" is the real line, "O" is the arithmetic 
product, etc,' fails to qualify as a semantical model 
because, while it is an interpretation of the system of 
the signs, A1 through AS, it does not make the system 
true in all cases." This answer explains why the men-
tioned linguistic entity fails to qualify as a semantical 
model. The understood missing premise in this case is the 
definition of a semantical model as "an interpretation of 
a theory that makes the theory come out true in all 
cases." This premise is an example of the kind of basic 
knowledge that the student is assumed to possess at the 
outset. The question and answer set could, of course, be 
programmed to vary the prerequisite level of sophistica-
tion, but consideration of the implications of this pos-
sibility lie beyond the scope of the present work. 
The focal point of a type L question, i.e., some 
subset of the set of linguistic entities, need not be 
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represented formally. Take, for example, "What is the 
reason for saying that simplicity is the privilege of 
either total ignorance or extreme generality (no de-
tail)?" In this case, the linguistic entity central to 
the question is expressed by a mere paraphrase of an 
informal, perhaps somewhat epigrammatic, comment made in 
the course of the expository process. The answer sug-
gested for this question is, "The reason for saying that 
simplicity is the privilege of either total ignorance or 
extreme generality is to justify the complication of 
theoretical models." This answer supplies the asked for 
purpose for the inclusion of the linguistic entity in the 
text. 
Look at one more example, "Why is every formula 
containing the symbol of the modeling relation either an 
interpretative axiom or a semantic assumption?" The 
linguistic entity at the heart of this question is the 
set of formulas "containing the symbol of the modeling 
relation." This def ini ti on of the set of formulas under 
consideration may appear to emphasize the contents of the 
these formulas. But this appearance is not to be relied 
upon. This prerequisite barely indicates the general 
type of formula being dealt with in the text; it leaves 
plenty of room for variety. Any formula of this type 
links a model object, and hence a theoretical model to 
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its referent But that referent can be a behavior or a 
structure, an object or a concept; it can be statistical 
or functional Moreover, given the referent, the type of 
model object can vary greatly In fact there can exist an 
infinite number of models for each referent any one of 
which must be classified as either "an interpretation or 
a semantic assumption." This example, then, like the 
previous ones sustains the thesis that type L questions 
deal with linguistic entities per se and only peripheral-
ly with their contents. A suggested answer to this 
question is, "Every formula containing the symbol of the 
modeling relation is either an interpretative axiom or a 
semantic assumption because such a formula relates a 
theoretical model to its referent, as, for example, the 
theoretical model s of a cell to the referent, or real 
cell r." This answer merely explains why a formula of 
this kind always turns out to be either an interpretive 
axiom or a semantic assumption--rather anticlimactic, 
really. With this, the exposition advances from the 
consideration of content-type L questions to the explica-
tion of those of content-type M. 
Content-type M questions involve the juxtaposition 
of concepts for the purpose of making contrasts by means 
of noting the differences between them. This example, 
"What is the difference between deterministic models and 
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probabilistic models," is quite straightforward. It 
simply asks for the specification of the principle dif-
ference between two concepts. The answer to this ques-
tion, "The difference between deterministic models and 
probabilistic models is that deterministic models predict 
(or attempt to predict) what will occur under certain 
given conditions, whereas probabilistic models try to 
predict what ~2.Y happen under given comditions while 
indicating in mathematical terms what the chances are 
that this or that event will or will not occur," is not 
quite so simple. Nonetheless, neither is it very compli-
cated. It specifies the required difference between the 
named concepts in terms of a contrast between the kinds 
of performance expected of each. 
The next example, "What is the importance of con-
trasting users with designers or scientists with engi-
neers?" is almost as direct. Judging from the question, 
the ways that this example differs from the previous one 
are embodied first, in the occurrence of a double con-
trast and second, in the more significant change in the 
sort of thing that is asked for. Since a single answer 
is apparently expected to suffice for both contrasts, it 
is fairly obvious that they are in some way analogous and 
that they do not really represent two different con-
trasts. One the other hand, whereas the first example 
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asks for the specification of the difference that consti-
tutes the contrast, the second requires an explanation of 
the author's purpose in presenting it. In this case, the 
contrast itself assumes a secondary importance, what is 
primary is its function. Nonetheless, knowledge of what 
the contrast consists of is assumed. The answer, "Users 
are contrasted with designers and scientists with engi-
neers to show how the model's application should deter-
mine whether a dark box or a built-up model is chosen. 
Where mere use is contemplated, the dark box model is 
adequate, but where knowledge is desired, a built-up 
model is needed," contains a similar assumption. It is 
taken for granted that users and scientists are inter-
ested in mere use, while designers and scientists are 
interested in knowledge. The nucleus of this response is 
the explanation that links the choice of model type with 
the particular interests of those who choose. 
Sometimes, it happens that a content-type M question 
is not immediately obvious as such. The question, "What 
error does the 'semantical freak' involve?" illustrates 
this. The only way of knowing that this is a content-
type M question is by reference to the answer, "The 
'semantical freak' involves a confusion between theoreti-
cal model and referent. The theoretical model is discus-
sed as though it were the referent." Here it can be 
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seen that what is involved is a confusion that can be 
resolved by marking well the contrast between two con-
cepts. Thus, it is the answer that unmasks the question 
as belonging to content-type M. This ends the discussion 
of content-type M questions; next starts the considera-
tion of those of content-type N. 
Content-type N questions tend to focus on prin-
ciples, rules or paradigms that may or may not serve as 
criteria for arriving at some decision or conclusion. 
These principles, etc. may be encountered in the form of 
hypotheses or assumptions of some kind or other, or even 
in the form of philosophical stances or attitudes. They 
play various roles in the questions. A look at some 
examples will help to illustrate this. 
The question, "What criteria were applied in order 
to determine the falsity of Ising's model object?" serves 
as the first of these. It requests that a set of princi-
ples that serve as criteria be specified. These criteria 
have been used in relation to the performance of a given 
function. Here is the suggested answer to this question, 
"The criteria that were applied in order to determine the 
falsity of Ising's model object were the relatively 
greater prestige of the general theory (statistical mech-
anics) and the principle that requires a theoretical 
model to represent every significant (relevant) aspect of 
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its referent if it is not to be considered false." This 
answer simply specifies the (two) requested criteria. 
The question, "What would be the likely result of 
the universal application of the black boxist philo-
sophy?" is another story. Here, the principle is not 
asked for, but specified at the outset. Only the name of 
the principle, referred to as a philosophy, is given, not 
its content. Knowledge of the content is assumed, there-
fore it is tested--obliquely, of course. The primary 
given, by this question, is a hypothesis of the applica-
tion of the principle. In summary, then, the form of the 
question is that of a conditional whose antecedent is the 
hypothesis of the application of the principle and whose 
consequent, the conjectured results of that application, 
is asked for. It should be mentioned at this point that 
the asked for conjecture does have to be made by the 
student, it has been made by the author; the student is, 
in substance, asked to do no more than to recognize it 
for what it is. The answer to this question, "The likely 
result of the universal application of the black boxist 
philosophy would be the immediate drying up of the 
sources of scientific knowledge and, consequently, an 
eventual halt to scientific progress." yields no great 
surprises. It supplies a two step conjectured result 
which takes on the rough outlines of the valid form, 
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[(p4 q) & (q4 r)] °"' (p4 r). 
where p is interpreted as "The black boxist philosophy is 
universally applied," q as "The sources of scientific 
knowledge immediately dry up," and r as "Scientific pro-
gress eventually halts." It was necessary to talk about 
the "rough outline" of the form because 
p4q 
(the universal application of the black boxist philosophy 
will immediately dry up the sources of scientific know-
ledge) and 
q4 r 
(the drying up of the sources of scientific knowledge 
will cause an eventual halt to scientific progress) are 
givens and not hypotheses--they are assumed to be true at 
the outset. What is asserted then is not that if these 
conditionals are true then the application of the black 
boxist philosophy will cause an eventual halt to scien-
tific progress but rather that since they are true, the 
application of the black boxist philosophy would event-
ually cause scientific progress to halt. Thus, although 
the argument does follow the "rough outlines" of a tauto-
logically valid form, it is not itself logically valid 
but merely consistent. This is not to be considered a 
defect in the argument since its essentially empirical 
character dictate that it be judged primarily in the 
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light of empirical criteria. Whether or not it is found 
to be "sound" will depend presumably upon "the state of 
things" although in actuality it may depend to a con-
siderable extent upon one's philosophical leanings. 
While in a sense the black boxist philosophy stands 
as the focal point of the question, in another it is 
situated in a secondary relationship to the supposition 
that it is applied--its application. If this seems like 
splitting hairs, it should be noted that a principle (or 
an attitude or a philosophy) is not identical to its 
application. To speak (directly) about a principle is to 
deal with it internally, while to discuss its application 
is to deal with it externally and to talk about it only 
indirectly. To deal with a principle internally is to 
talk about the composition of its components and how they 
relate to each other. To deal with it externally is to 
consider its relation to other concepts, objects or 
events. The object of this example is to show how a 
principle can be displaced from the logical center of a 
concept-type N question without substantially surren-
dering its position at the conceptual center. 
"Why might the black box paradigm be expected to 
encourage superficiality?" is the final example of a 
content-type N question to be considered. Here, the 
given is the name of a paradigm (rule, or principle) 
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along with a conjecture as to the probable results of the 
application of that paradigm. What is required is a 
justification of the conjecture. This is supplied by the 
answer, "The black box paradigm might be expected to 
encourage superficiality because of the fact that this 
paradigm, by implication, ignores the possibility of the 
existence of an internal structure and mechanism of its 
referent. Thus, the paradigm discourages the attempt to 
discover the internal structure and mechanism whose ex-
istence it ignores." The argument approximates the valid 
form, 
[(p-+ q) & (q-+ r)]--+ (p-+ r). 
where p is interpreted as "The black box paradigm is 
applied," q as "The internal structure (of a referent) is 
ignored," and r as "The attempt to discover internal 
mechanisms is discouraged." This argument depends first 
of all on the truth of p -> q, the claim that the black 
boxist paradigm implies ignorance of "the possibility of 
the existence of an internal structure and mechanism of 
its referent." Second, it depends upon the truth of a 
supressed premise that mediates q -> r (to ignore "the 
possibility of the existence of an internal structure and 
mechanism of the" black box's referent will cause the 
attempt to discover such a structure and mechanism to be 
discouraged.) The supressed premise is simply a general-
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ization of the q -> r statement: when certain things are 
ignored, the attempt to discover them is discouraged. At 
this point, the discussion of content-type O will break 
off and that of content-type 0 will begin. 
The concept-type 0 questions in this set have turned 
out to be a quite homogeneous lot. There is nothing 
inherent in the genus that makes it necessary that they 
should turn out this way, it just happens that they did. 
These questions tend to center on references, citations, 
quotations, allusions or mentions of some kind that the 
author makes somewhere in his text. While many possible 
patterns for questions of this concept-type exist, only 
one is used in this set. This general pattern that they 
all follow is exemplified by the question, "What is made 
of the fact that the water molecule was rejected by turn 
of the century energetists?" Here, the student is given 
to understand that the author has made some reference to 
a fact in the history of science. And what the student 
is asked to do is to state what use the author has made 
of this reference or, to put it another way, to specify 
the author's purpose in making it. Although this parti-
cular example displays some slight obliquity in the word-
ing, virtually all of the rest of the concept-type 0 
questions in this set are, if anything, more directly 
explicit. 
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The suggested answer to this question is, "The re-
jection of the water molecule model by the turn of the 
century energetists is part of a sort of reductio ad ab-
surdum argument meant to show the foolishness of pre-
ferring a grey box model to a built-up one. The prefer-
ence for grey or black box models can lead to the rejec-
tion of models that later prove their worth by gaining 
general acceptance." This answer attempts to accomplish 
two things: first, to supply the asked for purpose of 
the reference and second, to provide some insight into 
the manner by which this purpose is to be fulfilled. 
Since this one example suffices to display the peculiar-
ities of concept-type O questions, their exposition will 
terminate here and that of concept-type P questions will 
follow. 
Concept-type P questions deal with assumptions, 
conditions, premises or prerequisites of some kind or 
other. Typically, these turn out to be necessary assump-
tions upon which to base some theory or hypothesis or 
else prerequisites for the application of some method or 
procedure. Usually, the question asks either for the 
specification of the condition itself or perhaps for an 
explanation or reason as to why it exists or is neces-
sary. As an example of the former, consider this ques-
tion, "In order to apply the same general theory (clas-
75 
sical statistical mechanics, for example) to several 
different model objects, what must be assumed about those 
model objects?" In this case, the given is the fact that 
the carrying out of a specified procedure is being con-
sidered, while the required is the assumption that must 
be made in order to carry it out. The suggested answer 
to the preceding question is, "In order to apply the same 
general theory, such as classical statistical mechanics, 
to several different model objects, it must be assumed 
that the elements of each of those model objects are 
related to each other in similar ways, in ways described 
by the general theory." This answer simply fulfills the 
requirement of the question by specifying the asked for 
assumption. 
An example of the latter case is supplied by the 
question, "As long as the axiomatizability condition is 
not necessary to obtain a theoretical model, what is the 
reason for including it in the description of the pro-
cess?" Here, the condition is not asked for; it, along 
with the fact that it is included although not necessary, 
is part of the given. What is asked for is an explana-
tion of the anomaly wherein the condition is included in 
spite of the fact that it is not necessary to the speci-
fied process. The answer to this question, "Even though 
the axiomatizability condition is not necessary to obtain 
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a theoretical model, it is necessary in order to give a 
quick and exact definition of the concept," poses no 
special problems. It merely supplies the required ex-
planation which suggests that the condition, although not 
necessary, proves convenient. At this point, the discus-
sion proceeds from the consideration of concept-type P 
questions to an explanation of concept-type Q questions. 
Concept-type Q questions are concerned with judgements of 
some kind or other. These judgements or evaluations may 
determine truth-values, utility values, or the presence 
or absence of some property or other. Their objects 
might be concepts, theories, objects, methods or pro-
cedures. As an example of the latter, it may prove 
helpful to reexamine the question, "What criteria were 
applied in order to determine the falsity of Ising's 
model object?" Here, the given is the fact of a judge-
ment that determined the truth-value of a specified con-
cept, while the criteria used in making that judgement is 
asked for. The suggested answer is, "The criteria that 
were applied in order to determine the falsity of Ising's 
model object were the relatively greater prestige of the 
general theory (statistical mechanics) and the principle 
that requires a theoretical model to represent every 
significant (relevant?) aspect of its referent if it is 
not to be considered false." This answer, quite directly 
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and simply, provides the two criteria that the question 
asks for. 
Another, perhaps less typical, case is exemplified 
by the question, "What does it mean to say that the game 
is not just to account for appearance at any price?" The 
given is not in itself the atypical component of this 
question. What is somewhat unusual is the slightly in-
direct manner in which the given judgement is presented. 
This presentation does not make it quite as obvious as do 
some of the other questions that a judgement is being 
asked about, nor that the object of the judgement is a 
method, a procedure, or to a considerable extent, a goal. 
The second and rather more obvious departure from the 
content of the ordinary concept-type Q question is the 
fact that a meaning is asked for. This suggests that 
what is wanted is some kind of interpretation, explana-
tion or elaboration--an unpacking, as the cliche goes. 
The suggested answer to the question is, "To say that the 
game is not just to account for appearance at any price 
means that the attempt should be made not only to produce 
a mechanism that will adequately explain the end results 
of the referent, but come up with the actual mechanism 
that produces those results. This can be accomplished by 
showing some intermediate results that can be checked 
against those derived from the hypothetical mechanism." 
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This answer interprets the subject of the question as a 
kind of judgement-prescription. To categorize the ques-
tion as a concept-type Q question rather than as a con-
cept-type R question is to emphasize the judgement com-
ponent at the expense of the prescription component. The 
question could have, justifiably, been placed in both 
categories; it is already shared by concept-type cate-
gories H and Q. The decision not to place it in category 
R as well represents a prior or even an ipso facto deci-
sion regarding the placement of the border line between 
thoroughness and over-meticulosity. 
Consider now one more example, "Why should the one-
dimensional representation of a tridimensional system be 
considered the most audacious of all model objects?" 
Again, the given in the question is the fact of a judge-
ment; this time the judgement concerns the presence or 
absence of a specified quality in a specified concept. 
But what is asked for is a reason for that judgement--a 
justification. An answer is, "The one-dimensional repre-
sentation of a tridimensional system should be considered 
the most audacious of all model objects because, although 
model objects inherently fall short of fully representing 
their referents, the one-dimensional model object's at-
tempt to represent tridimensional referents can be con-
sidered particularly daring by virtue of the double hand-
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icap that it imposes upon itself by dispensing with two 
of the three dimensions that would ordinarily seem indis-
pensable to the adequate representation of tridimensional 
referents." This answer provides the required 
explanation-justification in a straightforeward, unequiv-
ocal manner. The discussion of concept-type Q questions 
ends here and the consideration of concept-type R ques-
tions begins. 
Concept-type R questions have to do with prescrip-
tions, advice or suggestions. It may be the case either 
that the question asks for a prescription or that it 
requires an explanation or justification of a prescrip-
tion already given. To exemplify the first of these 
cases, examine again the question, "What can be done to 
remedy the excessive coarseness and lack of economy char-
acteristic of the description of the model wherein the 
paired inputs and outputs are tabulated?" A prescription 
is asked for by this question. Take another look at the 
answer, "To remedy the excessive coarseness and lack of 
economy characteristic of the description of the model 
wherein the paired inputs and outputs are tabulated, the 
ordered pairs can be implied by means of a rule rather 
than stated explicitly by means of a table." It supplies 
the required prescription in a straightforeward and ob-
vious manner. 
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For an exemplification of the second case, look 
again at the question, "Why is an explicit statement of 
the semantic assumptions mandatory in the axiomatic re-
construction of a scientific theory?" In this case, the 
prescription is not asked for, but given. What is asked 
for is an explanatory justification of the given pre-
scription. The suggested answer is, "An explicit state-
ment of the semantic assumption is mandatory in the 
axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific theory because 
the same mathematical formulas will sometimes fit more 
than one referent. For example, the flow of water in a 
pipe can be represented by the same (or analogous) form-
ulas as the flow of electricity in a wire. Thus, an 
explicit statement of the semantic assumption is needed 
to make sure that there is no confusion regarding which 
formula is being linked to which referent." This answer 
provides the explanatory justification for the prescrip-
tion given by the question. And here the discussion 
proceeds from the consideration of concept-type R ques-
tions to the explanation of concept-type S questions. 
The special province of concept-type S questions 
lies in the area of things gone wrong. Problems, errors, 
confusions or failures are the sorts of things to be 
found in this terri tory--the land of the blemished, the 
faulted, the defective. In some cases, the problem or 
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error is given while an explanation or a response is 
asked for. In others the specification of the confusion 
or failure is expected. Or occasionally it may turn out 
that the fact of the error or confusion, masked in the 
question, shows up, perhaps unexpectedly, as the answer 
unfolds. 
The first example is a reexamination of the ques-
tion, "Why is it important not to confuse the model 
object with its referent?" The possibility as well as 
the nature of a confusion is specified as the given, 
while its significance or importance is what the question 
asks for. The suggested answer: "It is important not to 
confuse the model object with its referent because the 
same referent may be modeled by different model objects 
in different ways. Confusing the model object with its 
referent would, by obliterating or at least minimizing 
these differences, defeat the purpose of model objects--
to discover ever 'truer' ways of representing reality." 
This answer attempts to demonstrate the significance of 
the confusion by means of a three step argument that 
assumes that several unstated intermediate steps can be 
supplied by the student who has become familiar with the 
text. 
The opposite case: "What is the primary mistake 
that the black box philosopher makes?" Here the nature 
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of the error must be specified by the answer. Only the 
fact of the mistake and its perpetrator is given. The 
suggested answer is, "The black box philosopher's primary 
mistake is his failure to recognize that the acquisition 
of knowledge as opposed to mere use requires the con-
struction of built-up models as opposed to mere dark box 
models." Here, the mistake is specified and its general 
described as required by the question. 
Consider the question, "Why should the modeling 
relation occur explicitly in any formulation of a scient-
ific theory that takes care of the factual meaning of its 
symbols?" This question makes no obvious reference to an 
error or confusion at all. It simply asks why a theory 
should be formulated in a certain way. That is to say 
that it asks for a reason, an explanation. But look at 
the suggested answer, "The reason that the modeling rela-
tion should occur explicitly in any formulation of a 
scientific theory that takes care of the factual meaning 
of its symbols is to avoid any possible confusion between 
the model (theoretical) and the modeled (referent)." The 
required reason is supplied. But in the course of its 
development, it becomes clear that the original question 
implied a possible confusion to be avoided. 
The fourth and last example is, "In section 1 O, it 
is stated that (1) semantical models are interpretations 
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of formal systems that make all statements of the system 
true, (2) theoretical models (since their content is 
empirical) are never more that partially true so they 
cannot be semantical models, (3) the three empirical 
model objects described on page 112 are not always true, 
nonetheless (4) they constitute (or produce) semantical 
models." How is this possible?" This question suggests 
that something may be awry. But whether it presents a 
resolvable paradox or an unexplainable anomaly does be-
come apparent solely from reading it. Is the inconsist-
ency merely apparent or is it real? Here is the suggest-
ed answer, "This is not possible, it constitutes an 
unexplained contradiction. If semantical models are 
interpretations of formal systems that make all state-
ments of the system true (1), and theoretical, hence 
empirical, models are never more than partially true (2), 
then it is manifestly impossible for them to constitute 
semantical models." The suggestion of the last sentence 
of the question that the set of statements is somehow 
consistent is revealed as misleading. The answer, in 
effect, rejects the question as unanswerable and answers 
in the negative an implied substitute question: "Is this 
possible?" Moreover, by implication, it goes some dist-
ance toward accusing the author of having made a mistake. 
The accusation could not be made in a more positive way 
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because of the possibility that were the author present 
to defend himself he could come up with a satisfactory 
explanation of his apparent error. At this point, the 
explanation of concept-type S questions terminates and 
that of concept-type T questions begins. 
The questions that are categorized as belonging to 
concept-type T involve choices or options of various 
kinds. At times the choice given in the question re-
quires the answer either to explain the reasoning behind 
it or to specify the criteria that determined it. Other 
times a situation may be presented in the question which 
requires the answer to specify an appropriate response 
involving options or choices. 
As an example of the former, consider the question, 
"Why would it not be preferable to construct a model 
object that could represent its referent in every aspect 
instead of in merely certain significant aspects?" In 
this case, the question, in effect, presents an (albeit 
negative) choice already made and asks for a justifica-
tion of that choice. The suggested answer to this ques-
tion is, "It would not be preferable to construct a model 
object that could represent its referent in every aspect 
instead of in merely certain significant aspects because 
the possession of sufficient knowledge to construct such 
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a model object would render its construction redundant." 
This answer straightforewardly supplies the required 
justification. 
The latter case is represented by this example, 
"What is the basic choice that the model constructor must 
make?" Here, a situation is presented and the outline of 
a choice-structure or a set of options is looked for. 
This requirement is satisfied by the suggested answer, 
"The basic choice that the model constructor must make is 
between superficial knowledge and deep knowledge. 
former case, the black box is adequate. But 
In the 
in the 
latter cause, a built-up conceptual model is required." 
This concludes explanation of concept-type T questions 
and, since they range from A to T, of the concept-types 
in general. Of the explanation of the whole categorical 
system into which the questions and answers are organ-
ized, all that remains is a brief review of the specific-
content-constructs. 
The specific-content-constructs differ from the rest 
of the categories that have been used to categorize the 
question and answer set in that are not organizational 
categories imposed from without, but rather salient con-
cepts extracted from the body of the object-text itself. 
That is they are central concepts formulated by the 
author of the object-document and so their presence be-
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hind every question is at least implied whenever it is 
not specific. There are only four of these in the 
object-document used in this work: (1) referent, desig-
nated by the lower case letter "a," (2) model object, 
designated by letter "b," (3) theoretical model, desig-
nated by "c," and ( 4) general theory, by 1 et ter "d. "The 
referent is the bit of reality, the object, system or 
process that is modeled. The model object is the bare 
representation of the referent which has not as yet been 
organized deductively or mathematically. The theoretical 
model is the deductively and mathematically organized 
model model object. And a general theory is, as its name 
implies, a law or law-like theory of particularly wide 
application. These four concepts form a kind of concept-
chain. The interrelations between these concepts in the 
chain form the subject matter of the object-document. 
With this review of the specific-content-concepts, the 
explanation of the the categories that organize the ques-
tions is finished. The next three chapters will be 
devoted to the presentation of the question and answers 
themselves. 
CHAPTER VI 
TASKS I AND II: 
IDENTIFYING AND SPECIFYING 
This chapter along with the next two are devoted to 
the exposition of the results, the end-product of the 
present work--a set of questions and answers arranged 
hierarchically according to the principles that have been 
set forth in the previous chapters. It has been ex-
plained that each question and answer unit begins with an 
identity line that locates it within the complete ques-
tion and answer set, within the object-document, and 
within the conceptual hierarchy that forms the basis both 
for the formulation and for the organization of the 
question and answers. 
One word about the form of the suggested answers to 
the questions. It will undoubtedly be noted that each 
answer, in effect, contains the total conceptual sub-
stance of the question that it is meant to accompany. 
This is not accidental. The background assumption opera-
ting here is that a tendency exists among students to 
disassociate answers from the questions that they were 
intended to answer. It is the purpose of the present 
mode of formulating the suggested answers to combat this 
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tendency. Therefore, it is suggested that any practical 
application of either the question system or the prin-
ciples behind it not dispense with this feature. 
The questions and answers that follow in this 
chapter are numbered from 1 to 147. They are associated 
with the task-types I and II which involve the tasks of 
identification and specification. Here, then, are the 
questions and answers. 
Task I 
Question and Answer 1: page 92; line 1; type I, i, A, a. 
What is a referent? 
A referent (of a particular model object) is the 
object, process or bit of reality that is represented by 
that model object. 
Q and A 2: page 92; line 1; type I, i, A, b. 
What is a model object? 
A model object is a schematic representation of an 
object or process, that is (97-18), a schematic concep-
tual representation of a thing or of a situation assumed 
to be actual or possible. 
Q and A 3: page 97; line 17; type I, i, A, c. 
What is a theoretical model? 
A theoretical model is a hypothetico-deductive sys-
tem concerning a model object. 
Q and A 4: page 95; line 35; type I, i, A-C, a. 
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What is a factual referent? 
A factual referent is a referent that is not merely 
abstract (formal), it possesses empirical content. 
Q and A 5: page 93; line 2; type I, i, A-C, b. 
What are non-realistic abstract situations? 
Non-realistic abstract situations are, in effect, 
model objects in which only certain significant aspects 
of the referent are modeled. All other aspects of the 
referent are ignored. 
Q and A 6: page 110; line 35; type I, i, A-C, c. 
When is an interpretation of an abstract theory a 
semantical model? 
An interpretation of an abstract theory is a seman-
tical model whenever it makes the theory come out true in 
all circumstances. 
Q and A 7: page 107; line 14; type I, iii, A, d. 
What is a general theory? 
A ~ene~~l theory is a theory (a hypothetico-
deductive system) that has a particularly wide range of 
application by virtue of the fact that it contains only 
high level abstractions, which is to say that it has no 
specific empirical content. 
Q and A 8: page 102; line 20; type I, iii, C, c. 
What is a theoretical model of the behavior of a 
system? 
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A theoretical model of the behavior of a system is a 
set of statements, preferably mathematical formlulas, 
relating the exogenous variables I and O and the endogen-
ous variables S of the system. 
Task II: 
Q and A 9: page 92; line 2; type II, i, A, a. 
What is the object, mechanism, or process that a 
model object represents ? 
The object, mechanism, or process that a model ob-
ject represents is its referent. 
Q and A 10: page 112; line 15; type II, i, A, a. 
What is the referent of which the physical interpre-
tation of the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s');" and 
"H(s,s' )," constitutes a model object? 
The referent of which the physical interpretation of 
the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and "H(s,s');" con-
stitute a model object is an electrical current at a 
given point in a circuit. 
Q and A 11 : page 11 2; 1 i ne 1 5; type I I, i, A, a. 
What is the referent of which the sociological in-
terpretation of the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and 
"H(s,s');" constitutes a model object? 
The referent of which the sociological interpreta-
tion of the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and 
"G(s,s') ;" constitute a model object is the probability 
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of migration taking place between one given country and 
another. 
Q and A 12: page 103; line 22; type II, i, A-D, a. 
What is the referent of the water molecule? 
The referent of the water molecule is the composi-
tion of water, since it is this that the water molecule 
sets out to explain. In another sense, it can be said 
that the referent of the hypothetical or model water 
molecule is the "real" molecule that it is presumed to 
represent. 
Q and A 13: page 106; line 24; type II, i, A-H, d. 
What must be added to a general theory in order to 
obtain a theoretical model? 
A model object must be added to a general theory in 
order to obtain a theoretical model. 
Q and A 14: page 96; line 11; type II, i, B, a. 
What do certain real valued functions that are given 
on a differentiable manifold represent? 
Certain real valued functions that are given on a 
differentiable manifold represent properties of the ref-
erent. 
Q and A 15: page 95; line 1; type II, i, B, b. 
What feature of crude (simple) models frequently 
renders them more instructive than more complicated mod-
els? 
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The feature of crude (simple) models that frequently 
renders them more instructive than more complicated mod-
els is the exactness or precision of the solutions that 
they provide. 
Q and A 16: page 110; line 15; type II, i, B, b. 
What is the essential property of model objects 
that renders them useful? 
The essential property of model objects that renders 
them useful is their ability to be expanded into hypo-
thetico-deductive systems to form theoretical models. 
Q and A 17: page 101; line 3; type II, i, B-C, c. 
When it is said that there are many kinds of model 
objects and, consequently, of theoretical models, what 
property or properties account for these differences? 
When it is said that there are many kinds of model 
objects and, consequently, of theoretical models, the 
property that accounts for the differences being talked 
about is the amount of explanatory mechanism that is 
postulated in each kind of model object. 
Q and A 18: page 105; line 30; type II, i, B-H, d. 
What characteristic of a given field of research 
diminishes the probability of finding general theories in 
that field? 
A field of research that is likely to have few 
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general theories is one that has produced mainly isolated 
bits of knowledge rather than unifying concepts. 
Q and A 19: page 106; line 3; type II, i, B-H, d. 
What kind of field of research can be expected to 
have many general theories? 
A field of research that has produced many unifying 
concepts rather than mere isolated bits of knowledge can 
be expected to have many general theories. 
Q and A 20: page 102; line 8; type II, i, C, b. 
What kind of a model object is it that simply re-
lates input and output by means of a rule. 
A model object that simply relates input and output 
by means of a rule is a black box. 
Q and A 21: page 102; line 13; type II, i, C, b. 
What is a model called if it has an input and an 
output along with internal variables, but no explanatory 
mechanism? 
A model that has an input and an output along with 
internal variables but no explanatory mechanism is called 
a grey box. 
Q and A 22: page 102; line 17; type II, i, c, b. 
What is a model called if its law can be represented 
by a formula relating the input, output, and the internal 
variables to each other? 
If a model's law can be represented by a formula 
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relating the input, output, and the internal variables to 
each other, it is called a grey box. 
Q and A 23: page 102; line 36; type II, i, c, b. 
What is a behavior model of a system? 
A behavior model of a system is a model that at-
tempts to relate significant phenomena to each other 
without attempting to explain them by means of any con-
jectured structure or mechanism. A model of this kind 
that makes no attempt to go beyond the phenomena is a 
black or grey box. 
Q and A 24: page 95; line 32; type II, i, C, c. 
What is a model object, if theoretical? 
A model object, if theoretical, is not a model 
object at all. According to the terminology that has 
been employed hitherto, it is a theoretical model. 
Q and A 25: page 105; line 9; type II, i, C-D-S, b. 
Discussion of the variety of models that can be 
proposed for any given system serves to combat what 
erroneous notion? 
Discussion of the variety of models that can be 
proposed for any given system serves to combat the mis-
taken notion that there is a one-to-one relation between 
referents and their models. 
Q and A 26: page 103; line 1; type II, i, C-G, b. 
What do black box models accomplish? 
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Black box models make it possible to condense the 
data and to predict the evolution of the system. 
Q and A 27: page 105; line 16; type II, i, C-G, b. 
If the primary goal of model construction were mere-
1 y to make practical use of the referent, what kind of 
model would be most appropriate? 
If the primary goal of model construction were mere-
1 y to make practical use of the referent, the black or 
grey box model would probably prove most appropriate. 
Q and A 28: page 105; line 16; type II, i, C-G, b. 
In view of the fact that the goal of model construc-
tion is primarily the acquisition of theoretical know-
ledge, what kind of model object accords best with that 
goal? 
In view of the fact that the goal of model construc-
tion is primarily the acquisition of theoretical know-
ledge, a built-up model object accords best with that 
goal. 
Q and A 29: page 105; line 34; type II, i, C-G, b. 
What can a bui 1 t-up model object do that a black box 
model cannot? 
A built-up model object can, and a black box model 
cannot, do the following: (1) A built-up model object can 
explain what takes place as opposed to merely noting that 
it does take place. (2) A built-up model object can 
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predict new facts as opposed to merely making it possible 
to compute outputs for given inputs. (3) A built-up 
model object can provide knowledge that fits in with 
present knowledge as opposed to merely restating the 
behavior of observed systems. 
Q and A 30: page 91; line 16; type II, i, CH, b. 
What can be accomplished with a "black box'?" 
A black box can be expanded into a hypothetico-
deductive system to produce a theoretical model. 
Q and A 31: page 91; line 16; type II, 1. C-G-I, b. 
What can be accomplished with a "black box'?" 
A black box can be expanded into a hypothetico-
deducti ve system to produce a theoretical model. 
Q and A 32: page 99; line 30; type II, i, C-G-0, b. 
What is the point of citing the necklace, the socio-
gram, and the Watson-Crick model'? 
The point of citing the necklace, the sociogram, and 
the Watson-Crick model is to emphasize the fact that a 
variety of kinds of models is possible. 
Q and A 33: page 100; line 1; type II, i, C-H, c. 
How many ways are there of obtaining a theoretical 
model'? 
There are two ways of obtaining a theoretical model. 
Q and A 34: page 100; line 1; type II, i, C-H, c. 
What are the two ways of obtaining a theoretical 
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model? 
The two ways of obtaining a theoretical model are 
either to expand the model object or to embed it in a 
general theory. 
Q and A 35: page 104; line 29; type II, i, C-H-Q, b. 
How can the truth of the built-up models be checked? 
The truth of the built-up models can be checked by 
attempting to infer behavior from them. 
Q and A 36: page 101; line 4; type II, i, C-J, b. 
What is the name given to a model object having no 
internal explanatory mechanism? 
The name given to a model object having no internal 
explanatory mechanism is "black box." 
Q and A 37: page 101; line 26; type II, i, C-J, b. 
What is a model object that concerns itself only 
with accounting for the end results of the referent 
without attempting to explain how these results are ob-
tained called? 
A model object that concerns itself only with ac-
counting for the end results of the referent without 
attempting to explain how these results are obtained is 
called a black box. 
Q and A 38: page 111; line 12; type II, i, C-J, c. 
What could a theoretical model that has been "con-
firmed" be termed to show that, to some extent (albeit 
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inadequately), it fulfills the requirements of a seman-
tical model? 
In order to show that, to some extent, a "confirmed" 
theoretical model fulfills the requirements of a seman-
tical model, it could be termed a "guasimodel." 
Q and A 39: page 107; line 25; type II, i, C-L, c. 
What kind of theory is likely to be logically weak? 
The kind of theory that is likely to be logically 
weak is a specific theory (or theoretical model). 
Q and A 40: page 107; line 25; type II, i, C-L, d. 
What kind of theory is likely to be logically 
strong? 
The kind of theory that is likely to be logically 
strong is a general theory. 
Q and A 41: page 109; line 7; type II, i, C-M, c. 
What is the difference between deterministic models 
and probabilistic models? 
The difference between deterministic models and 
probabilistic models is that deterministic models predict 
(or attempt to predict) what will occur under certain 
given conditions, whereas probabilistic models try to 
predict what m~ happen under given conditions while 
indicating in mathematical terms what the chances are 
that this or that event will or will not occur. 
Q and A 42: page 105; line 27; type II, i, C-T, b. 
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What is the basic choice that the model constructor 
must make? 
The basic choice that the model constructor must 
make is between superficial knowledge and deep knowledge. 
In the former case, the black box is adequate. But in 
the latter cause, a built-up conceptual model is re-
quired. 
Q and A 43: page 91; line 5; type II, i, D, b. 
What is the relation between the ball-and-spoke 
model of a molecule and the molecule itself? 
The relation between the ball-and-spoke model of a 
molecule and the molecule itself is the relation that 
holds between a model object and its referent: the 
modeling relation. 
Q and A 44: page 91; line 1 O; type II, i, D, b. 
What is the relation between a continuum endowed 
with certain properties, such as compressibility and 
viscosity, and a fluid? 
The relation between a continuum endowed with cer-
tain properties, such as compressibility and viscosity 
and fluid is the relation that holds between a model 
object and its referent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 45: page 91; line 13; type II, i, D, b. 
What is the relation between a black box and a 
learning organism? 
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The relation between a black box and a learning 
organism is the relation that holds between a model 
object and its referent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 46: page 92; line 6; type II, i, D, b. 
Of what is the relation between a contour map of a 
molecule and the molecule itself an example? 
The relation between a contour map of a molecule and 
the molecule itself is the relation that holds between a 
model object and its referent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 47: page 92; line 7; type II, i, D, b. 
Of what is the relation between the hamiltonian 
operator for a molecule and the molecule itself an exam-
ple? 
The relation between the hamiltonian operator for a 
molecule and the molecule itself is an example of the 
relation that holds between a model object and its refer-
ent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 48: page 92; line 10; type II, i, D, b. 
Of what is the relation between the random net model 
of the brain and the brain itself an example? 
The relation between the random net model of the 
brain and the brain itself is an example of the relation 
that holds between a model object and its referent: the 
modeling relation. 
Q and A 49: page 92; line 24; type II, i, D, b. 
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What is the relation between a homogeneous set or 
equivalence class of mice and all the individuals of a 
given mice strain? 
The relation between a homogeneous set or equival-
ence class of mice and all the individuals of a given 
mice strain is the relation that holds between a model 
object and its referent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 50: page 92; line 26; type II, i, D, b. 
What is the relation between the ordered triple (m, 
n, Q) and a collision of m cars having as a result n 
injured persons with a total damage of Q dollars? 
The relation between the ordered triple (m, g, Q) 
and a collision of m cars having as a result n injured 
persons with a total damage of Q dollars is the relation 
that holds between a model object and its referent: the 
modeling relation. 
Q and A 51: page 93; line 23; type II, i, D, b. 
What is the relation between a sketch of an animal 
population and the animal population itself? 
The relation between a sketch of an animal popula-
tion and the animal population itself is the relation 
between a model object and its referent: the modeling 
relation. 
Q and A 52: page 96; line 3; type II, i, D, b. 
What sorts of elements are related to other elements 
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by the modeling relation? 
The modeling relation relates constructs to facts. 
Q and A 53: page 96; line 4; type II, i, D, b. 
The modeling relates what to what? 
The modeling relation relates model objects (and, by 
extension, theoretical models) to referents. 
Q and A 54: page 93; line 5; type II, i, D, b. 
What is the relation between a sketch of an animal 
population and the animal population itself? 
The relation between a sketch of an animal popula-
tion and the animal population itself is the relation 
that holds between a model object and its referent: the 
modeling relation. 
Q and A 55: page 100; line 9; type II, i, D, b. 
What is the relation between Mand R? 
The relation between M and R is the modeling rela-
tion. This relation can be expressed by saying that M is 
the model object that models R or that R is a referent 
that is represented by model object M. 
Q and A 56: page 92; line 8; type II, i, D-E, b. 
Of what is the relation between the Pseudo Areo-
pagite's model of the celestial hierarchy and the celes-
tial hierarchy itself an example? 
The relation between the Pseudo Areopagite's model 
of the celestial hierarchy and the celestial hierarchy 
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itself is an example of the relation that holds between a 
model object and its referent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 57: page 92; line 10; type II, i, D-E, b. 
Of what is the relation between the random net model 
of the brain and the brain itself an example? 
The relation between the random net model of the 
brain and the brain itself is an example of the relation 
that holds between a model object and its referent: the 
modeling relation. 
Q and A 58: page 92; line 24; type II, i, D-E, b. 
What is the relation between a homogeneous set or 
equivalence class of mice and all the individuals of a 
given mice strain? 
The relation between a homogeneous set or equi-
valence class of mice and all the individuals of a given 
mice strain is the relation that holds between a model 
object and its referent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 59: page 92; line 26; type II, i, D-E, b 
What is the relation between the ordered triple (m, 
g, £) and a collision of m cars having as a result n 
injured persons with a total damage of £ dollars? 
The relation between the ordered triple (m, n, £) 
and a collision of m cars having as a result n injured 
persons with a total damage of £ dollars is the relation 
that holds between a model object and its referent: the 
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modeling relation. 
Q and A 60: page 93; line 10; type II, i, D-E, b. 
What is the relation between Ising's model of matter 
in condensed states and matter in condensed states it-
self. 
The relation between Ising's model of matter in 
condensed states and matter in condensed states itself is 
the relation that holds between a model object and its 
referent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 61: page 96; line 4; type II, i, D-E, b. 
What relation is presumed to hold between the set of 
all of the first elements of the ordered pair (c,f) and 
the set of all of the second elements of the same ordered 
pair? 
The relation that is presumed to hold between the 
set of all of the first elements of the ordered pair 
(c,f) and the set of all of the second elements of the 
same ordered pair is the relation that is presumed to 
hold between a model object and its referent: the model-
ing relation. 
Q and A 62: page 92; line 6; type II, i, D-K, b. 
Of what is the relation between a contour map of a 
molecule and the molecule itself an example? 
The relation between a contour map of a molecule and 
the molecule itself is the relation that holds between a 
model object and its referent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 63: page 93; line 23; type II, i, D-K, b. 
105 
What is the relation between a sketch of an animal 
population and the animal population itself? 
The relation between a sketch of an animal popula-
tion and the animal population itself is the relation 
that holds between a model object and its referent: the 
modeling relation. 
Q and A 64: page 92; line 33; type II, i, D-K, b. 
What does the sign "§" designate? 
The sign 11§ 11 designates the relation between a model 
object and its referent. 
Q and A 65: page 112; line 15; type II, i, E, a. 
What is the referent of which the physical interpre-
tation of the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')" and 
"H(s,s')," constitutes a model object? 
The referent of which the physical interpretation of 
the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and "H(s,s')" con-
stitute a model object is an electrical current at a 
given point in a circuit. 
Q and A 66: page 112; line 15; type II, i, E, a. 
What is the referent of which the sociological in-
terpretation of the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and 
"H(s,s')" constitutes a model object? 
The referent of which the sociological interpreta-
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tion of the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and 
11G(s,s 1 ) 11 constitute a model object is the probability of 
migration taking place between one given country and 
another. 
Q and A 67: page 100; line 21; type II, H, E-G, b. 
What do the mass point and the ball do? 
The mass point and the ball--as examples of model 
objects--constitute alternate hypotheses that model a 
planet. 
Q and A 68: page 103; line 20; type II, i, E-G, b. 
What is the water molecule example supposed to show? 
The water molecule example is supposed to show how 
conjecture and imagination are needed to explain the law 
of multiple proportions. Thus, this example is intended 
to exemplify the type of difficulty inherent in the at-
tempt to disclose hidden structure and mechanism. 
Q and A 69: page 109; line 2; type II, i, E-G, b. 
What is the purpose of the examples of the mechan-
isms of electromagnetic propagation, of complex chemical 
reactions, and of biological evolution? 
The purpose of the examples of the mechanisms of 
electromagnetic propagation, of complex chemical reac-
tions, and of biological evolution is to combat the 
identification of the concepts of model and mechanism, 
that is, to show that the concept of model is broader 
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than this identification would suggest, that there are 
models that are not mechanistic. 
Q and A 70: page 109; line 27; type II, i, E-G, b. 
What is the purpose of the quantum theory example? 
The purpose of the quantum theory example is to show 
how a too narrow concept of model object (model objects 
are invariably analogues) has precipitated unnecessary 
confusion into an area of scientific investigation. 
Q and A 71: page 110; line 8; type II, i, E-G, b. 
What is the purpose of the coupled oscillators exam-
ple? 
The purpose of the coupled oscillators example is to 
reinforce the point that model objects, and hence the-
ories, are solely sets of statements and never can in-
clude pictorial representations as integral parts. 
Q and A 72: page 110; line 8; type II, i, E-G, b. 
What is the purpose of the coupled oscillators exam-
ple? 
The purpose of the coupled oscillators example is to 
reinforce the point that model objects, and hence the-
ories, are solely sets of statements and never can in-
clude pictorial representations as integral parts. 
Q and A 73: page 100; line 19; type II, i, E-G, c. 
What is the point of the example of the mass point 
or the ball as model objects for a planet? 
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The point of the example of the mass point or the 
ball as model objects for a planet is that model objects 
by themselves are not sufficient. Theoretical models 
must be constructed from the model objects if they are to 
prove useful. 
Q and A 74: page 107; line 14; type II, i, E-G, c. 
What is the purpose of the shell oscillation exam-
ple? 
The purpose of the shell oscillation example is the 
demonstration of the indispensability of theoretical 
models. 
Q and A 75: page 106; line 13; type II, i, E-G, d. 
What is the reason for bringing up the example of 
the model of a gas as a swarm of point particles connec-
ted by van der Waals forces? 
The model of a gas as a swarm of point particle 
connected by van der Waals forces was brought up for the 
purpose of exemplifying the processes whereby the same 
model object can be fitted into different general the-
ories thereby producing different theoretical models. 
Q and A 76: page 108; line 10; type II, i, E-G, d. 
What is the purpose of the example of the sun, the 
rotating ellipsoid or a mass point, and the theories of 
gravitation and of light? 
The purpose of the example of the sun, the rotating 
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ellipsoid or a mass point, and the theories of gravita-
tion and of light is to illustrate what can and should be 
done when a theoretical model embedded in a general 
theory fails to conform to the facts. 
Q and A 77: page 108; line 18; type II, i, E-G, d. 
What is the purpose of the Dicke and Brans example? 
The purpose of the Dicke and Brans example is to 
illustrate how the violation of the prescribed methodo-
logical rule has, in a real case, led theorists astray. 
Dicke and Brans violated this rule by proposing to dis-
card Einstein's highly prestigious gravitation theory. 
Q and A 78: page 109; line 15; type II, i, E-G, d. 
What is the purpose of the example of the model of a 
machine out of kilter (model object) as a model of an 
unreliable fellow (referent) being embedded in the theory 
of Markovian machines (general theory)? 
The purpose of the example of the model of a machine 
out of kilter as a model of an unreliable fellow being 
embedded (the model, not the fellow) in the theory of 
Markovian machines is to further broaden the concept of 
the model object by showing that not all model objects 
function as analogues by representing their referents in-
directly in terms of another (usually more familiar) 
mechanism or process, but rather, that some model objects 
represent their referents by ref erring to them directly 
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and literally. 
Q and A 79: page 107; line 1; type II, i, E-G-H, d. 
What is the purpose of the meteorologist example? 
The purpose of the meteorologist example is to show 
how, in an "advanced area," theoretical models are typi-
cally produced by uniting the model objects with pre-
existing general theories rather than, as in the "back-
ward areas," by building a hypothetico-deductive system 
around the model object. 
Q and A 80: page 100; line 13; type II, i, E-J, c. 
What is it that constitutes a theoretical model of a 
collection R of things? 
What constitutes a theoretical model of a collection 
R of things is a hypothetico-deductive system with primi-
tive base M. 
Q and A 81: page 98; line 21; type II, i, E-L, c. 
What is the central hypothesis of the McCulloch and 
Pitts model of the brain? 
The central hypothesis of the McCulloch and Pitts 
model of the brain is that neurons fire only when the 
preceding neurons have fired during the preceding moment. 
Q and A 82: page 93; line 25; type II, i, E-N-Q, b. 
What criteria were applied in order to determine the 
falsity of Ising's model object? 
The criteria that were applied in order to determine 
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the falsity of Ising's model object were the relatively 
greater prestige of the general theory (statistical me-
chanics) and the principle that requires a theoretical 
model to represent every significant (relevant?) aspect 
of its referent if it is not to be considered false. 
Q and A 83: page 107; line 25; type II, i, E-0, d. 
What example of a logically strong theory has been 
cited? 
The example of logically strong theory that has been 
cited (by implication, at least) is that of classical 
mechanics? 
Q and A 84: page 107; line 14; type II, i, G, c. 
What are the three chief functions of theoretical 
models? 
The three chief functions of theoretical models are 
these: (1) the posing of specific theoretical problems, 
(2) the solution (explanation) of specific theoretical 
problems, and (3) the testing of proposed solutions 
(explanations). 
Q and A 85: page 99; line 18; type II, i, G-H, b. 
When a model object has been characterized in exact 
terms with the help of mathematical concepts, such as 
those of function and series, what has been accomplished? 
When a model object has been characterized in exact 
terms with the help of mathematical concepts, such as 
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those of function and series, a theoretical model has 
been constructed. 
Q and A 86: page 105; line 16; type II, i, G-H, b. 
What are the two principal goals of model construe-
tion? 
The two principal goals of model construction are as 
follows: (1) to acquire theoretical understanding of the 
referent, (2) to make practical use of the referent. 
Q and A 87: page 91; line 10; type II, i, G-H, d. 
What can be accomplished with a continuum endowed 
with certain properties, such as compressibility and 
viscosity? 
A continuum endowed with certain properties, such as 
compressibility and viscosity can be conjoined with 
(grafted onto) classical mechanics, general relativistic 
mechanics or some other general theory to produce a 
theoretical model of a fluid. 
Q and A88: page 106; line 18; type II, i, G-H, d. 
What is the purpose of assuming different particle 
shapes and different force laws while keeping classical 
mechanics throughout? 
The purpose of assuming different particle shapes 
and different force laws while keeping classical mechan-
ics throughout is to exemplify a method of applying 
different model objects to the same general theory to 
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obtain different theoretical models. 
Q and A 89: page 98; line 29; type II, i, G-H-0, b. 
What is the purpose of the reference to the success 
of McCulloch and Pitts? 
The purpose of the reference to the success of 
McCulloch and Pitts is to justify the method of starting 
with models objects that ignore certain significant as-
pects of their referents and then proceeding to compli-
cate them when necessary. 
Q and A 90: page 99; line 5; type II, i, G-H-0, c. 
What is the point of listing some of the aspects of 
the referent that stochastic learning models ignore? 
Some of the aspects of the referent that stochastic 
learning models ignore are listed in order to emphasize 
the concept of a model as a simplification or idealiza-
tion. 
Q and A 91: page 100; line 15; type II, i, G-H-P, c. 
As long as the axiomatizability condition is not 
necessary to obtain a theoretical model, what is the 
reason for including it in the description of the pro-
cess? 
Even though the axiomatizability condition is not 
necessary to obtain a theoretical model, it is necessary 
in order to give a quick and exact definition of the 
concept. 
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Q and A 92: page 98; line 31; type II, i, G-I-0, c. 
What does the introduction of Rapoport's stochastic 
models of the central nervous system accomplish? 
The introduction of Rapoport's stochastic models of 
the central nervous system serves to justify the delayed 
complication of theoretical model--in this case, with the 
addition of the random factor. 
Q and A 93: page 92; line 3; type II, i, G-K, b. 
What is the point of saying that the representation 
may be pictorial, conceptual, figurative, semisymbolic, 
or symbolic? 
The point of saying that the representation may be 
pictorial, conceptual, figurative, semisymbolic, or sym-
bolic is that these are the modes of representation that 
model objects may make use of in performing their func-
tion of representing their referents. 
Q and A 94: page 92; line 28; type II, i, G-K, c. 
What is the importance of the mode of representation 
of model objects and theoretical models? The modes of 
representation of model objects and theoretical models 
are important only to the extent that they be necessary 
to enable the model objects or theoretical models to 
accomplish their purpose of representing reality. All of 
which is to say that their importance is not intrinsic at 
all; it is merely instrumental. 
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Q and A 95: page 100; line 26; type II, i, G-K, c. 
What does the table do? 
The table gives examples of model objects along with 
their corresponding referents and theoretical models. 
Q and A 96: page 103; line 29; type II, i, G-M-R, b. 
What is the importance of contrasting users with 
designers or scientists with engineers? 
Users are contrasted with designers and scientists 
with engineers to show how the model's application should 
determine whether a dark box or a built-up model is 
chosen. Where mere use is contemplated, the dark box 
model is adequate, but where knowledge is desired, a 
built-up model is needed. 
Q and A 97: page 95; line 13; type II, i, G-0, b. 
What is the citation of Bush and Mosteller, and of 
Sternberg supposed to accomplish 
The citing of Bush and Mosteller, and of Sternberg 
is supposed justify the procedure whereby crude (simple) 
models are utilized in the early stages of an investiga-
tion to point the way to the more complicated, hence 
realistic, models that are to be used in the later stages 
of the investigation. 
Q and A 98: page 105; line 16; type II, i, G-0, b. 
What is the purpose of the Pringle citation? 
The purpose of the Pringle citation is to emphasize 
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the dependence of the choice of model upon the goal of 
the investigator. If the goal is only to summarize data, 
a black box model is sufficient. But if further know-
ledge is sought, a built-up model is needed. 
Q and A 99: page 94; line 30; type II, i, G-0, c. 
What is the introduction of the papers by Kac, 
Uhlenbeck, and Hemmer; Dyson; and Kronig and Penney sup-
posed to accomplish? 
The introduction of the papers by Kac, Uhlenbeck, 
and Hemmer; Dyson; and Kronig and Penney is supposed to 
justify the use of crude theoretical models in the early 
stages of an investigation. 
Q and A 100: page 103; line 25; type II, i, G-0-S, b. 
What is made of the fact that the water molecule was 
rejected by turn of the century energetists? 
The rejection of the water molecule model by the 
turn of the century energetists is part of a sort of 
reductio ad absurdum argument meant to show the foolish-
ness of preferring a grey box model to a built-up one. 
The preference for grey or black box models can lead to 
the rejection of models that later prove their worth by 
gaining general acceptance. 
Q and A 101: page 107; line 35; type II, i, G-Q, c. 
What is the object of assessing blame in case a 
theory fails? 
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The object of assessing blame in case a theory fails 
is to know what to modify or discard in order to come up 
with a viable theory. 
Q and A 102: page 91; line 11; type II, i, H, c. 
In what two ways can theoretical models be obtained? 
Theoretical models can be obtained either by graf-
ting model objects onto general theories or by expanding 
model objects to hypothetico-deductive systems. 
Q and A 103: page 105; line 37; type II, i, H, c. 
In a field of research like contemporary mathemati-
cal sociology which has tended to produce isolated bits 
of knowledge rather than unifying concepts, how are the-
oretical models typically constructed? 
In a field of research like contemporary mathemati-
cal sociology which has tended to produce isolated bi ts 
of knowledge rather than unifying concepts, theoretical 
models are typically constructed by by building them 
around model objects. This is usually done by expanding 
the model into a mathematically oriented hypothetico-
deductive system, 
Q and A 104: page 106; line 3; type II, i, H, c. 
In a field of research like atomic and molecular 
physics which has tended to produce unifying concepts 
rather than mere isolated bits of knowledge, how are 
theoretical models typically constructed? 
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In a field of research like atomic and molecular 
physics which has tended to produce unifying concepts 
rather than mere isolated bits of knowledge, theoretical 
models are typically produced by fitting model objects to 
existing general theories. That is to say that the model 
object is attached to the relevant part of the mathemati-
cal hypothetico-deductive apparatus of the general the-
ory. 
Q and A 105: page 106; line 29; type II, i, H, c. 
How are theoretical models usually obtained in the 
developing areas of science? 
In the developing areas of science, theoretical 
models are usually obtained by starting with the model 
object and elaborating a set of formulas that define it. 
Q and A 106: page 107; line 8; type II, i, H, c. 
What manner of producing theoretical models do psy-
chologists and sociologists have at their disposal? 
The manner of producing theoretical models that 
psychologists and sociologists have at their disposal 
involves building hypothetico-deductive systems around 
model objects. 
Q and A 107: page 91; line 11; type II, i, H, d. 
What process unites a model object with a general 
theory? 
The process that unites a model object with a gener-
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al theory is the process of "grafting on." 
Q and A 108: page 97; line 26; type II, i, H, d. 
What can be done with a general theory in conjunc-
tion with a model object? 
A general theory can be applied to a model object to 
produce a theoretical model. 
Q and A 109: page 106; line 20; type II, i, H, d. 
In what two ways can multiple theoretical models be 
generated? 
Multiple theoretical models can be generated either 
by embedding the same model object into different general 
theories or by grafting different model objects onto the 
same general theory. 
Q and A 110: page 106; line 25; type II, i, H, d. 
How is a model object added to a general theory in 
order to produce a theoretical model? 
A model object is added to a general theory in order 
to produce a theoretical model by adding to the general 
theory a set of subsidiary hypotheses that characterize 
or define the model object 
Q and A 111: page 107; line 25; type II, i, H, d. 
How are general theories tested? 
General theories are tested by testing the theoreti-
cal models that are produced from them by joining model 
objects to them. 
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Q and A 112: page 93; line 33; type II, i, H-I, b. 
What procedure do Onsager's good results justify? 
The procedure that Onsager's good results justify is 
that of making simple model objects to start and compli-
cating them later. 
Q and A 113: page 107; line 19; type II, i, H-I, b. 
What is the result of specifying the boundary and 
initial conditions, the mass and stress distributions, 
and the external forces for the oscillation of a shell? 
The result of specifying the boundary and initial 
conditions, the mass and stress distributions, and the 
external forces for the oscillation of a shell is a model 
object. 
Q and A 114: page 97; line 9; type II, i, H-I, c. 
What must done with a model object if it is to 
become useful? 
If a model object is to become useful, it must be 
converted into a theoretical model. 
Q and A 115: page 98; line 8; type II, i, H-I, c. 
What can be accomplished by complicating the Bloch 
model? 
By complicating the Bloch model, more properties of 
the crystal can be explained. 
Q and A 116: page 98; line 10; type II, i, H-I, c. 
What must be done in order to render the theoretical 
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model capable of representing more traits? 
To render the theoretical model capable of represen-
ting more traits, it must be made more complicated. 
Q and A 117: page 104; line 19; type II, i, H-I, c. 
What is the result of adding the constitutive equa-
tions of the oscillation of a shell to the model object 
of this referent? 
The result of adding the constitutive equations of 
the oscillation of a shell to the model object of this 
referent is a theoretical model of it. 
Q and A 118: page 97; line 25; type II, i, H-I, d. 
How was the Bloch model of a crystal obtained? 
The Bloch model of a crystal was obtained by ap-
plying wave mechanics (a general theory) to a simple 
model of a crystal (a model object). 
Q and A 119: page 109; line 19; type II, i, H-I, d. 
What would be the expected result of embedding the 
model of a machine out of kilter (model object) in the 
theory of Markovian machines (general theory)? 
The expected result of embedding the model of a 
machine out of kilter in the theory of Markovian machines 
would be the production of a theoretical model. 
Q and A 120: page 99; line 2; type II, i, H-M, d. 
What difference between the advanced and the back-
ward sciences makes it necessary to obtain theoretical 
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models differently in each? 
The difference between the advanced and the backward 
sciences that makes it necessary to obtain theoretical 
models differently in each is the relatively plentiful 
supply of general theories in the one as opposed to their 
relative paucity in the other. 
Q and A 121: page 99; line 22; type II, i, H-M, d. 
What is the difference in the way that theoretical 
models are typically obtained in the advanced sciences as 
opposed to the way that they are obtained in the backward 
sciences? 
In the advanced sciences, theoretical models are 
typically obtained by embedding model objects in one or 
another of the relatively plentiful general theories that 
are to be found there. In the backward sciences, how-
ever, theoretical models are usually obtained by expand-
ing the model objects into mathematically explicit hypo-
thetico-deductive systems; since there, general theories 
are typically scarce. 
Q and A 122: page 100; line 1; type II, i, H-P, c. 
What is the prerequisite (if any) for obtaining a 
theoretical model? 
The prerequisite for obtaining a theoretical model 
is a model object. 
Q and A 123: page 107; line 8; type II, i, H-P, d. 
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What is the enviable position that the psychologists 
and sociologists have not, so far, attained? 
The enviable position that the psychologists and 
sociologists have not, so far, attained is that of being 
able to count on general theories to attach their model 
objects to in order to produce theoretical models. 
Q and A 124: page 108; line 15; type II, i, H-P, d. 
Under what conditions should the model object be 
modified or discarded in favor of the general theory? 
The model object should be modified or discarded in 
favor of the genera 1 theory when the genera 1 theory has 
had a long and distinguished career or then the model 
object is obviously much too coarse. 
Q and A 125: page 108; line 20; type II, i, H-P, d. 
Under what conditions should the general theory be 
modified or discarded in favor of the model object? 
The general theory should be modified or discarded 
in favor of the model object if it has failed in the past 
or if it is very young and cannot be assigned a truth 
value. 
Q and A 126: page 108; line 23; type II, i, H-Q, c. 
What three steps are involved in the verification of 
theoretical models? 
The three steps involved in the verification of 
theoretical models are these: ( 1) the bui !ding of sev-
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eral model objects,(2) the joining of these model objects 
to the generic theory to produce theoretical models, a 
(3) the testing of these theoretical models to find out 
if they agree with the empirical facts. 
Q and A 127: page 108; line 1; type II, i, H-Q-S, d. 
If a theoretical model not associated with a general 
theory fails to conform to the facts, what can be done? 
If a theoretical model not associated with a general 
theory fails to conform to the facts, the theoretical 
model must be modified or replaced. This involves trying 
out other theoretical models. 
Q and A 128: page 107; line 35; type II, i, H-Q-T, d. 
In case that a theory fails, what options are avail-
able with respect to blame assessment? 
In case that a theory fails, the options that are 
available with respect to blame assessment are either to 
blame the theoretical model, and hence the model object, 
or to blame the general theory. 
Q and A 129: page 103; line 13; type II, i, H-S, b. 
What difficulty is inherent in most attempts to 
disclose the inner structure and mechanism of a system? 
The difficulty inherent in most attempts to disclose 
the inner structure and and mechanism of a system lies in 
the fact that such structures and mechanisms are usually 
hidden and cannot be seen. Thus, they must be conjec-
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tured or imagined. 
Q and A 130: page 108; line 5; type II, i, H-S-T, d. 
If a theoretical model that is associated with a 
general theory fails to conform to the facts, what can be 
done? 
If a theoretical model that is associated with a 
general theory fails to conform to the facts, either the 
theoretical model or the general theory can be rnodif ied 
or replaced. 
Q and A 131: page 92; line 2; type II, i, J, b. 
What is the object, mechanism, or process that a 
model object represents called? 
The object, mechanism, or process that a model ob-
ject represents is called its referent. 
Q and A 132: page 97; line 20; type II, i, J, c. 
What is a specific theory? 
A specific theory is a theoretical model. 
Q and A 133: page 111; line 33; type II, i, J-L, c. 
What is the set of statements, F1 through F4? 
The set of statements, F1 through F4, is the inter-
preted system that has been obtained by applying the 
interpretation; "the capital letters are sets or func-
tions, 'R' is the real line, 'O' is the arithmetic prod-
uct, etc.;" to the sys tern of s ta tern en t forms A 1 through 
AS. 
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Q and A 134: page 100; line 9; type II, i, K, a. 
What does R represent? 
R represents a referent. 
Q and A 135: page 100; line 8; type II, i, K, b. 
What does M represent? 
M represents a model object. 
Q and A 136: page 101; line 37; type II, i, K-R, b. 
What can be done to remedy the excessive coarseness 
and lack of economy characteristic of the description of 
the model wherein the paired inputs and outputs are 
tabulated? 
To remedy the excessive coarseness and lack of econ-
omy characteristic of the description of the model where-
in the paired inputs and outputs are tabulated, the 
ordered pairs can be implied by means of a rule rather 
than stated explicitly by means of a table. 
Q and A 137: page 93; line 25; type II, i, N-Q, c. 
To arrive at the diagnostic "false" for Ising's 
model what rule or principle was applied? 
To arrive at the diagnostic "false" for Ising's 
model, the principle that requires a theoretical model to 
represent every significant (relevant?) aspect of its 
referent if it is not to be considered false was applied. 
Q and A 138: page 93; line 27; type II, i, N-Q, d. 
What criterion was applied in order to determine the 
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falsity of Ising's model object? 
The criterion that was applied in order to determine 
the falsity of Ising's model object was the relatively 
greater prestige of the general theory (statistical mech-
anics). 
Q and A 139: page 104; line 7; type II, i, N-S, b. 
What is the primary mistake that the black box 
philosopher makes? 
The black box philosopher's primary mistake is his 
failure to recognize that the acquisition of knowledge as 
opposed to mere use requires the construction of built-up 
models as opposed to mere dark box models. 
Q and A 140: page 105; line 13; type II, i, N-T, b. 
What are the gross criteria that determine the 
choice from among the variety of models available to 
represent any given referent? 
The gross criteria that determine the choice from 
among the variety of models available to represent any 
given referent are the following: (1) the nature of 
the referent, (2) the goal of the investigator. 
Q and A 141: page 93; line 27; type II, i, Q-T, c. 
What options are there for placing the blame in case 
a theoretical model proves false?. 
In case a theoretical model proves false, there are 
usually two options for placing the blame: (1) It can be 
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determined that the model object is at fault. (2) It can 
be determined that the general theory is at fault. 
Q and A 142: page 104; line 14; type II, ii, C-G-I b 
Does the black box model have any use in the process 
of scientific inquiry? 
Yes. The black box model does have a use in the 
process of scientific inquiry. But this use occurs pri-
marily during the early stages of scientific investi-
gation. 
Q and A 143: page 100; line 14; type II, ii, H-I-P, c. 
Does the satisfaction of the axiomatizability condi-
tion guarantee the production of a theoretical model as 
long as the other conditions are as described. 
Yes. The satisfaction of the axiomatizability con-
dition does guarantee the production of a theoretical 
model as long as the other conditions are as described. 
Q and A 144: page 100; line 14; type II, ii, H-P, c. 
Would it be possible to obtain a theoretical model 
of R without satisfying the axiomatizability condition? 
Yes. It would be possible to obtain a theoretical 
model of R without satisfying the axiomatizability condi-
tion. 
Q and A 145: page 100; line 1; type II, ii, H-P, d. 
Is a general theory a prerequisite for obtaining a 
theoretical model? 
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No. A general theory is not a prerequisite for 
obtaining a theoretical model. It is quite possible to 
obtain a theoretical model even though there is no gener-
al theory on the horizon. 
Q and A 146: page 104 line 16 type II, iii, C-G-I, b. 
If one of the aims of research were to be instanta-
neously and universally realized, what would be the ef-
fect on all black boxes? 
If one of the aims of research were to be instanta-
neously and universally realized, all black boxes would 
be converted into built-up models. Since one of the aims 
of research is to throw further light into every box, the 
accomplishment of this aim would change all black boxes 
into built-up models or, at least, into grey boxes. 
Q and A 147: page 104 line 14 type II, iii, C-I-N, b. 
What would be the likely result of the universal 
application of the black boxist philosophy? 
The likely result of the universal application of 
the black boxist philosophy would be the immediate drying 
up of the sources of scientific knowledge and, conse-
quently, an eventual halt to scientific progress. 
This concludes the presentation of the questions and 
answers that are associated with the task-types I and II. 
The questions that have been presented in this chapter 
involve the tasks of identification and specification. 
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In the next chapter, questions associated with task-types 
III, IV, V, and VI will be presented. Those questions 
involve the tasks of description, classification, compar-
ison, and interpretation. 
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CHAPTER VII 
TASKS III, IV, V, AND VI: 
DESCRIBING, CLASSIFYING, COMPARING AND INTERPRETING 
The questions and answers associated with task-types 
I and II involving the tasks of identification and 
specif ica ti on have been presented in the preceding 
chapter. Here the presentation of the questions and 
answers continues with the task-types III, IV, V, and VI 
involving the tasks of description, classification, com-
parison, and interpretation. These questions and an-
swers, numbered from 148 to 275 follow immediately. 
Task III 
Q and A 148: page 95; line 17; type III, i, C, b. 
What is a more or less schematic model object? 
A more or less schematic model object is a model 
object that in some way represents its referent but does 
it rather crudely--leaving out many significant aspects 
of the referent. 
Q and A 149: page 103; line 6; type III, i, c, b. 
What kind of a model is a built-up model of a 
system? 
A built-up model of a system is a model that shows 
the inner structure and the mechanism of the system. 
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Q and A 150: page 103; line 3; type III, i, C-H, b. 
What will a black box model not do? 
A black box model will not explain the behavior of a 
system, nor will it provide the kind of knowledge that 
can be related to scientific knowledge in general. 
Q and A 151: page 96; line 17; type III, i, D-E, c. 
What is the logical form of the formula for the 
total mass of cell r? 
The logical form of the formula for the total mass 
of cell r is that of a conditional whose antecedent is a 
statement of the modeling relation and whose consequent 
is a statement about the total mass of cell r. 
Q and A 152: page 93; line 21; type III, i, H-P, d. 
In order to apply the same general theory (classical 
statistical mechanics, for example) to several different 
model objects, what must be assumed about those model 
objects? 
In order to apply the same general theory, such as 
classical statistical mechanics, to several different 
model objects, it must be assumed that the elements of 
each of those model objects are related to each other in 
similar ways, in ways described by the general theory. 
Q and A 153: page 104; line 9; type III, i, N-S, b. 
What is the black boxist's attitude toward mind and 
brain. 
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The black boxist would have us consider only the 
input and output of the mind and brain without any in-
quiry into the kinds of structure and mechanism that 
convert the one into the other. 
Task IV 
Q and A 154: page 91; line 14; type IV, i, A-C, d. 
What is a "black box?" 
A black box is a kind of a kind of model object in 
which no mechanism is displayed; only an input and 
output are provided. 
Q and A 155: page 100; line 11; type IV, i, A-L, b. 
What do any consistent set of conditions (postu-
lates) specifying the structure (mathematical nature) of 
then primitive concepts of Q, as well as their factual 
meaning, constitute? 
Any consistent set of conditions specifying the 
structure of the n primitive concepts of Q, as well as 
their factual meaning, is a theoretical model of R. 
Q and A 156: page 98; line 15; type IV, i, C-E, b. 
What kind of model object is the McCulloch and Pitts 
brain model? 
The McCulloch and Pitts brain model is an example of 
a grey box model. 
Q and A 157: page 93; line 10; type IV, i, D, b. 
What is the relation between Ising's model of matter 
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in condensed states and matter in condensed states it-
self. 
The relation between Ising's model of matter in 
condensed states and matter in condensed states itself is 
the relation that holds between a model object and its 
referent: the modeling relation. 
Q and A 1 58: page 91 ; line 1 0; type IV, i I E, a. 
What is a fluid? 
A fluid is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 159: page 91 ; line 1 3; type IV, i I E, a. 
What is a "learning organism?" 
A "learning organism" is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 160: page 92; line 9; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the celestial hierarchy? 
The celestial hierarchy is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 161: page 92; line 10; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the brain? 
The brain is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 162: page 92; line 10; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the random net model of the brain? 
The random net model of the brain is an example of a 
model object. 
Q and A 163: page 92; line 21; type IV, i, E, a. 
What do all the individuals of a given mice strain 
constitute? 
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All the individuals of a given mice strain consti-
tute an example of a referent. 
Q and A 164: page 92; line 26; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a collision of m cars having as a result n 
injured persons with a total damage of £ dollars? 
A collision of m cars having as a result n injured 
persons with a total damage of£ dollars is an example of 
a referent. 
Q and A 165: page 93; line 10; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is matter in condensed states? 
Matter in condensed states is an example of a refer-
ent. 
Q and A 166: page 93; line 23; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is an animal population? 
An animal population is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 167: page 94; line 23; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a gas? 
A gas is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 168: page 94; line 30; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the glass structure? 
The glass structure is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 169: page 95; line 22; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is R? 
R is an example of a referent (the set of individ-
uals to be represented). 
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Q and A 170: page 96; line 4; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the set of all of the second elements of the 
ordered pair (c,f )? 
The set of all of the second elements of the ordered 
pair (c,f) is an example of a referent> 
Q and A 171: page 96; line 9; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a cell? 
A cell is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 172: page 97; line 7; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a liquid? 
A liquid is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 173: page 97; line 7; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a brain? 
A brain is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 174: page 97; line 11; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a gas? 
A gas is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 175: page 97; line 26; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a crystal? 
A crystal is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 176: page 98; line 15; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the brain? 
The brain is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 177: page 99; line 2; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is animal behavior? 
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Animal behavior is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 178: page 99; line 33; type IV, i, E, a. 
What sort of thing does some-of-the-relations-among-
the-individuals-in-a-community constitute? 
Some-of-the-relations-among-the-individuals-in-a-
community constitutes an example of a referent. 
Q and A 179: page 100; line 5; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a cell? 
A cell is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 180: page 100; line 21; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a planet? 
A planet is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 181: page 106; line 7; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a carbon atom? 
A carbon atom is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 182: page 106; line 13; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is a gas? 
A gas is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 183: page 107; line 4; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the real atmosphere? 
The real atmosphere is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 184: page 107; line 19; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the oscillation of a shell? 
The oscillation of shell is an example of a refer-
ent. 
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Q and A 185: page 108; line 10; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the sum (along with its optical and gravita-
tional manifestations)? 
The sum (along with its optical and gravitational 
manifestations) is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 186: page 109; line 2; type IV, i, E, a. 
What are the mechanisms of electromagnetic propaga-
tion, of complex chemical reactions, and of biological 
evolution? 
The mechanisms of electromagnetic propagation, of 
complex chemical reactions, and of biological evolution 
are example of referents for which model objects and then 
theoretical models can be hypothesized or constructed. 
Q and A 187: page 109; line 16; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is an unreliable person? 
An unreliable person is an example of a referent. 
Q and A 188: page 110; line 4; type IV, i, E, a. 
What is the motion of a set of coupled oscillators? 
The motion of a set of coupled oscillators is an 
example of a referent. 
Q and A 189: page 91; line 10; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a continuum endowed with certain properties, 
such as compressibility and viscosity? 
A continuum endowed with certain properties, such as 
compressibility and viscosity is an example of a model 
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object. 
Q and A 190: page 92; line 6; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a contour map of a molecule? 
A contour map of a molecule is an example of a model 
object. 
Q and A 191: page 92; line 7; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is the hamiltonian operator? 
The hamiltonian operator is an example of a model 
object. 
Q and A 192: page 92; line 8; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is the Pseudo Areopagite's model of the celes-
tial hierarchy? 
The Pseudo Areopagite's model of the celestial hier-
archy is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 193: page 92; line 24; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a homogeneous set or equivalence class (of 
mice)? 
A homogeneous set or equivalence class (of mice) is 
an example of model object. 
Q and A 194: page 92; line 28; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is the ordered triple (rn, n, £)? 
The ordered triple (m, n, £) is an example of a 
model object. 
Q and A 195: page 93; line 10; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is Ising's model of matter in condensed states? 
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Ising's model of matter in condensed states is an 
example of a model object. 
Q and A 196: page 93; line 23; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a sketch of an animal population? 
A sketch of an animal population is an example of a 
model object. 
Q and A 197: page 95; line 23; type IV, i, E, b. 
What do the homogeneous subsets S constitute? 
The homogeneous subsets S constitute an example of a 
model object. 
Q and A 198: page 95; line 24; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is each member s? 
Each member s is an element of set S which, in turn, 
constitutes an example of a model object. 
Q and A 199: page 96; line 4; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is the set of all of the first elements of the 
ordered pair (c,f)? 
The set of all of the first elements of the ordered 
pair (c,f) is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 200: page 96; line 10; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a differentiable manifold? 
A differentiable manifold is an example of a model 
object. 
Q and A 201: page 97; line 7; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a molecular lattice? 
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A molecular lattice is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 202: page 97; line 8; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a neuron net? 
A neuron net is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 203: page 97; line 26; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a simple model of the crystal? 
A simple model of the crystal is an example of a 
model object. 
Q and A 204: page 98; line 15; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is the McCulloch and Pitts brain model? 
The McCulloch and Pitts brain model is an example of 
a model object. 
Q and A 205: page 99; line 32; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a chain of multicolored beads? 
A chain of multicolored beads is an example of a 
model object. 
Q and A 206: page 99; line 33; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a sociogram? 
A sociogram is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 207: page 99; line 35; type IV, i, E, b. 
What sort of thing is the Watson-Crick model of DNA? 
The Watson-Crick model of DNA is an example of a 
model object. 
Q and A 208: page 100; line 5; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a model cell? 
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A model cell is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 209: page 100; line 22; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a mass point? 
A mass point is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 210: page 100; line 22; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a ball? 
A ball is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 211: page 103; line 22; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a water molecule? 
A water molecule is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 212: page 106; line 6; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a hamiltonian operator? 
A hamiltonian operator is an example of a model 
object. 
Q and A 213: page 106; line 14; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a swarm of point particles connected by van 
der Waals forces? 
A swarm of point particles connected by van der 
Waals forces is an example of a model object. 
Q and A 214: page 108; line 10; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point? 
A rotating ellipsoid or a mass point is an example 
of a model object. 
Q and A 215: page 109; line 16; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is a vending machine out of order? 
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A vending machine out of order is an example of a 
model object. T~e unreliable person would, of course, be 
the referent of this model object. 
Q and A 216: page 110; line 3; type IV, i, E, b. 
What are the alternative representations of the mo-
tion of a set of coupled oscillators? 
The alternative representations of the motion of a 
set of coupled oscillators are examples of model objects. 
Q and A 217: page 110; line 6; type IV, i, E, b. 
What are the symbolic diagrams that correspond to 
the alternative representations of the motion of the set 
of coupled oscillators? 
The symbolic diagrams that correspond to the alter-
native representations of the motion of the set of coupl-
ed oscillators are examples of heuristic devices (the 
alternative representations) more intelligible while 
remaining merely adjuncts to, and not parts of, those 
model objects. 
Q and A 218: page 111; line 33; type IV, i, E, b. 
What is the series of statements; "the capital let-
ters are sets or functions, 'R' is the real line, 1 0 1 is 
the arithmetic product, etc.?" 
The series of statements; "the capital letters are 
sets or functions, 'R' is the real line, 10 1 is the 
arithmetic product, etc." is an interpretation for the 
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system of signs A1 through AS. 
Q and A 219: pag.e 112; line 15; type IV, i, E, b. 
What do the physical and sociological interpreta-
tions of the symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and 
"H(s,s')" constitute? 
The physical and sociological interpretations of the 
symbols; "s," "F(s)," "G(s,s')," and "H(s,s')" constitute 
examples of model objects. 
Q and A 220: page 112; line 26; type IV, i, E, b. 
What does the set of entities; "the set of bodies," 
"the temperature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass," 
and "the specific heat at constant volume" constitute? 
The set of entities; "the set of bodies," "the 
temperature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass," and 
"the specific heat at constant volume" constitutes an 
example of a model object. 
Q and A 221: page 94; line 23; type IV, i, E, c. 
What is a linear model of a gas? 
A linear model of a gas is an example of a theoreti-
cal model. 
Q and A 222: page 94; line 29; type IV, i, E, c. 
What is Dyson's random chain? 
Dyson's random chain is an example of a theoretical 
model. 
Q and A 223: page 95; line 19; type IV, i, E, c. 
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What is M? 
M is an examf>le of a theoretical model. 
Q and A 224: page 96; line 10; type IV, i, E, c. 
What is a differentiable manifold on which certain 
real valued functions are given? 
A differentiable manifold on which certain real val-
ued functions are given is an example of theoretical 
model. 
Q and A 225: page 97; line 10; type IV, i, E, c. 
What is the kinetic gas theory? 
The kinetic gas theory is an example of a theoreti-
cal model. 
Q and A 226: page 98; line 5; type IV, i, E, c. 
What is the Bloch model of a crystal? 
The Bloch model of a crystal is an example of a 
theoretical model. 
Q and A 227: page 98; line 30; type IV, i, E, c. 
What are stochastic models of the central nervous 
system? 
Stochastic models of the central nervous system are 
examples of theoretical models. 
Q and A 228: page 99; line 3; type IV, i, E, c. 
What are stochastic learning models? 
Stochastic learning models are examples of theoreti-
cal models. 
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Q and A 229: page 111; line 17; type IV, i, E, c. 
What is the. system of signs: A1 through AS? 
The system of signs, A1 through AS, is an example of 
a purely formal (and uninterpreted) theory, that is to 
say, a related series of statement forms. 
Q and A 230: page 111; line 33; type IV, i, E, c. 
Does the interpreted system, F1 through F4, consti-
tute an example of a theoretical model? 
No. The interpreted system, F1 through F4, does not 
constitute an example of a theoretical model because, 
although it has now been interpreted, the interpretation 
is mathematical not factual. Thus, it still includes no 
empirical content. 
Q and A 231: page 91; line 10; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is "classical mechanics?" 
Classical mechanics is an example of a general the-
ory. 
Q and A 232: page 91; line 13; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is "general relativistic mechanics?" 
General relativistic mechanics is an example of a 
general theory. 
Q and A 233: page 93; line 19; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is classical statistical mechanics? 
Classical statistical mechanics is an example of a 
general theory. 
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Q and A 234: page 97; line 12; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is general statistical mechanics? 
General statistical mechanics is an example of a 
general theory. 
Q and A 235: page 97; line 12; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is thermodynamics? 
Thermodynamics is an example of a general theory. 
Q and A 236: page 97; line 14; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is general graph theory? 
General graph theory is an example of a general 
theory. 
Q and A 237: page 97; line 24; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is the current theory of the solid state? 
The current theory of the solid state is an example 
of a theoretical model. 
Q and A 238: page 97; line 25; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is wave mechanics? 
Wave mechanics is an example of a general theory. 
Q and A 239: page 97; line 33; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is quantum mechanics? 
Quantum mechanics is an example of a general theory. 
Q and A 240: page 106; line 15; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is relativistic particle mechanics? 
Relativistic particle mechanics is an example of a 
general theory. 
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Q and A 241: page 106; line 15; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is classical particle mechanics? 
Classical particle mechanics is an example of a gen-
eral theory. 
Q and A 242: page 106; line 37; type IV, i, E, d. 
What are hydrodynamics and thermodynamics? 
Hydrodynamics and thermodynamics are examples of 
general theories. 
Q and A 243: page 108; line 13; type IV, i, E, d. 
What are the theories of gravitation and of light? 
The theories of gravitation and of light are exam-
ples of general theories. 
Q and A 244: page 109; line 22; type IV, i, E, d. 
What is the theory of Markovian machines? 
The theory of Markovian machines is an example of a 
general theory. 
Q and A 245: page 110; line 37; type IV, ii, A, c. 
Can metascientif ic theories ever qualify as semantic 
models? 
No. Metascientif ic theories cannot ever qualify as 
semantic models. 
Q and A 246: page 111; line 7; type IV, ii, A, c. 
Would it be possible for a semantical model to 
qualify as a model in the metascientif ic sense? 
Yes, it would be possible for a semantical model to 
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qualify as a model in the metascientif ic sense. 
Q and A 247: pa~e 111; line 7; type IV, ii, A-C, c. 
Do all semantical models qualify as metascientif ic 
models? 
No. Not all semantical models qualify as metascien-
tif ic models. 
Q and A 248: page 112; line 26; type IV, ii, A-C, c. 
Does the set of entities: "the set of bodies," "the 
temperature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass," and 
"the specific heat at constant volume" constitute a sem-
antical model? 
No. The set of entities; "the set of bodies," "the 
temperature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass," and 
"the specific heat at constant volume" does not consti-
tute a semantical model. 
Q and A 249: page 111; line 27; type IV, ii, C, c. 
Is the set of statements; "the capital letters are 
sets or functions, 'R' is the real line, 1 0 1 is the 
arithmetic product, etc;" a semantical model? 
No. The set of statements; "the capital letters are 
sets or functions, 'R' is the real line, 'O' is the 
arithmetic product, etc;" is not a semantical model. 
Q and A 250: page 94; line 30; type IV, iii, E-N, b. 
The concept of one-dimensional models helping the 
attainment of understanding of three-dimensional phenome-
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na is an instance of what generalization? 
The concept_ of one-dimensional models helping the 
attainment of understanding of three-dimensional phenome-
na is an instance of the concept of crude models helping 
the attainment of understanding of complicated phenomena. 
Q and A 251: page 93; line 25; type IV, iii, E-H, b. 
What sort of thing was the solution that Ising 
obtained by grafting his model object onto general sta-
tistical mechanics? 
The solution that Ising obtained by grafting his 
model object onto general statistical mechanics was a 
theoretical model. 
Task V 
Q and A 252: page 100; line 20; type V, i, A, c. 
In what way is a theoretical model far richer than 
the bare model object? 
Q and A 253: page 110; line 23; type V, i, A, c. 
What is the difference between theoretical models 
and semantical models? 
The difference between theoretical models and seman-
tical models is that while theoretical models are sets of 
statements concerning some aspect of reality, semantical 
models are interpretations of abstract theories. 
Q and A 254: page 11 O; line 24; type V, i, C, b •. 
In what ways are semantic models and metascientif ic 
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models similar? 
Semantic models and metascientif ic models are simi-
lar to the extent that they both contain designation 
rules and semantic assumptions that provide the abstract 
statements with factual content that can be assigned 
truth values. 
Q and A 255: page 101; line 13; type V, i, C-H, b. 
In what way is a grey box an improvement over the 
black box? 
A grey box is an improvement over the black box in 
that the grey box specifies intermediate variables be-
tween the input and output rather than merely providing 
the latter as does the black box. 
Task VI 
Q and A 256: page 96; line 1; type VI, i, B, a. 
What does it mean to say that a referent is not 
abstract? 
To say that a referent is not abstract, is to say 
that it is a factual referent. This means that it (pur-
portedly) represents some concrete (real) thing or event. 
It has empirical content. 
Q and A 257: page 107; line 25; type VI, i, B-C, c. 
What does it mean for a theory to be logically 
strong? 
For a theory to be logically strong means that the 
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theory has little empirical content. Thus, the truth or 
falsity of such a theory depends primarily upon the 
validity of its logical form rather than upon the state 
of things in the world. 
Q and A 2S8: page 107; line 2S; type VI, i, B-C, c. 
What does it mean for a theory to be logical 1 y weak? 
For a theory to be logically weak means that the 
theory has considerable empirical content. Thus, its 
truth or falsity depends upon the state of things in the 
world rather than upon the validity of its logical form. 
Q and A 2S9: page 111; line 2S; type VI, i, B-E, c. 
What is meant by saying that the system of signs, A1 
through AS, is nonsignificant? 
By saying that the system of signs, A1 through AS, 
is nonsignificant, it is meant that the system is unin-
terpreted, which is to say that its terms, relations, 
operators, etc. have not been assigned meanings. 
Q and A 260: page 92; line 23; type VI, i, B-H, b. 
What does it mean to say that the real population, 
made up of different individuals, is modeled as a homo-
geneous (equivalence) class? 
To say that the real population, made up of differ-
ent individuals, is modeled as a homogeneous (equival-
ence) class means that all of the properties of the 
different individuals making up the set are ignored ex-
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cept for a selected property or properties so that the 
the set may be regarded as homogeneous in that the indi-
viduals all embody the selected property or properties 
without regard for any differences that they may display 
with respect to other properties. 
Q and A 261: page 109; line 32; type VI, i, B-J, b. 
What does "The same holds, a fortiori, for the 
diagram" mean? 
"The same holds, a fortiori, for the diagram" means 
that the diagram, in some respects, a prototypical case 
of metaphor, can be expected to display its properties 
~ excellence. In this case, the property in question 
is that of being misleading when used as the characteri-
zation of a model object. 
Q and A 262: page 95; line 18; type VI, i, B-L, b. 
What does it mean to say that a model object consti-
tutes a profile of its referent? 
To say that a model object constitutes a profile of 
its referent is to say that the model object displays 
one, or at most a few, salient aspects of its referent, 
but that it ignores many more. 
Q and A 263: page 112; line 6; type VI, i, B-L, c. 
What does it mean to say that the interpreted sys-
tem, F1 through F4. is "a ready-made dummy?" 
To say that the interpreted system, F1 through F4, 
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is "a ready-made dummy" is to say that it could be fitted 
to any number of factual, that is empirical, interpreta-
tions. 
Q and A 264: page 108; line 35; type VI, i, D, b. 
How can the relation between hypothetical mechanisms 
and model objects be stated in terms of subsets and 
supersets? 
The relation between hypothetical mechanisms and 
model objects can be stated in terms of subsets and 
supersets by saying that the set of hypothetical mechan-
isms forms a subset of the set of model objects, which is 
equivalent to saying that the set of model objects forms 
a superset of the set of hypothetical mechanisms. 
Q and A 265: page 92; line 26; type VI, i, E, b. 
What is the presentation of a collision of m cars 
having as a result n injured persons with a total damage 
of£ dollars as an example of a referent and the ordered 
triple (m, n, £) as an example of a model object meant to 
show? 
The presentation of a collision of m cars having as 
a result n injured persons with a total damage of £ 
dollars as an example of a referent and the ordered 
triple (m, n, £) as an example of a model object is meant 
to show how model objects miss traits of their refer-
ents, discard details, omit inessentials, represent only 
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certain significant aspects of the referent, model popu-
lations as homogeneous sets, and partition them into 
equivalence classes. 
Q and A 266: page 98; line 15; type VI, i, E-L, b. 
What does it mean to say that the McCulloch and 
Pitts model of the brain is a grey box model? 
To say that the McCulloch and Pitts model of the 
brain is a grey box (semi-phenomenological) model means 
that it attempts to provide mechanism enough to account 
for only part of the results (input and output) that it 
represents. 
Q and A 267: page 101; line 7; type VI, i, H, b. 
What does it mean to say that the natural course is 
not necessarily the historical one? 
To say that the natural course is not necessarily 
the historical one is to imply that one does not always 
start with the simplest model object and then proceed to 
complicate it bit by bit. Sometimes one starts with a 
complicated model object. 
Q and A 268: page 101; line 12; type VI, i, H, b. 
What does it mean to say that the hypothesized 
mechanisms must be conjectured? 
To say that the hypothesized mechanisms must be 
conjectured means that must first the end result of the 
referent (what it actually accomplishes) must be consid-
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ered, and then a mechanism that could plausibly account 
for that end result must be found. 
Q and A 269: page 104; line 34; type VI, i, H-M, b. 
What does it mean to say that inferring behavior 
from mechanism is a direct problem while conjecturing 
mechanism from behavior is an inverse problem? 
To say that inferring behavior from mechanism is a 
direct problem while conjecturing mechanism from behavior 
is an inverse problem means that inferring behavior from 
mechanism is a problem in deduction while conjecturing 
mechanism from behavior is a problem in induction. 
Q and A 270: page 101; line 15; type VI, i, H-Q-0, b. 
What does it mean to say that the game is not just 
to account for appearance at any price? 
To say that the game is not just to account for 
appearance at any price means that the attempt should be 
made not only to produce a mechanism that will adequately 
explain the end results of the referent, but come up with 
the actual mechanism that produces those results. This 
can be accomplished by showing some intermediate results 
that can be checked against those derived from the hypo-
thetical mechanism. 
Q and A 271: page 107; line 14; type VI, i, H-S, c. 
What does it mean to pose a theoretical problem? 
To pose a particular theoretical problem is to re-
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quire an explanation for a set of observed facts about 
specific phenomena. More specifically, it is to repre-
sent those facts in a relatively succinct form. 
Q and A 272: page 107; line 14; type VI, i, H-S, c. 
What does it mean to solve a particular theoretical 
problem? 
To solve a particular theoretical problem is to 
provide an explanation for a set of observed facts about 
specific phenomena. More specifically, it is to repre-
sent the explanation in a relatively succinct form, to 
wit: first, a model object; ultimately, a theoretical 
model. 
Q and A 273: page 93; line 1; type VI, i, J, b. 
What is meant by "idealizing reality?" 
By "idealizing reality" is meant simplifying it, 
leaving out certain aspects of it. 
Q and A 274: page 113; line 14; type VI, i, J, c. 
What two meanings of "model" show up most prominent-
ly in theoretical science? 
The two meanings of "model" that show up most prom-
inently in theoretical science are those of "model ob-
ject" and "theoretical model" (also called "specific 
Q and A 275: page 93; line 3; type VI, ii, H-0, b. 
Is the Rashevsky citation meant to inform the reader 
about how to go about performing a scientific investiga-
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tion, or what? 
The Rashevsky citation is not meant to inform the 
reader about how to go about the performance of a scien-
tific investigation, but to describe some of the essen-
tials of scientific investigation as necessarily perform-
ed by practicing scientists. 
At this point, the presentation of the questions and 
answers associated with task-types III, IV, V, and VI 
which involve the tasks of description, classification, 
comparison, and interpretation has been made. In the 
next chapter, the presentation of the complete question 
and answer set will be concluded with the questions and 
answers associated with task-types VII and VIII involving 
the tasks of explanation and evaluation. 
CHAPTER VIII 
TASKS VII, VIII: 
EXPLAINING, EVALUATING 
In the previous chapters, the questions and answers 
numbered 1 through 275 have been presented. These 
questions and answers are associated with task-types I 
through VI. They involve the tasks of identification, 
specification, description, classification, comparison, 
and interpretation. In this chapter, the presentation of 
the complete question and answer set will be concluded. 
The questions and answers to be shown in this chapter, 
numbered from 276 through 345, are associated with task-
types VII and VIII. They involve the tasks of explana-
tion and evaluation (judging). These questions and 
answers follow immediately. 
Task VII 
Q and A 276: page 91; line 21; type VII, i, B, b. 
In what way are model objects of themselves "bar-
ren?" 
Model objects of themselves are barren in that they 
are untestable and, therefore, of no use to science. 
Q and A 277: page 98; line 19; type VII, i, B-E, b. 
Why did the McCulloch and Pitts model of the brain 
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ignore the time of conduction along the axon and the 
variance of the synaptic delay? 
The McCulloch and Pitts model of the brain ignores 
the time of conduction along the axon and the variance of 
the synaptic delay in order to avoid complicating the 
calculations with matters that were not central to what 
was being investigated. 
Q and A 278: page 92; line 14; type VII, i, B-G, b. 
Why do model objects capture only approximately the 
relations among the aspects they incorporate? 
Model objects capture only approximately the rela-
tions among the aspects that they incorporate because 
referents worth modeling are too complicated to represent 
completely. The possession of sufficient knowledge of 
the referent to enable the construction of a model object 
capable of capturing the exact and complete relations 
among the elements that it incorporated would render the 
construction of such a model object unnecessary. 
Q and A 279: page 104; line 16; type VII, i, B-H, b. 
Why is the task of throwing light into boxes, for the 
theoretician, a task of invention rather than discovery? 
The task of throwing light into boxes, is for the 
theoretician, a task of invention rather than discovery 
because the internal structures and mechanisms that are 
looked for are not visible for the most part. This means 
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that they must be conjectured. 
Q and A 280: page 107; line 25; type VII, i, B-H-N, c. 
Why might the logical strength of a theory be ex-
pected to turn out to be inversely related to its ability 
to solve particular theoretical problems and to empirical 
testability of that theory. 
The logical strength of a theory might be expected 
to turn out to be inversely related to its ability to 
solve particular theoretical problems and to the empiri-
cal testability of that theory because logical strength 
is gained only at the expense of empirical content, 
whereas particular theoretical problems are essentially 
about empirical content. 
Q and A 281: page 98; line 12; type VII, i, B-L, c. 
What is the reason for saying that simplicity is the 
privilege of either total ignorance or extreme generality 
(no deta i 1)? 
The reason for saying that simplicity is the privi-
lege of either tot a 1 ignorance or extreme generality is 
to justify the complication of theoretical models. 
Q and A 282: page 92; line 13; type VII, i, C, b. 
Why are model objects apt to include imaginary ele-
ments? 
Model objects are apt to include imaginary elements 
as stand-ins for real elements whose nature is unknown 
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but whose functions are known 
Q and A 283: pa9e 104; line 18; type VII, i, C-H, b. 
Given that the functioning of a black box may ex-
plained by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the 
underlying mechanisms, what is to prevent the task of 
conversion from black box to built-up model from degen-
erating into a process of merely making an arbitrary 
choice from among them? 
Although the functioning of a black box may be 
explained by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the 
underlying mechanisms, it is the requirement that the 
explanation fit into patterns of pre-existing knowledge 
that prevents the task of conversion from black box to 
built-up model from degenerating into a process of merely 
making an arbitrary choice from among them. 
Q and A 284: page 100; line 25; type VII, i, C-H, c. 
Why is it possible for the testing of theoretical 
models to "become as involved as one wishes?" 
It is possible for the testing of theoretical models 
to "become as involved as one wishes" because, while a 
finite number of tests (even one, sometimes) can refute a 
theoretical model, only an infinity of tests could verify 
it completely. This means that theoretical models are 
verified only partially, to the point at which confidence 
is felt that the model is "True." And whether or not 
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this point has been reached is a matter of judgement, so 
the testing "can become as involved as one wishes." 
Q and A 285: page 102; line 19; type VII, i, C-H, c. 
If a referent displays modes of behavior not in 
conformity with a definite law, how does this affect the 
construction of the theoretical model? 
If a referent displays modes of behavior not in 
conformity with a definite law, the theoretical model 
must represent these different modes of behavior by means 
of appropriate laws, however definite or indefinite they 
may turn out to be. 
Q and A 286: page 93; line 11; type VII, i, C-P, b. 
Why is it necessary for Ising's model of matter in 
condensed states to assume that the units are ordered 
linearly? 
It is necessary for Ising's model of matter in 
condensed states to assume that the units are ordered 
linearly because Ising's model is a one-dimensional mod-
el, therefore, the elements can be arranged only along a 
linear dimension. 
Q and A 287: page 105; line 30; type VII, i, C-P, b. 
Why must the referents of models be assumed to be 
real if the results are to have scientific value? 
The referents of models must be assumed to be real 
if the results are to have scientific value because one 
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of the basic premises of science holds that science 
proposes to deal_ with real things. 
Q and A 288: page 101; line 30; type VII, i, C-Q, b. 
In what way are grey boxes deficient? 
Grey boxes are deficient in that their intermediate 
variables do not explain or account for the mechanisms of 
the referent; they only supplement them computationally. 
Q and A 289: page 103; line 5; type VII, i, C-Q, b. 
Why should the fact that black and grey boxes merely 
permit the attainment of computational results rather 
than also providing explanations of these results be 
considered a defect of these models? 
The fact that black and grey boxes merely permit the 
attainment of computational results rather than also 
providing explanations of these results is considered a 
defect of these models because computational results 
generally remain isolated bits of knowledge rather than 
fitting with and adding to the great mosaic of human 
knowledge in general. 
Q and A 290: page 108; line 12; type VII, i, D-E, d. 
How are a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point related 
to the theories of gravitation and of light? 
A rotating ellipsoid or a mass point are related to 
the theories of gravitation and of light in the following 
way. A rotating ellipsoid or a mass point are examples 
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of model objects that can be associated with the general 
theories of gravitation and of light in order to produce 
theoretical models of the sun with its optical and gravi-
tational manifestations. 
Q and A 291: page 108; line 12; type VII, i, D-E, b. 
How are the sun (along with its optical and gravi ta-
tional manifestations) and a rotating ellipsoid or a mass 
point related to each other? 
The sun (along with its optical and gravitational 
manifestations) and a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point 
are related to each other in the following way. The sun 
(along with its optical and gravitational manifestations) 
is an example of a referent for which a rotating ellip-
soid or a mass point is an example of a model object. 
And, conversely, a rotating ellipsoid or a mass point is 
an example of a model for which the sun (along with its 
optical and gravitational manifestations) is an example 
of a referent. 
Q and A 292: page 96; line 6; type VII, i, D-H-S, b. 
Why should the modeling relation occur explicitly in 
any formulation of a scientific theory that takes care of 
the factual meaning of its symbols? 
The reason that the modeling relation should occur 
explicitly in any formulation of a scientific theory that 
takes care of the factual meaning of its symbols is to 
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avoid any possible confusion between the model (theoreti-
cal) and the modeled (referent). 
Q and A 293: page 96; line 13; type VII, i, D-L, c. 
Why is every formula containing the symbol of the 
modeling relation either an interpretative axiom or a 
semantic assumption? 
Every formula containing the symbol of the modeling 
relation is either an interpretative axiom or a semantic 
assumption because such a formula relates the theoretical 
model s of a cell to the referent, or real cell r. 
Q and A 294: page 95; line 29; type VII, i, E-F, c. 
How is it possible to tell that S is the model 
object and M is the theoretical model, and not vice-
versa? 
It is possible to tell that S is the model object 
and that Mis the theoretical model and not vice-versa by 
noting that S merely represents the referents themselves, 
while L, in addition to including R, also includes the 
mathematical representation of the properties of the 
referents as well as the relations between them. 
Q and A 295: page 98; line 31; type VII, i, E-F, c. 
How is it possible to know that stochastic models of 
the central nervous system constitute examples of theo-
retical models? 
It is possible to know that stochastic models of the 
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central nervous system constitute theoretical models 
because the mathematical apparatus that they must possess 
in order to be stochastic models provides assurance that 
they will also turn out to be theoretical models. 
Q and A 296: page 106; line 6; type VII, i, E-G-H-0, b. 
Why were the carbon atom and the hamiltonian opera-
tors mentioned? 
The carbon atom and the hamiltonian operators were 
mentioned in order to exemplify the process of model 
construction in fields of research which have tended to 
produce unifying concepts rather than merely isolated 
bits of knowledge. 
Q and A 297: page 106; line 5; type VII, i, E-H-0, d. 
Why is quantum mechanics mentioned? 
Quantum mechanics is mentioned in order to exemplify 
the process of constructing theoretical models in a field 
of research which has tended to produce unifying concepts 
rather than merely isolated bits of knowledge. 
Q and A 298: page 111; line 1; type VII, i, F, c. 
Why is it impossible for metascientific theories 
ever to qualify as semantic models? 
It is impossible for metascientif ic theories (or, 
strictly speaking, their systems of factual interpreta-
tion, i.e., their model objects) ever to qualify as 
semantic models because those interpretations would have 
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to make the theories come out true under all logically 
possible circumstances. This would, of course, be impos-
sible since an infinite number of tests would be neces-
sary to establish this. And this would, obviously, be 
impossible in the empirical world. 
Q and A 299: page 111; line 7; type VII, i, F, c. 
Why is it that some semantical models fail to quali-
fy as metascientific models? 
Some semantical models fail to qualify as metascien-
tif ic models because, as purely formal systems, they lack 
empirical content. 
Q and A 300: page 111; line 17; type VII, i, F, c. 
Why does the system of signs, A1 through A5, not 
qualify as a semantical model? 
The system of signs, A1 through A5, does not qualify 
as a semantical model because it is not an interpretation 
of a theory that makes the theory true in all cases, or 
even an interpreted theory whose interpretation makes it 
come out true in all cases (in the latter instance, it 
might loosely be termed a model by extension.) 
Q and A 301: page 112; line 26; type VII, i, F, c. 
Why does the set of entities; "the set of bodies," 
"the temperature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass," 
and "the specific heat at constant volume;" not consti-
tute a semantical model? 
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The set of entities; "the set of bodies," "the tem-
perature," "the quantity of heat per unit mass," and "the 
specific heat at constant volume;" does not constitute a 
semantical model because; while it does constitute a 
factual interpretation of the mathematical system, F1 
through F4, and, hence, of the purely formal system, A1 
through AS; precisely because it is a factual interpreta-
tion, it does not make these systems come out true in 
every case. 
Q and A 302: page 111; line 27; type VII, i, F-L, c. 
Why does the set of statements; "the capital letters 
are sets or functions, 'R' is the real line, 'O' is the 
arithmetic product, etc.;" fail to qualify as a semanti-
cal model? 
The set of statements; "the capital letters are sets 
or functions, 'R' is the real line, 'O' is the arithmetic 
product, etc.;" fails to qualify as a semantical model 
because, while it is an interpretation of the system of 
signs , A 1 through AS, it does not make the system true 
in all cases. 
Q and A 303: page 9S; line 21; type VII, i, G-H, b. 
What good does it do to pretend that the domain of 
individuals to be represented can be partitioned into 
homogeneous subsets if they really cannot? 
While the domain of individuals to be represented 
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cannot be partitioned into subsets that are homogeneous 
in every respect, it really can be partitioned into 
subsets that are homogenous in one respect. But this is 
enough--if only one property is being controlled for. 
Q and A 304: page 104; line 14; type VII, i, G-H, b. 
Does the black box model have any use in the process 
of scientific inquiry? 
Yes. The black box model does have a use in the 
process of scientific inquiry. But this use occurs pri-
marily during the early stages of scientific investi-
gation. 
Q and A 305;: page 103; line 9; type VII, i, G-N, b. 
Why might it be expected that the assumption that 
every system has an inner structure and mechanism will 
encourage research? 
It might be expected that the assumption that every 
system has an inner structure and mechanism will encour-
age research because the assumption that a thing of value 
and interest exists can be expected to lead to attempts 
to discover what that thing is. 
Q and A 306: page 92; line 15; type VII, i, H, b. 
Why will most individual variations in a class be 
deliberately ignored and most of the details of the 
events involving those individuals be discarded? 
Most individual variations in a a class will be 
1 71 
deliberately ignored and most of the details of the 
events involving those individuals will be discarded 
because the function of a model object is usually the 
isolation and investigation of certain relevant proper-
ties of the referent classes. In general, science con-
cerns itself with individuals only to the extent that 
knowledge of them leads to knowledge of classes. 
Q and A 307: page 92; line 20; type VII, i, H, b. 
Why may all the individuals of a given mice strain 
be taken to be indiscernible? 
All the individuals of a given mice strain may be 
taken to be indiscernible because the model object is 
being constructed only to model the behavior of the mice 
with respect to their propensity to push bars for food 
pellets. 
Q and A 308: page 92; line 21; type VII, i, H, b. 
Why may all ways of pressing a bar for food pellets 
be assumed to be equivalent? 
All ways of pressing a bar for food pellets may be 
assumed to be equivalent because only the propensity to 
push a bar for food pellets is being investigated by 
means of the model object, not the manner of pressing it. 
Any unnecessary complications introduced into the struc-
ture of the model object would be gratuitous. They 
would augment the amount of difficulty and work involved 
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in the construction and use of the model object without 
any compensatory increase in the value of the results. 
Q and A 309: page 93; line 29; type VII, i, H, b. 
If complicating the model brings it closer to reali-
ty, why not make it more complicated right from the 
beginning as a way of saving time and effort? 
Models are not always made as complicated as they 
eventually become right from the beginning because the 
knowledge gained from the construction of the early sim-
pler models is often needed for the construction of 
later, more complicated, models. 
Q and A 310: page 96; line 22; type VII, i, H, b. 
Why is an explicit statement of the semantic assump-
tions mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a 
scientific theory? 
An explicit statement of the semantic assumption is 
mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific 
theory because the same mathematical formulas will some-
times fit more than one referent. For example, the flow 
of water in a pipe can be represented by the same (or 
analogous) formulas as the flow of electricity in a wire. 
Thus, an explicit statement of the semantic assumption is 
needed to make sure that there is no confusion regarding 
which formula is being linked to which referent. 
Q and A 311: page 101; line 7; type VII, i, H, b. 
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Why is the method of starting with the simplest 
model object and then gradually proceeding to complicate 
it described as the natural course? 
The method of starting with the simlplest model 
object and then gradually proceeding to complicate it is 
described as the natural course because the assumption is 
made that it is natural to proceed from the simple to the 
complicated. The assumption that this procedure is natu-
ral is probably derived from the observation that it 
frequently turns out to be convenient. 
Q and A 312: page 104; line 16; type VII, i, H, b. 
Why is the task of throwing light into boxes, for 
the theoretician, a task of invention rather than discov-
ery? 
The task of throwing light into boxes, is for the 
theoretician, a task of invention rather than discovery 
because the internal structures and mechanisms that are 
looked for are not visible for the most part. This means 
that they must be conjectured. 
Q and A 313: page 106; line 29; type VII, i, H, c. 
Why is it that theoretical models are obtained in 
the developing sciences by constructing a hypothetico--
deducti ve system around the model object instead of at-
taching the model object to a general theory as is fre-
quently done in the more advanced sciences? 
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Theoretical models are obtained in the developing 
sciences by constructing a hypothetico-deductive system 
around the model object instead of attaching the model 
object to a general theory as is frequently done in the 
more advanced sciences because, in the developing scienc-
es, general theories are not as likely to be available as 
they are in the more advanced sciences. 
Q and A 314: page 107; line 14; type VII, i, H, c. 
What does it mean to pose a particular theoretical 
problem? 
To pose a particular theoretical problem is to re-
quire an explanation for a set of observed facts about 
specific phenomena. More specifically, it is to repre-
sent those facts in a relatively succinct form. 
Q and A 315: page 107; line 14; type VII, i, H, c. 
What does it mean to solve a particular theoretical 
problem? 
To solve a particular theoretical problem is to 
provide an explanation for a set of observed facts about 
specific phenomena. More specifically, it is to repre-
sent the explanation in a relatively succinct form, to 
wit: first, a model object; ultimately, a theoretical 
model. 
Q and A 316: page 106; line 29; type VII, i, H-M, c. 
Why is it that theoretical models are obtained in 
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the developing sciences by constructing a hypothetico-
deductive system around the model object instead of at-
taching the model object to a general theory as is fre-
quently done in the more advanced sciences? 
Theoretical models are obtained in the developing 
sciences by constructing a hypothetico-deductive system 
around the model object instead of attaching the model 
object to a general theory as is frequently done in the 
more advanced sciences because, in the developing scienc-
es, general theories are not as likely to be available as 
they are in the more advanced sciences. 
Q and A 317: page 96; line 18; type VII, i, H-M-S, c. 
What error does the "semantical freak" involve? 
The "semantical freak" involves a confusion between 
theoretical model and referent. The theoretical model is 
discussed as though it were the referent. 
Q and A 318: page 95; line 10; type VII, i, H-Q, b. 
How might the failure of the precise solutions ob-
tained through the use of a simple model prove more 
instructive than the success of the vague solutions ob-
tained by means of more complicated, hence realistic, 
models? 
The failure of the precise solutions obtained 
through the use of a simple model might prove more in-
structive than the success of the vague solutions ob-
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tained by means of more complicated, hence realistic, 
models by indicating the kinds of modifications to the 
model that will produce more realistic models. 
Q and A 319: page 95; line 21; type VII, i, H-Q, b. 
What good does it do to pretend that the domain of 
individuals to be represented can be partitioned into 
homogeneous subsets if they really cannot? 
While the domain of individuals to be represented 
cannot be partitioned into subsets that are homogeneous 
in every respect, it really can be partitioned into 
subsets that are homogenous in one respect. But this is 
enough--if only one property is being controlled for at a 
time. 
Q and A 320: page 101; line 7; type VII, i, H-Q, b. 
Why is the method of starting with the simplest 
model object and then gradually proceeding to complicate 
it described as the natural course? 
The method of starting with the simlplest model 
object and then gradually proceeding to complicate it is 
described as the natural course because the assumption is 
made that it is natural to proceed from the simple to the 
complicated. The assumption that this procedure is natu-
ral is probably derived from the observation that it 
frequently turns out to be convenient. 
Q and A 321: page 96; line 22; type VII, i, H-R, c. 
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Why is an explicit statement of the semantic assump-
tions mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a 
scientific theory? 
An explicit statement of the semantic assumption is 
mandatory in the axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific 
theory because the same mathematical formulas will some-
times fit more than one referent. For example, the flow 
of water in a pipe can be represented by the same (or 
analogous) formulas as the flow of electricity in a wire. 
Thus, an explicit statement of the semantic assumption is 
needed to make sure that there is no confusion regarding 
which formula is being linked to which referent. 
Q and A 322: page 91; line 19; type VII, i, H-T, b. 
Why would it not be preferable to construct a model 
object that could represent its referent in every aspect 
instead of in merely certain significant aspects? 
It would not be preferable to construct a model 
object that could represent its referent in every aspect 
instead of in merely certain significant aspects because 
the possession of sufficient knowledge to construct such 
a model object would render its construction redundant. 
Q and A 323: page 108; line 1; type VII, i, J, c. 
What are "theoretical ideas?" 
Theoretical ideas are, in effect, theoretical models 
or general theories. 
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Q and A 324: page 101; line 37; type VII, i, K-Q, b. 
Why is the description of the model as a set of 
ordered pairs too coarse and uneconomical? 
The description of the model as a set of ordered 
pairs is too coarse and uneconomical because every single 
input along with its corresponding output must be dis-
played. Thus, the description will tend to turn out 
lengthy and cumbersome. 
Q and A 325: page 96; line 26; type VII, i, M-S, b. 
Why is it important not to confuse the model object 
with its referent? 
It is important not to confuse the model object with 
its referent because the same referent may be modeled by 
different model objects in different ways. Confusing the 
model object with its referent would, by obliterating or 
at least minimizing these differences, defeat the purpose 
of model objects--to discover ever "truer" ways of repre-
senting reality. 
Q and A 326: page 95; line 29; type VII, i, N, c. 
How is it possible to tell that S is the model 
object and M is the theoretical model, and not vice-
versa? 
It is possible to tell that S is the model object 
and that .M is the theoretical model and not vice-versa by 
noting that S merely represents the referents themselves, 
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while L, in addition to including R, also includes the 
mathematical representation of the properties of the 
referents as well as the relations between them. 
Q and A 327: page 91; line 19; type VII, i, Q, d. 
Why are general theories not sufficient for science? 
General theories are not sufficient for science 
because they cannot be tested. Testing is, of course, 
necessary to science. 
Q and A 328: page 104; line 14; type VII, ii, C-G-H, b. 
Does the black box model have any use in the process 
of scientific inquiry? 
Yes. The black box model does have a use in the 
process of scientific inquiry. But this use occurs prim-
arily during the early stages of scientific investi-
gation. 
Q and A 329: page 92; line 12; type VII, iii, B-G-H, b. 
Why do model objects always miss certain traits of 
their referents? 
Model objects always miss certain traits of their 
referents because any referent worth modeling would be 
too complicated to represent completely. The possession 
of knowledge of the nature of the referent sufficiently 
ample to enable the construction of a model object that 
included every trait of its referent would render the 
construction of such a model object superfluous. 
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Q and A 330: page 108; line 25; type VII, iii, B-H, c. 
Why is it possible for the testing of theoretical 
models to "become as involved as one wishes?" 
It is possible for the testing of theoretical models 
to "become as involved as one wishes" because, while a 
finite number of tests (even one, sometimes) can refute a 
theoretical model, only an infinity of tests could verify 
it completely. This means that theoretical models are 
verified only partially, to the point at which confidence 
is felt that the model is "True." And whether or not 
this point has been reached is a matter of judgement, so 
the testing "can become as involved as one wishes." 
Q and A 331: page 107; line 25; type VII, iii, B-H-N, c. 
Why should the logical strength of a theory be 
expected to turn out to be inversely related to its 
ability to solve particular theoretical problems and to 
empirical testability of that theory. 
The logical strength of a theory might be expected 
to turn out to be inversely related to its ability to 
solve particular theoretical problems and to the empiri-
cal testability of that theory because logical strength 
is gained only at the expense of empirical content, 
whereas particular theoretical problems are essentially 
about empirical content. 
Q and A 332: page 98; line 12; type VII, iii, B-L-R, c. 
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What is the reason for saying that simplicity is the 
privilege of either total ignorance or extreme generality 
(no detail)? 
The reason for saying that simplicity is the privi-
lege of either total ignorance or extreme generality is 
to justify the complication of theoretical models. 
Q and A 333: page 101; line 3; type VII, iii, C-D, b. 
Why does the fact that there are many kinds of model 
objects imply that there are many kinds of theoretical 
models? 
The fact that there are many kinds of model objects 
implies that there are many kinds of theoretical models 
because theoretical models inherit the characteristics of 
the model objects that they are based upon. 
Q and A 334: page 104; line 18; type VII, iii, C-H, b. 
If the functioning of a black box may be explained 
by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the underlying 
mechanisms, what is to prevent the task of conversion 
from black box to built-up model from degenerating into a 
process of merely making an arbitrary choice from among 
them? 
Although the functioning of a black box may be 
explained by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the 
underlying mechanisms, it is the requirement that the 
explanation fit into patterns of pre-existing knowledge 
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that prevents the task of conversion from black box to 
built-up model from degenerating into a process of merely 
making an arbitrary choice from among them. 
Q and A 335: page 103; line 11; type VII, iii, C-N, b. 
Why might the black box paradigm be expected to 
encourage superficiality? 
The black box paradigm might be expected to encour-
age superficiality because the fact that this paradigm, 
by implication, ignores the possibility of the existence 
of an internal structure and mechanism of its referent. 
Thus, the paradigm discourages the attempt to discover 
the internal structure and mechanism whose existence it 
ignores. 
Q and A 336: page 93; line 8; type VII, iii, C-Q, b. 
Why should the one-dimensional representation of a 
tridimensional system be considered the most audacious of 
all model objects? 
The one-dimensional representation of a tridimen-
sional system should be considered the most audacious of 
all model objects because, although model objects inher-
ently fall short of fully representing their referents, 
the one-dimensional model object's attempt to represent 
tridimensional referents can be considered particularly 
daring by virtue of the double handicap that it imposes 
upon itself by dispensing with two of the three dimen-
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sions that would ordinarily seem indispensable to the 
adequate representation of tridimensional referents. 
Q and A 337: page 94; line 23; type VII, iii, E-F, c. 
How can it be known that a 1 inear model of a gas is 
a theoretical model? 
It can be known that a linear model of a gas is a 
theoretical model because it has been stated that a 
linear model of a gas can mimic the condensation process. 
In order to mimic the condensation process, the model 
must specify the mathematical dimensions of the changes 
or movement that takes place. And if a model can specify 
the mathematical dimensions of the changes or movement 
that takes place, it must be a theoretical model. 
Q and A 338: page 106; line 6; type VII, iii, E-G-H, b. 
Why were the carbon atom and the hamiltonian opera-
tors mentioned? 
The carbon atom and the hamiltonian operators were 
mentioned in order to exemplify the process of model 
construction in fields of research which have tended to 
produce unifying concepts rather than merely isolated 
bits of knowledge. 
Q and A 339: page 91; line 18; type VII, iii, G, c. 
Why are theoretical models necessary to science? 
Theoretical models are necessary to science because 
they alone are testable. The unstated premise of this 
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argument is that testing is necessary to science. 
Q and A 340: page 92; line 11; type VII, iii, G-K, b. 
Why is the represent a ti on of a concrete object al-
ways partial and more or less conventional? 
The representation of a concrete object is always 
partial and more or less conventional because concrete 
objects are, as far as is known, inherently too compli-
cated to fully represent. Also, the possession of know-
ledge of the referent of a model object as faithfully 
complicated as its referent would obviate the reason for 
constructing any model object of that referent. 
Q and A 341: page 103; line 9; type VII, iii, G-N, b. 
Why might it be expected that the assumption that 
every system has an inner structure and mechanism will 
encourage research? 
It might be expected that the assumption that every 
system has an inner structure and mechanism will encour-
age research because the assumption that a thing of value 
and interest exists can be expected to lead to attempts 
to discover what that thing is. 
Task VIII 
Q and A 342: page 110; line 24; type VIII, i, S, b. 
In section 1 O, it is stated that (1) semantical 
models are interpretations of formal systems that make 
all statements of the system true, (2) theoretical models 
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(since their content is empirical) are never more than 
partially true so they cannot be semantical models, (3) 
the three empirical model objects described on page 112 
are not always true, nonetheless (4) they constitute (or 
produce) semantical models. How is this possible? 
This is not possible, it constitutes an unexplained 
contradiction. If semantical models are interpretations 
of formal systems that make all statements of the system 
true (1), and theoretical, hence empirical, models are 
never more than partially true (2), then it is manifestly 
impossible for them to constitute semantical models. 
Q and A 343: page 100; line 17; type VIII, ii, A, c. 
Are theoretical models necessarily true? 
No. Theoretical models are not necessarily true; 
they may be either true or false. 
Q and A 344: page 100; line 19; type VIII, ii, A-G, c. 
Do some theoretical models manage to represent the 
full complexity of their referents completely and accur-
ately? 
No. No theoretical model ever manages to represent 
the full complexity of its referent completely and accur-
ately. Any theoretical model of a concrete object is 
bound to fall short of representing the complexity of its 
referent. 
Q and A 345: page 104; line 14; type VIII, ii, C-E-H, b. 
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Does the black box model have any use in the process 
of scientific inquiry? 
Yes. The black box model does have a use in the 
process of scientific inquiry. But this use occurs pri-
marily during the early stages of scientific investi-
gation. 
This concludes the presentation of the question and 
answers, numbered from 276 through 345, associated with 
task-types VII and VIII in this chapter and those of the 
complete question and answer set, numbered from 1 through 
345, associated with task-types I through VIII in this 
this chapter together with the two previous chapters. 
The questions and answers displayed in this chapter 
involve the tasks of explanation and evaluation, while 
those presented in the three chapters terminating in this 
chapter involve the tasks of identification, specifica-
tion, description, classification, comparison, interpre-
tation, explanation, and evaluation. All that remains to 
be done now is to of fer a brief summary of what has been 
accomplished or at least attempted in the present work. 
The conclusion, doing just that, will follow in the next 
and last chapter. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
In the preceding chapters, the problem of construc-
ting an autodidactic tool for the study of a document in 
the philosophy of science has been formulated. The meth-
odology involved in this undertaking has been discussed, 
and the results shown. It has been seen that this prob-
lem is translatable into the problem of using the docu-
ment as a starting point for the generation of a set of 
questions and suggested answers that would in some way 
reflect the document's logical structure. Moreover, it 
has become apparent that this translation of the original 
problem can itself be resolved into a set of subordinate 
problems: (1) an analysis of the text to determine its 
conceptual elements, (2) an analysis of the methods of 
setting forth those conceptual elements within the text, 
(3) the formulation of a set of tasks that, when expres-
sed as questions and answers, will promote, exercise, and 
test the student's conceptual grasp of the text, (4) the 
conversion of these tasks into such a question and answer 
set and (5) the categorization of the resultant questions 
and answers in a way that reflect the logical structures 
of the various conceptual elements, tasks, etc. that went 
187 
188 
into their formulation. Then a more or less detailed 
description of these analyses, determinations and formu-
lations followed. The nucleus of the present work is the 
exhibition of the results of these procedures: the ques-
tions and answers themselves. 
It is this nucleus then that, through its capacity 
both to mirror the conceptual content and to elucidate 
the concept structure of the objectdocument, can hopeful-
ly serve both as the basis of an auto-didactic approach 
to the understanding of this document and as a point of 
departure for the future application of this approach to 
study of other professional documents. 
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APPENDIX 
APPENDIX 
The appendix consists of the document referred to 
throughout the present work as "the object-document" or 
"the object-text." The page numbers found in the 
identity-lines of the questions and answers refer to the 
page numbers of the original document. Thus, these page 
numbers have been retained along with the pagination of 
this work. These page numbers can be found on odd num-
bered pages of the object-document a little below and 
slightly to the right of the page numbers on the upper 
right corners of the pages of this work. And they will 
be found on the upper left hand side of the even numbered 
pages. However, the un-numbered title pages ( 8 9-91 ) of 
the object-document are located on pages 191-193 of this 
work. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCEPTS OF MODEL* 
The purpose of this chapter is to elucidate the two notions of model that 
occur in factual (natural or social) science. These concepts are those of 
model obj"lct, or schema, and theoretical model, or specific theory. A 
clarification of these notions is needed in view of the ambiguity of the 
term 'model' and of the merry confusion, prevailing in the current 
scientific and philosophic literature, among various senses of this 
word. 
We shall be concerned with model objects and theoretical models as 
hypothetical sketches of supposedly real, though possibly fictitious, things 
or facts. Thus a fluid may be modeled as a continuum endowed with cer-
tain properties, such as compressibility and viscosity. Such a model ohjcct 
may be giafted onto any of a number of general theories, say classical 
mechanics, or general relativistic mechanics. Likewise, a learning orga-
nism may be modeled as a black box equipped with certain input and 
output terminals, and this model object may then be expanded into a 
hypothetico-deductive system. In either case a specific theory, or theoreti-
cal model, of a concrete (or supposedly concrete) object, results. What 
can be subjected to empirical tests are such theoretical models: on the 
other hand general theories, being unconcerned with particulars, remain 
empirically untestable unless enriched with models of their referents. 
And model objects remain barren unless introduced in, or expanded 
into, some theory. 
Besides offering elucidations of the concepts of model object and theo-
retical model, we shall examine their relations to several other concepts 
with which they are often mixed up. These are, in particular, the aesthetic 
sense (pictorial representation), the heuristic sense (analog of a familiar 
object), and the model-theoretic sense (realization or true interpretation 
of a formal system). It will be shown that any relation to these other 
characters is accidental and that model objects and theoretical models 
are not important by what they may suggest but by what they perform, 
to wit, a partial representation of a chunk of reality. 
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I. CONCRETE OBJECT AND MODEL OBJECT 
A schem:llic representation of an object may be called a model objecr. 
lf the represented object (or referent) is concrete or physical, then its 
model is an idealization of it. The represent•1lio11 may be pictorial, as in 
the case of a drawing, or conceptual, as in lhe case of a mathematical 
formula. It may be figuratiw, like lhc ball-and-spoke model of a molecule, 
of scmisymbolic, us in the case of the contour map of the same mole· 
culc; or finally symbolic like the hamiltonian operator for that same ob· 
ject. The model object may be extratheoretical like the Pseudo 
ArCllpagitc's model of the cdestial hierarchy; or intrathcoretical as in 
the case of the random net model of the brain. 
Thi: representation of a concrete object is always partial and more or 
kss conventional. The model object will miss certain traits of its referent, 
it is apt to include imaginary elem<;nts, and will recapture only approxi-
mately the relations among the aspects it does incorporate. In particular, 
most individual variations in a clas~ Wall be deliberately ignored and most 
of the details of the events involving those individuals will likewise be 
discarded. As an eminent economist says, "Typically they [models] are 
representations in which details, that appear inessential for intended uses, 
are omitted. A model is intended to represent the real thing in certain 
significant aspects" (Orcutt, 1967, p. 69). For example, all the individuals 
of a given mice strain may be taken to be indiscernible and all ways of 
pressing a bar for food pellets may be assumed to be equivalent as well. 
In other words, the real population, made up of different individuals, is 
modeled as a homogeneous set (an equivalence class), and likewise the 
set of all possible events is partitioned into homogeneous (equivalence) 
classes. For example, a collision of m cars having as a result 11 injured 
persons with a total damage of p dollars can be represented by the ordered 
triple (111, 11, p ). From the point of view of the traffic engineer all the car 
collisions characterized by the same triple of numbers m, n, and p are 
equivalent, even though the particular circumstances of interest to the vie· 
tims, the doctors, or the police, may be quite different. The engineer may 
then assume that every fact/ of this nature is represented by such a triple 
or, as we shall put it, that (m, n, p) a/, where' a• designates the relation 
of model object to its referent. More on = in Sec. 3 and Ch. 6. Let us now 
examine a striking kind of model, rather unrealistic and yet quite fertile. 
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2. EXAMPLE: LINEAR MODELS OF TRlDlMENSlONAL THINGS 
The conceptual conquest of reality starts, paradoxically enough, by ideal-
izing it. Whether in astronomy or in biology, in chemistry or in history, 
if we want to build conceptual models "we must begin with a study of 
non-realistic abstract situations. We cannot attempt lo grasp any situation 
in its entire complexity. We must first study the partial, simpler aspccti. of 
a complex situation and then, as the next step, investigate the various 
possible combinations of those partial aspects" (Rashcvsky, 1968, p. 16). 
Consider the most audacious of all model objects, namely, the one di-
mensional representation of a tridimcnsional system. The bci.t known 
model of this kind is lsing's model of matter in condensed stales. One 
assumes that tbe units (m.:>lecuks or ions) are ordered linearly and cnch . 
of them interacts but with it$ nearest neighbor. This oversimplified moJcl 
of liquids and solids was proposed in 1920 by W. Lenz, who gave his 
student E. Ising the task of building the corresponding theoretical model. 
In other words, the problem was to construct the (or rather a) theory 
describing that model object of matter in a condensed state. (For the 
fascinating story of this theoretical model see Brush, 1967.) Ising did not 
have to start from scratch but was able to use an existing general frame-
work, namely classical statistical mechanics. This is an extremely general 
theory that does not commit itself as to the nature of the individuals 
constituting a statistical ensemble and may therefore be "applied to" (con-
joined with) a number of model objects. One such model object could be 
Ising's, another could be a sketch of an animal population. Ising grafted 
the model object onto statistical mechanics and worked out the exact 
solution (1925). But this solution failed to represent the typical qualitative 
transitions such as the jump to the ferromagnetic state. Diagnostic: The 
theoretical modd is false. Since the generic framework (statistical me-
chanics) was judged to be basically correct, clearly the model object was 
responsible for the shortcomings of the theoretical model. Prognostic: 
If we complicate the model we may bring it closer to reality. But the task 
of solving the two dimensional Ising problem was too formidable: Ising 
got discouraged and gave up physics. The job was taken up two decades 
later by L. Onsager. His results were so good that we are justified in ex-
pecting even better results from the attempts to solve the tridimensional 
Ising problem, which is still open at the time of writing. 
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Surely this model, which among other things neglects the long-range 
interactions among molecules, is a simplified representation of matter. 
Still, it poses formidable mathematical problems - essentially the exact 
computation of the partition function, which yields all the rnacroproper-
ties of the material system. Why invest so much ingenuity and labor in a 
model that is known to be physic:.illy too simple and mathematically too 
complicated? For no better reason than we would not know how to pro-
ceed otherwise than by successive refinements or complications of an 
initial coarse model. Whether the number of dimensions of a space is 
increased or decreased, whether the given is simplified or is assumed to be 
made up of suprasensible components, conceptual models are built and 
these are the only reasonable symbolic pictures of reality. Only models 
built with the help of intuition and mathematics, and susceptible to em-
pirical tests, have succeeded in representing reality and can be corrected 
as need be. Moreover even a coarse model, like Ising's one-dimensional 
representation, is capable of explaining complex facts of interest to biolo-
gy, such as the elasticity of macromolecules and the uncoiling of proteins 
(sec Vol'kenshtcin, 1970). A crude mathematical model is worth a thou-
sand jeremiads on the defeating complexity of life. 
Take a look at a recent volume devoted to some oversimplified models 
of physical systems: Mathematica/ Physics in One Dimension, by Lieb and 
Mattis (1966). One finds here classics such as the papers by Kac, 
Uhlenbeek, and Hemmer on a linear model of a gas capable of mimicking 
the condensation process; Dyson's article on the dynamics of a chaotic 
chain; the memoirs of Kronig and Penney on the movement of electrons 
in linear lattices, and many other imaginative contributions. They are not 
just exercises in applied mathematics but (crude) theoretical models of 
real objects: they propose full-fledged (but specific) theories specifying 
schematic representations of physical systems. Thus Dyson's random 
chain is a coarse model of the glass structure. AH these fantasies intend 
to grasp reality. How? Listen to the editor-authors of this singular volume: 
The solution to one dimensional problems "make a contribution to the 
three-dimensional [account of] reality as well: by educating us to the need 
for rigorous and exact analysis, they lead us away from the easy and sim-
plistic first theories toward a more critical and mathematical approach, 
and finally to a better definition [representation] of rea \ity" (Lieb and 
Mattis, 1966, p. vi). 
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Surely a number of real complexities are discarded when working on 
model objects, whether one-dimensional, three-dimensional or pluric.li-
mensional. For example, a one-dimensional model of matter in a con-
densed state fails to represent condensation, freezing, and magnetization. 
But as a compensation one may obtain exact solutions, which arc easier 
to interpret than the approximate solutions to more complex problems 
(in particular the numerical solutions obtained with the help of comput-
ers). What better preparation for facing more realistic, i.e., more complex, 
problems? Certainly one must expect that any such oversimplified model 
will fail. But the failure of a precise idea is more instructive than the 
success of a muddled idea, for it may suggest the precise modifications 
producing more realistic (truer) models. (For lucid discussions concerning 
the adjustment of theoretical models in contemporary psychology see Bush 
and Mosteller, 1955; and Sternberg, 1963.) Briefly, to grasp reality one 
starts by sifting the available information and discarding most of it. Then 
one adds imaginary (or rather hypothetical) components - though with 
a realistic intention. One thus constitutes a more or less schematic model 
object. This model object is hoped to constitute a profile of its referent. 
3. THE MODELING RELATION 
As we recalled in Section 1, one starts modeling by pretending that the do-
main(s) R of individuals to be represented can be partitioned into homo-
geneous subsets S, i.e., into subsets all of whose elements are identical in a 
given respect. We then attribute each members of every such equivalence 
class S certain key predicates P 1, P2 , ••• , Pn-i· These predicates stand for 
properties and relations (in particular functions) that are for the most 
part unobservable. {Although these predicates are defined on S, they will 
be satisfied only approximately, if at all, by the ultimate referents, i.e. the 
members of R.) We thus form a relational system M = (S, P1 ,P2 , •• • , Pn_ 1) 
intended as a conceptual model of the concrete referents R. In short, M 
models R or, briefly, M :R. 
The model object, if theoretical, is a more or less elaborate construct: 
a set together with a few functions, a ring of operators in a Hilbert space, 
or what have you. It need not and in general it is not intuitable: but it 
always has a factual referent, even if hypothetical. For example, social 
mobility in a community can be represented by a certain transition proba-
bility matrix. Such a matrix is not a picturable model object but it is not 
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al1ogc1her abstract either, for it represents jumps of real people from one 
social rung to another: it is a factual construct or, better, a construct with 
a factual referent. Tn other words, the relation = of modeling is included 
(in extension) in the set of all ordered pairs (c,f), where c is a construct 
and/a fact. 
The modeling relation ~ should occur explicitly in any formulation of 
a scientific theory that takes care of the factual (physical, psychological, 
historical, etc.) meaning of its symbols (Bunge, l 967b}. Thus in theor~­
tical biophysics one may assume that a eel! r is rcprescntl!d by, or modeled 
as, a subset s of a differentiable manifold on which certain real value\! 
functions arc given, that represent so many properties of the cell (tem-
perature, density, etc.). We may then write 's= r' and similarly for the 
predicates. Every formula containing the symbol '=' of the modeling 
relation may be called an interpretative axiom or a semantic assumption. 
If written out in extenso, any theoretical statement in factual science 
' will contain the modeling relation .. Thus the formula for the total mass 
of a cell r will be: .. If s == r, then M ~r) = 111 the Lebesgue integral of the 
mass density over the sets". If no such precaution is taken, a semantical 
freak such as 'the total mass of the set s' is apt to be engendered. 
In informal scientific discourse one rarely takes pains to state explicitly 
any such semantic assumptions: they are usually hinted at in what under-
graduates call "the conceptual part of the stuff." But an explicit statement 
of the semantic assumptions is mandatory in the foundations of the science 
and in particular in the axiomatic reconstruction of a scientific theory, if 
only because any given mathematical formalism fits a number of kinds of 
concrete object: it is noncommittal and thus ambiguous. An explicit ex-
hibition of the modeling relation will not only indicate what one is talking 
about but may also constitute a reminder that the object model, though 
hoped to represent a certain thing, is not the same as it. It is never useless 
to insist that every model object is an idealization of a system or a fact 
taken to be real or realizable. There are as many idealizations as idealizers, 
data, and goals. Even if two model builders have access to the same em-
pirical information, they may construct different models, for model build-
ing is a creative activity engaging the background, abilities, and taste of 
the builder. Hence the worries of administrators and politicians, about 
the "unnecessary duplication" of theoretical work, are unfounded. In-
stead, the absence of communication among the model builders faced 
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with the same problem (but likely to come up with different results) does 
justify an ulcer or two. So does the playing around with model objects 
without ever expanding them into full-fledged theoretical models. 
4. FROM MODEL OBJECT TO THEORETICAL MODEL 
It is not enough to conceive of a liquid as a molecular lattice or of a brain 
as a neuron net: all this has to be described in detail and, if possible, in 
agreement with the known general laws. In other words, one must build 
a theory of the modei object, i.e., a theoretical model. The kinetic gas 
theory is such a theoretical model, whereas neither general statistical 
mechanics nor thermodynamics are theoretical models of a gas, since 
they do not specify the peculiarities of a gas vis-a-vis other kinds of system. 
Nor is geHeral graph theory a theoretical model: on the other hand some 
of its applications, e.g., to human organizations such as enterprises, are 
theoretical models. From these examples we infer a first characterization 
of the notion of a theoretical model, namely this. A theoretical model is 
a bypothetico-deductive system concerning a model object, which is in 
turn a schematic conceptual representation of a thing or of a situation 
assumed to be actual ~r possible. If such a specific theory is couched in 
exact (mathematical) terms, it is often called a mathematical model of a 
certain domain of facts (see, e.g., Neyman et al., 1959). Let us review a 
distinguished specimen of this kind of animal. 
The current theory of the solid state was founded by Bloch four decades 
ago. Bloch's master idea was to apply wave mechanics (a generic theory) to 
a simple model of the crystal. The constituents of this model object are 
a set of fixed points representing an atom each, and a bunch of electrons 
(or rather model electrons) wandering among the fixed centers. The lattice 
of fixed centers (fiction) is assumed to be rigid (fiction), the interaction 
among the electrons is set equal to zero (fiction), and the electron-lattice 
interaction is represented by a potential that is periodic in space but con-
stant in time (approximation). This model object is next conjoined with 
the vast framework of quantum mechanics. In the course of the computa-
tions some additional mathematical simplifications may have to be intro-
duced. However, the results are frequently in agreement with the experi-
mental data, which suggest that a nearly true image of a real crystal 
(a nonpictorial image·to be sure) has been built. Thus, although initially 
200 
98 METHOD, MODEL AND MATTER 
one does not postulate any difference among conductors, semiconductors, 
and insulators, this partition is obtained upon analyzing the distribution 
of energy levels (or rather bands). These bands are separated by "forbid-
den" regions (no states). If every band is occupied by the electrons, then 
there will be no electric current, i.e. the system will be an insulator. This 
theoretical model explains numerous macroproperties of most pure crys-
tals: their thermal and electric conductivities, magnetic susceptibility, 
optical properties, etc. Some other properties, such as luminisccnce, arc 
explained upon complicating the Bloch model by adding impurities, as-
suming disorder in the lattice, and so on. The more traits a theo::-etic::i.l 
model is to take in and the more accurately it is to represent them, the 
more complex it will have to be. Simplicity is the privilege of either total 
ignorance or extreme generality (no specific detail at all). 
The procedure is the same in the nonphysical sciences. Consider the 
brain model proposed by McCulloch and Pitts three decades ago. This 
model covers only the nerve fibres and it does not account for the mecha-
nism of the nerve pulse: it is a semiphcnomenological model (or grey box 
theory) that will have to be supplemented with models accounting for the 
physical and chemical process of nerve conduction. Also the time of con-
duction along the axon is ignored, and the synaptic delay is assumed to 
be constant and the same for all neurons. Next one formulates the central 
hypothesis of the theoretical model: that a neuron does not fire unless the 
preceding neurons have fired during the preceding moment (i.e., no spon-
taneous firings and no effect before the cause). This statement is translated 
into mathematical formulas, one for each type of connection. Once in the 
possession of these formulas one attempts to embed them in an existing 
mathematical calculus: otherwise one will have to invent a new mathe-
matical theory. In the present case, the ready-made mathematical foil was 
Boolean algebra. In this way McCulloch and Pitts succeeded in con-
structing a theory that explains some neurophysiological processes. If one 
wishes to go beyond he will have to complicate this model. For example, 
if synaptic contacts are assumed to be formed randomly, then one can 
pose and solve the question of the chance formation of certain nervous 
loops - which should in turn explain the appearance of ideas that seem 
to come out of the blue (i.e., without external stimulation). Which is 
precisely what Rapoport and his coworkers have done, namely to develop 
stochastic models of the central nervous system. 
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Stochastic models became fashionable in mathematical psychology 
when it was realized that animal behavior is far from consistent and 
systematic. There are thus numerous stochastic models of the process 
of learning simple tasks such as running a maze under reward or punish-
ment. All these models share the following traits. Firstly, they ignore 
dilTcrences among animal species as well as the dilTcrcnccs in the tasks 
to be learned. Secondly, they discard all the biological variables: they 
focus on stimuli, responses, and the effects of the latter (in particular 
reward and punishment), thus bypassing the central nervous system. 
Thirdly, in each model the central hypothesis is a formula for the proba-
bility of respor.se of a subject as c. function of the number of trials. This 
function varies from one model to the other. In any case, what is usually 
called a 'stochastic learning model' is actually the central hypothesis of a 
specific theory (=theoretical model) in consonance with the general frame· 
work of learning theory. (The hypothesis in question is central by virtue 
of being accompanied by subsidiary hypothesis concerning either the 
mathematical structure of the constructs involved or their factual content.) 
In sum, once a model of the thing has been conceived, the model has 
got to be characterized in exact terms with the help of mathematical con-
cepts, such as those of function and series. If possible, the resulting 
specific theory should be inserted into a comprehensive theoretical schema. 
This, a common practice in the physical sciences, is hardly possible in the 
new sciences, rich though they are in grandiose but woolly conceptions. 
Backward disciplines include at most such conceptions, developing areas 
have only theoretical models, and advanced fields include both theoretical 
models and vast theories that make room for theoretical models. (Recall 
Chapter 2.) 
5. THEORETICAL MODELS 
Not all model objects are conceptual and those which are may not be 
theoretical models although they can constitute bases for such specific 
theories. A necklace of multicolored beads can represent a chain polymer, 
and a sociogram may represent some of the relations among the individ-
uals in a community, but the former is a physical model or analogue while 
the latter is just a data display. Even the Watson-Crick model of DNA is 
a model object which, at the time of writing, is still in search of a full 
theoretical description, or expansion into a theoretical model. In order 
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to obtain a theoretical model, the model object must be either blown up 
or embedded into a theoretical framework. Upon being absorbed by a 
theory, whether existing or created ad hoc, the model object inherits the 
peculiarities of the theory and, in particular, whatever law statements the 
theory may contain. Thus a model cell, if adjoined to the general theory 
of di!Tusion, will satisfy the latter's diffusion equation: otherwise it will 
not be able to mirror an intracellular diffusion process. 
Let M=(S, P1, /'2, ••• , P"_ 1) be a model of a concrete object of the 
kind R, i.e. let M = R. Further, assume that the various coordinates of 
M are logically independent from one another, i.e., not interdefir.able. 
Then any consistent set of conditions (postulates) specifying the structure 
(mathematical nature) of then primitive concepts, as well as their factua! 
meaning, will be a theoretical model of R. In other words, a theoretical 
model of a collection R of things is a hypothetico-deductive system with 
primitive base M. (The axiomatizability condition is sufficient but not 
necessary for getting a theoretical mo~el, but it is necessary in order to 
give a quick and exact definition Qf the concept.) Wheth(!r any given 
theoretical model is true to some extent is another matter. 
Any theoretical model of a concrete object is bound to fall short of 
the complexity of its referent, but in any case it is far richer than the bare 
model object, which is just a list of traits of the concrete object. Thus if 
a planet is modeled as a mass point, or even as a ball, not much is said. 
It is only by further assuming that such a model satisfies certain law 
statements, in particular laws of motion, that we get a piece of scientific 
knowledge. Look at a few more examples: 
Thing or fact Model object Theoretical model 
(referent) (conceptual schema) (specific theory) 
Deuteron Proton-neutron potential Quantum mechanics of the 
well p-n potential well 
Solute in dilute solution Perfect gas Kinetic theory of gases 
Traffic at rush hour Continuous flow Mathematical theory of 
traffic flow 
Learning organism Markovian black box Bush and Mostellcr's 
linear operator model 
Bunch of singing cicadas Collection of coupled Statistical mechanics of an 
oscillators ensemble of coupled 
oscillators 
Enterprise Flowchart Inventory theory 
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6. FROM THE BLACK BOX TO THE MECHANISM 
There are many kinds of model object and, consequently, of theoretical 
model. At one end of the spectrum we find the black box equipped only 
with input and output terminals. At the other end we find the box filled 
up with mechanisms, more or less bidden, serving to explain the external 
behavior of the box. The natural course (but not necessarily the histori-
cal one) is to start with the simplest model object, one without a struc-
ture. One then proceeds to assign a simple structure, e.g., by dividing the 
o:iginal box into two, and he may continue this process of successive 
complications till whatever was to be explained gets ir. fact explained. 
Since the hypothesized mechanisms are not usually on display, they must 
be conjectured. This conjecturing may or may not be based on existing 
knowledge: for example, the mechanism may be assumed to consist in 
a known field or in a newly invented one. In either case the game is not 
just to account for appearance (observable behavior) at any price, but to 
try to guess the actual mechanism. In other words, it is not a question of 
imitating Ptolemy's epicycles or even the "virtual" particles and processes 
of contemporary physics, which discharge only computation duties but 
have no real referents (Bunge, 197ld). Hypothetical mechanisms should 
be taken seriously, as representing the innards of the thing. To take such 
conjectures seriously is to demand that they be empirically testable: an 
occult mechanism that fails to show up in any distinctive way, that stays 
aloof from the known portion of the net of laws, and that is contrived 
only to comply with the data, is no more than a makeshift. 
Consider any system whatever, machine or animal, molecule or institu-
tion, and assume we wish to describe and predict its behavior without for 
the moment being com:erned with either the composition of the processes 
that may occur inside the system. In this case one will build a black box 
model that will constitute a representation of the global functioning of 
the system - just like the idea a young child has of a TV set. Assume 
further that all environmental factors but one are disregarded, and call 
I the strength of that factor, or input. Assume also that the system has a 
single property that is influenced by the input: call 0 the intensity of the 
output, or response of the system to the environmental stimuli /. The 
simplest representation of the events involving the box will be a table 
displaying the various couples (/, 0) of the values of the input and the 
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corresponding output. Each evenl will then be represented by one such 
ordered couple, which will be a model event. But this description of the 
model is too coarse and uneconomical. We shall gain by replacing the 
table of observed values by a hypothesized general formula relating the 
set of input v.ilucs to the set of output values (or some function of it). 
Such a formula will represent, in a concise and general fashion, the be-
havior of the model system without saying a word about the events going 
on inside the system. If the formula is related to other formulas, and 
particularly if one succeeds in inserting it into a general theory, one will 
get a black box model of the system. Such a simplistic representation may 
temporarily assuage our cognitive thirst, particularly ii our ultimate go::.! 
is to use the system rather than to know all about it or to improve on it. 
The next stage in the theoretical investigation of the system will consist 
in introducing further variables of the same types (inputs and outputs). A 
time may come when one or more variables of a third type will have to be 
introduced, namely variables S specifying the internal state of the system. 
The law of the system, or rather a scliematic representation of one of its 
Jaws, will then be a formula tying up the three sets of variables,/, 0, and 
S, or rather a whole bunch of formulas involving these variables. If the 
system cannot only react in a certain manner, i.e., in conformity with a 
definite Jaw, but can also jump into some other form of behavior, be it 
spontaneously or under the influence of an external stimulus, then the 
theoretical model will have to be enriched with the laws of such a behavior 
change. (Think of a watch used as a projectile or of an individual taking an 
LSD dose.) In any case a theoretical model of the behavior of a system is a 
set of statements, preferably mathematical formulas, relating the exogenous 
variables I and 0 and the endogenous variables S of the system. Since no 
mechanism has been conjectured, the box is still dark; but since it has 
been assigned internal states, it is grey rather than black. In other words, 
the theoretical model includes endogenous variables but the latter do not 
represent any detail of the inner structure of the system: they are just 
intervening variables with a computational rather than representational 
value. (For a rich set of black and grey boxes, see Zadeh and Desoer, 
1963. For a general black box framework, see Bunge, 1963b, and for a 
philosophical analysis see Bunge, 1964.) 
A beharior model of a system will satisfy the requirements of empiricist 
philosophies (positivism, pragmatism, operationism, phenomenalism) as 
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well as of conventionalism since, without going much beyond the data, it 
enables one to condense the latter and even to predict the evolution of the 
system. But no model of this kind, be it a black box or a grey one, will 
explain the behavior both external and internal of the system. Moreover 
it will remain isolated from the rest of our knowledge of things or at least 
it will make no use of it. To obtain such an explanation and Lo establish 
contacts with other theories and, a fortiori, with other disciplines, we shall 
have to try a build-up model of the same system, i.e. we must disclose the 
inner structure and the mechanism of it. (That every system has an inner 
structure and mechanism, is a rather bold metaphysical assumption that 
has always er.couraged research, whereas the black box paradigm en-
courages superficiality.) Such a disclosure is not difficult to perform in the 
case of a clock, at least if we remain content with a rnacrodescription. But 
in general, whether we have to do with light or with chemical bonds, with 
thought or with institutions, the task is hard and probably open ended. 
The reason for this is that most of the structures and mechanisms respon-
sible for appearance are hidden to the senses. Hence, instead of attempting 
to see them we must try to imagine them. Even if we finally succeed in ob-
serving a part of the inner structure and mechanism, we shall have made 
hypotheses and shall have checked them. For example, to explain the 
semiphenomenological law of multiple proportions we must posit mole-
cules made up of atoms. Thus, by assuming that the water molecule is 
composed of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom, we account for 
the macrofact that two volumes of hydrogen combine with exactly one 
volume of oxygen. (Incidentally, this hypothesis was rejected by the ener-
getists of the turn of the century, who argued along positivist lines against 
the positing of any hidden structure and mechanism: thermodynamics, a 
grey box theory, was enough for them.) 
To most drivers a car is a black box: they operate the leversand 
switches knowing what behavior they will induce thereby but they know 
little if anything about the engine and the transmission mechanism. 
Likewise most computer users know how to operate computers but have 
only faint ideas about their build-up. To a machine designer, on the 
other hand, a car and a computer are transparent or at least translucid 
boxes rather than black ones. (However, every single component of a 
machine may be handled, for practical purposes, as a black box. It be-
hoves the physicist or the chemist, rather than the engineer, to find out 
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what is inside the box.) It would be absurd to laugh at drivers and computer 
programmers for taking a phenomenological approach with respect to the 
machines they operate since, unlike the engineer, the user of a machine is 
is supposed to treat it as a means not as an end. But it would be equally 
absurd to criticize research engineers for not remaining satisfied with the 
external approach and for wishing to know whal mechanism each switch 
controls. Yet that is precisely what the behaviorist (phenomenalist, posi-
tivist, black boxist) philosophy does: it derides all those who inquire into 
the modus op<'ra11di of tl1ings. In particular, black boxism discourages the 
attempt to unveil the neurophysiological mechanisms of the mind: it as-
serts not only that psychology can bypass the brain in a first stage of re-
search, but that it must do so as a matter of principle. Enforcing black 
boxism in science would be like banning car designers and mechanics: 
after a while there would be no more cars to be driven. In sum, while the 
black box is a useful model, it should be only a preliminary one. 
An aim of research is to throw further light into every box. As far as the 
theoretician is concerned this task is one of invention rather than discov-
ery. There is considerable leeway in the transition from a black box to a 
translucid box. Indeed the functioning of a black box may be explained 
by infinitely many hypotheses concerning the underlying mechanisms. 
For every function/ relating the inputs I to the outputs 0 there are infi-
nitely many pairs of functions g and h such that g maps the set I of inputs 
into a set S of intermediaries (e.g., internal states) and h maps S into the 
set 0 of outputs, subject to the condition that the composition of g and h 
equals the given function/ If the intervening variables are interpreted in 
factual (e.g. biological) terms, then one gets infinitely many possible mech-
anisms for every black box - provided the various hypotheses are not 
required to be in tune with any known laws of nature. 
Empiricists hold this ambiguity to be a shortcoming of any model that 
covers more than the observable external behavior. On the other hand 
realists regard that as a virtue of the translucid box approach for, if one 
is lucky enough to find (or rather invent) the real mechanism, then the 
apparent behavior remains uniquely determined by that mechanism, 
whereas the converse is false. In other words, if a mechanism is posited 
then one derives its behavior, whereas if the latter is given the former can 
only be guessed. (Inferring behavior from mechanism is a direct problem; 
conjecturing mechanism from behavior is an inverse problem, hence a 
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much harder one.) Any such guess must of course be checked. The out-
come of such a control may be regarded as successful, i.e. the mechanism 
hypothesis may be taken to be confirmed pro tempore if it satisfies the 
following conditions: (a) it accounts for the observed behavior; (h) it 
predicts new facts, not covered by the black box model, and some such 
predictions are borne out by new observations or experiments; and (c) it 
is consistent with the bulk of the known Jaw statements. (For a list of cri-
teria for the evaluation of scientific theories sec Bunge, I 967a, Chapter 15.) 
One may then propose a variety of models of any given system: the 
black box, the grey box with internal states, or the translucid box equipped 
with a mechanism. One may try causal boxes or stochastic boxes, i.e. boxes 
with random features built into them. One may build single level boxes 
(e.g., physica! models) or multilevel boxes (e.g., psychosocial models). The 
choice among these various model objects and the corresponding theore-
tical models depends not only upon the nature of the system itself but also 
upon the goal of the investigator. If the aim is just to handle a system, 
then a black box may suffice. But if one wishes to understand how the 
system works, be it out of intellectual curiosity or with a view to improving 
on it, then he must imagine more complex models enjoying the support of 
general theories as well as of new experiments. As an eminent biologist 
wrote a propos of muscle models (Pringle, 1960), the postulation of a 
conceptual model is unnecessary if the goal is the synthesis of data: in this 
case the goodness of fit is the only requirement. But if the objective is 
further data analysis, or the construction of a compass for a deeper experi-
mental exploration, then it will be necessary to imagine theoretical models, 
which alone will justify adopting a given "empirical curve" rather than any 
other curve fitting thP. same empirical data. In sum, it is up to us to decide 
which road to take: superficial knowledge (description and prediction of 
behavior) or deep knowledge (explanation and ability to explain unheard-
of effects). But in either case we have to do with the construction of model 
objects and theoretical models of supposedly real things. 
7. GENERATING THEORETICAL MODELS 
In some fields of research the theoretical model is built around the 
model object. Jn others the model object can often be attached to an 
existing general theory. Thus in contemporary mathematical sociology 
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there is hardly a generic theory: here every theory proper (as distinct from 
a vague view) is specific and the various specific theories do not seem to 
assemble into a single comprehensive theory. On the other hand in atomic 
and molecular physics the construction of theoretical models usually con-
sists in applying a generic theory (frequently quantum mechanics) to 
models of the thing concerned. Thus, if we wish to generate theoretical 
models of the carbon atom, we try symbolic models of it (namely, hamil· 
tonian operators that gather basic properties such as the number of elec-
trons and their interactions) and plug such model object:> into the general 
theory. 
Any given model object can, within bounds, be conjoined with a number 
of gi!neral theories to yield as many different theoretic~l models (specific 
theories) of the real object concerned. Example: the model of a gas r.s a 
swarm of point particles connected by van der Waals forces may be 
inserted either in classical or in rel;itivistic partiele mechanics, to yieid two 
different theoretical models of the gas. Conversely, a number of model 
objects can be associated to any £i~cn general theory provided they are 
couched in the language of the latter. Example: assume different particle 
shapes and different force laws but keep classical mechanics throughout: 
you will obtain different theoretical models of the gas. Whenever general 
theories are available, theoretical models can then be generated in either 
of two ways: either by embedding a given model object into different 
general theories, or by grafting different model objects onto a given generic 
framework. In either case a theoretical model is a generic theory together 
with a model object. More precisely, when a generic theory Tg is available, 
a theoretical model or specific theory T. can be built by adjoining to T, 
a set S of subsidiary hypotheses, i.e. T.= Tu u S. These subsidiary hypo-
theses characterize ("define") a given model object. 
This does not hold for the developing areas of science, where most of 
the time model construction proceeds centrifugally, out of model objects. 
Here one starts out from some M and tries to weave a net of formulas 
characterizing Min as precise a manner as possible. Consequently prob-
lem solving is hardest in the underdeveloped fields of research: here one 
must make a fresh start almost every time, relying only on data on the one 
hand and on pure mathematics on the other, without the guide of a com-
prehensive framework. Such a guide can often be taken for granted in the 
more advanced areas. For instance, nowadays the theoretical meteorologist 
209 
CONCEP1"S OF MODEL 107 
starts from the general equations of hydrodynamics and thermodynamics, 
which are assumed to hold regardless of the atmospheric composition. I lis 
job is often to contrive a set of subsidiary assumptions representing the 
composition of the real atmosphere - i.e., to devise a model atmosphere. 
Atmosphere pollution by industry, as well as atmospheric clean-up, will 
force him to change the model object, hence the theoretical model of the 
atmosphere - not however the general equations. This enviable position 
is certainly not the one attained so far by psychologists and sociologists, 
who are still waiting for their second conceptual revolution - the first one 
having been the introduction of mathematical models. 
8. MODELS AND TESTABILITY 
Particular theoretical problems, that is, problems concerning the repre-
sentation of specific situations, can be posed and solved only within 
specific theories of some scope or other. By the same token, only specific 
theories (theoretical models) are empirically testable: the general theories 
yield no particular conclusion, hence no precisely testable one. Thus, in 
the case of mechanics, if we wish to find, say, the modes of oscillation of 
a particular structure, such as a shell, we have to specify the external forces, 
the mass and stress distributions, the constitutive equations of the mate-
rial, and the boundary and initial conditions - in short. we have to enrich 
the general theory with a definite model shell. In sum, model-free theories 
are not empirically testable. 
A first conclusion: both the ability to solve particular theoretical prob-
lems and the empirical testability of a theory are inversely related to the 
logical strength of the theory. Second: the testing of general theories calls 
for the production of specific ones: by themselves, the extremely general 
theories, such as information theory, and even theories of intermediate 
breadth, such as quantum mechanics, are untestable, as was argued in 
Chapter 2. What can be tested is only a specific theory, i.e., a theoretical 
model, whether or not it is the outcome of attaching a model object to a 
generic theory. Third, in testing a theoretical model in an advanced field, 
where comprehensive theories are available, it is not always clear which is 
to be blamed in case of failure: whether the general theory, or the model 
object, or both - even assuming the data themselves to be blameless. Let 
us take a closer look at this situation. 
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If the theoretical model T. disagrees with the facts and if one can be 
reasonably certain that this dissonance is not the fault of the empirical 
dala, then the theoretical ideas will have to be revised. If T. is not embedded 
in a comprehensive framework, then one has to try different central 
hypotheses, leading to as many alternative theoretical models. But if '1~ 
is embedded in a generic theory, then we have a double infinity of possible 
alternatives. In fact, in this case one may either change the model object 
M characterized by T. without touching the generic framework T~, or 
one may keep M and adopt or construct a different general theory Ts. 
Thus, if certain calculations on the propagation of light in the vicinity of 
the sun do not agree with the data, then one may try either complicating 
the model of the sun (e.g., rotating ellipsoid instead of mass point), or 
changing the general theory of gravitation or that of light. The type of 
change one may find advisable will depend critically on the services ren-
dered in the past by both the general theory and the model object. If the 
comprehensive framework has had a distinguished career or if the model 
object is obviously much too coarse, then it will be wise to keep the former 
and try an alternative model object. (If Dicke and Brans had taken this 
methodological rule into account they might not have proposed an alter-
native to Einstein's gravitation theory.) But if the general theory has failed 
in the past, or else if it is very young and cannot be assigned a truth value, 
then it will be advisable to try alternative theoretical systems with a wide 
scope. In any case, the verification procedure of such a generic theory 
cannot dispense with the construction of a number of model objects, and 
the test of any theoretical model can become as involved as one wishes 
(see Bunge, 1970). So complex indeed that no clear cut decision is attain-
able in some cases. For example, to date one does not know which of the 
various stochastic models of learning is the truest, even though they are 
quite different from one another (see Sternberg, 1963; Ritchie, 1965). All 
of which casts doubts on the simplistic methodologies of science advising 
us to adopt a theory if, and only if, it agrees with the evidence. 
9. MODELS, MECHANISMS, ANALOGS, PICTURES 
Every hypothetical mechanism of a process is a model object but the 
converse is not true: not every conceptual model sketches a mechanism. 
Thus a black box is a model that ignores inner mechanisms. Moreover 
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mechanism models need not be mechanical or mechanistic. Thus the 
mechanisms of electromagnetic propagation, of complex chemical reac-
tions, and of biological evolution, are nonmechanical, i.e., they arc model-
ed in ways that are foreign to mechanics. At any rate the frequent identifi-
cation of model object with mechanism - an identification inherited from 
the mechanistic period of physics - is mistaken. 
Nor need model objects be deterministic: they may be probabilistic. 
In other words, some or even all of the predicates occurring in a model 
object may be random variables. Thus every specific stochastic learning 
model is cer.tered on some formula expressing the response probability at 
the nth trial as a function of the event(s) preceding that trial. Any such 
formula may be taken either at its face value or as representing a definite 
random process. In the latter case it will be said to embody a stochastic 
model, or a chance mechanism, of the process. 
Also, while some models are literal and unfamiliar, others are analogi-
cal, i.e., conceived in imitation of familiar situations. Thus an unrcliahlc 
person may be regarded as simiJar to a vending machine out of order, that 
delivers the goods only a fraction of the times it swallows a dime. This is 
an example of an analog or simulate: the real thing (the unreliable fellow) 
is modeled on a model of a known kind (a machine out of kilter), and the 
resulting model object can be embedded in a generic theory, namely the 
theory of Markovian machines. Conceptual analogs can of course be as 
respectable as material analogs or simulates, but the point is that they 
constitute a proper subset of the set of model objects. Many, perhaps most, 
model objects are literal and more or less uncanny (to the layman) rather 
than analogical and familiar. Thus there are no adequate analogical mod-
els of electrons, ecosystems, and markets. Furthermore, the insistence on 
analogical models, such as the particle and the wave analogies, is respon-
sible for a great deal of confusion in the quantum theory (Bunge, J 967e). 
At any rate, the characterization of the model object as a metaphor, which 
has recently been revived (Black, 1962; Hesse, 1966), is misleading. 
The same holds, a fortiori, for the diagram, which - except in pure 
mathematics - may be regarded as a kind of analog. In factual science a 
diagram is a visual and sketchy representation of a model object: it 
pictures the latter without replacing it. Being more or less conventional, 
a diagram is not a unique representation ofits referent and is consequently 
unintelligible unless accompanied by some interpretation code. The vari-
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lHIS piclures ,1f a model object need not be isomorphic tu one another and 
consequently they cannot replace the object they picture even though lhey 
can help to understand it. For example, the allernative representations of 
the motion of a set of coupled oscillators, in usual coordinates and in 
"normal" (interaction-free) coordinates, are theoretically equivalent, 
whereas the corresponding symbolic diagrams are not: while in the former 
case the various dots ••re linked with springs, in the latter case they arc 
unauad1cd. At any rate, pictorial diagrams arc not part and parcel of 
factual thel>rctical science although they may illuslrale some parts of a 
theory in equivocal ways. They are not for the simple reason that a theory 
is, by definition, a set of statements not a mixture of statements and 
pictures. Pictures and, in general, metaphors, may occur in the process of 
building, learning, teaching or applying a theory but they are not part of 
the theory. 
In summary, there are many kinds of model object: mechanical and 
nonmechanical, deterministic and stochastic, literal and analogical, figu-
rative and symbolic - and so on. None of these properties is desirable in 
itself, for what makes a model ooject work is something else, namely its 
being an idea concerning some aspects of a thing or of a fact, and as such 
something that can be expanded into a hypothetico-deductive system. 
10. THEORETICAL MODELS AND SEMANTICAL MODELS 
In semantics, and particularly in model theory (the semantics of pure 
mathematics), the term 'model' signifies an interpretation of an abstract 
theory, under which (interpretation) all the statements of the theory are 
satisfied (or true). For example, since the integers (Z) satisfy ring theory, 
the structure ;t'=(Z, +, ·, 0, 1) is a model of ring theory, itself an ab-
stract theory admitting alternative models. What is the relation between 
this semantic concept of model and the metascientific concepts of model 
object and theoretical model? Clearly every scientific theory, whether 
generic or specific, is an interpreted theory in the sense that, if properly 
formulated, it contains both designation rules and semantic assumptions 
endowing the formalism with a factual content. (Recall Chapter 4.) More-
over, if such an interpreted theory did turn out to be wholly true it would 
qualify as a model, in the semantic sense, of the underlying abstract for-
malism. But things arc not quite so simple. 
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Firstly, not all theoretical models have been subjected to tests for truth: 
consequently they cannot all be assigned a truth value. Secondly, every 
tested theoretical model proves to be at best partially true in the sense that, 
with toil and luck, some of its testable statements turn out to be approxi-
mately true. Therefore no theoretical model is, strictly speaking, a model 
in the model-theoretic sense, for this requires the exact satisfaction of 
every formula in the theory. Nor is it true that all semantical models are 
models in the metascientific sense. Thus ad hoc models and mathematical 
model;; (interpretations within mathematics) mirror no real systems. Since 
the arrow points in neither direction, the semantic and the metascientific 
concepts of model do not coincide - pace Suppes (196 l ). What might be 
said is that a theoretical model that has been given a pass mark constitutes 
a quasimodel of its underlying formalism. But this semantic concept .of 
quasimodel has yet to be ehlcidated. In any even!, the model-theoretic or 
semantic concept of a model fails to capture the metascientific concepts of 
model. A simple example will bear out this conclusion. 
Consider the following system of signs 
Al S ::P 0. 
A2 (a) F: S-+ R. (b) G: S x S-+ R. (c) H: S x S-+ R. 
A3 s, s' e S => H (s, s') = h e R. 
A4 (a)O:RxR-+R. (b)O:RxR-+R. 
AS s, s' e S => G(s, s') = hO [F(s') OF(s)] 
This system of signs is nonsignificant. We may assign it as many mean-
ings as interpretation codes we care to adjoin it. Let us do it in two stages. 
In a first stage Jet us interpret the capital letters either as sets or as func-
tions, according to the context. Moreover, we shall stipulate that 'R' 
stands for the real line, 'O' for the arithmetic product, and 'D' for sub-
traction; the remaining symbols shall be assigned the standard interpreta-
tion. In this way we obtain the following interpreted system 
Fl S is a non-empty set. 
F2 (a) F is a real valued function on S. (b) G and H are real 
valued functions on the set of pairs of members of S. 
F3 His the constant function with value /z. 
F4 For every sands' in S, G(s, s')=lz[F(s')-F(s)]. 
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This is a form:llism interpreted within pure mathematics. It makes no 
sense outside mathematics. In particular, it is not a theoretical model in 
any metascientific sense of the term, for it does not concern anything 
extramathematical: the basic set Sis an arbitrary (abstract) set and there-
fore the functions F, G, and H cannot represent any concrete properties. 
Precisely this renders the formalism valuable from a scientific point of 
view, for it is a ready-made dummy that can be clothed in a number of 
ways. 
To transform the preceding formalism into a theoretical model of a 
concrete thing it is necessary and sufficie.it that the primitive concepts 
S, F, G, and H be interpreted in such a way that the resulting theory will 
in fact concern real (or supposedly real) objects. See here two, among 
many other, possible factual interpretations of the preceding formalism: 
Symbol 
s 
F(s) 
G(s, s') 
H(s,s') 
Physical interpretation 
Point on a d.c. electric circuit 
Electrical potential at s 
Intensity of current between 
sands' 
Conductivity betweens ands' 
Sociological interpretation 
Country 
Enticement offered bys 
(e.g .• standard of living) 
Migratory pressure from s to s' 
Permeability of the border between 
.sands'. 
The very same formalism is of course susceptible to further alternative 
interpretations in factual terms. For example, if Sis interpreted as the set 
of bodies, Fas the temperature, Gas the quantity of heat per unit mass, 
and H as the specific heat at constant volume, we get the nucleus of 
elementary thermology. If we interpret Sas the academic body, Fas the 
number of publications, G as professional jealousy, and H as natural 
hatred, we obtain a theoretical model of an important aspect of Academe. 
In sum, we have alternative semantical models of an abstract structure and 
each of them seems to be a theoretical model of some real system. 
But this is just a first approximation. We know, in fact, that the first 
model is inadequate (false) at low temperatures. The second model does 
not seem to have been subjected to an empirical test, so that we can assign 
it no truth value. This situation is not exceptional but common. Indeed, 
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all the theoretical models that have been checked prove to be more or less 
distant from full truth: they are not and they could not possibly be com-
pletely true, since they all involve simplifications. Consequently every 
theoretical model is, in the best of cases, a quasimode1 in the sense that 
its formulas are (at best) satisfied only approximately by reality. Therefore 
the model-theoretic concept of a model does not coincide with either of 
the two metascientific notions of model. Which shows that model theory 
is not enough to constitute the semantics of science, and suggcl>ls that the 
very term 'theoretical model' (and also 'mathematical model') would be 
advantageously replaced by 'specific theory'. 
11. CONCLUSION 
To surr. up, the terrr. 'model' designates a whole set of concepts that should 
be distinguished. 1n theoretical science, whether natural or social, the 
term seems to have been assigned two main significations: (a) that of 
schematic representation of a concrete object (i.e., model object), and (b) 
that of theory characterizing a model object. A theoretical model lives as 
long as experience tolerates it. On the other hand a general theory Jives 
as Jong as it can generate reasonably true theoretical models. Being special 
purpose devices, theoretical models are transient and disposable as com-
pared to general theories. The latter, being more adaptable, last longer. 
While the young sciences can boast, if at all, of their theoretical models, 
a mature and healthy science evolves theories of both kinds. 
NOTE 
• Based on Bunge (1968c, 1969c). 
216 
APPROVAL SHEET 
The thesis submitted by William Thomas Mooney has been 
read and approved by the following committee: 
Fr. Walter P. Krolikowski 
Professor, Foundations of Education, Loyola 
Dr. John M. Wozniak 
Professor, Foundations of Education, Loyola 
The final copies have been examined by the director of 
the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies 
the fact that any necessary changes have been incorpor-
ated and that the thesis is now given final approval by 
the Committe with reference to content and form. 
The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. 
0rwt:J1121t;-DateJ 
I 
217 
